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Vol. XXXVIII No. 1 *January-March 1982*

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

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THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION : ISSUES OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

By C. Raja Mohan* and C. Vishnu Mohan**

The international debate on information and communication became intense and acrimonious by the end of the 1970s. The publication of the Macbride Commission Report in 1980 was the high water-mark in this debate.[1] *Throughout the 1970s, the developing countries had been pressing for a new world order on information and communication as part of their struggle for a new international economic order. In the Third World, the public debate in general has been limited to issues of imbalances in the flow of international news dominated by the big four international news agencies (AP, Reuter, AFP and UPI), the efforts of the non-aligned countries to create a newspool, etc. However, the rapid strides in the field of microelectronics and its marriage to the developments in space technology has posed a number of intractable problems before the Third World, besides the issue of newsflow. The most important international fallout of the new developments in technology is the issue of transborder data flows (TDF).*[2] *The international legal, political and economic implications of data flows across national frontiers are increasingly acquiring greater significance.*

At the outset, it is essential to comprehend what the enthusiasts have been terming as the "information revolution," the coming of the "age of information" and the "information society."[3] The computer has introduced limitless possibilities for the storage, integration, analysis and accessibility of vast quantities of information. Thanks to the developments in the technology of the silicon chip—which have made possible very large scale integration of electronic circuiting onto a small chip of silicon—the computer has become more powerful, much smaller and cheaper. The advances of satellite communication technology have enabled the instantaneous movement of vast quantities of information between any two points on the earth. The convergence of these two areas—computing and communications—has led to what is now called "communications" or "telematics." (The words "informatics" or "information" are more popular.) This convergence has removed the earlier constraints of distance and costs of transmission in setting up international information networks. Tremendous concurrent advances in semiconductors, lasers, optical fibres, and electronic digitalisation offer seemingly endless and revolutionary possibilities in computer power and transmission of information. The automated "office of the future," personal and home computers, interactive

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home communication systems, a wide range of voice and video casette equipment, and many other exotic devices are increasingly coming into daily use in the major industrialized countries.[4] Many of the *Fortune 500* companies in the United States, which have been involved in manufacturing industrial products or data processing equipment are expanding into this high-growth information sector. The IBM, Exxon, Xerox, Chase Manhattan, General Electric, RCA, Aetna Insurance, Columbia Broadcasting Service have moved into information industries in a big way and are shaping its future.[5] Besides the large corporate actors, a number of small entrepreneurial endeavours by professionals are also on the scene.

Traditionally, the vendors of data processing and telecommunication equipment and services have restricted themselves to their respective specialities. The blurring boundaries among communications technologies are creating new definitions of traditional markets and distribution channels, and new conflicts among the established producers of information.[6] Telephone companies, such as the privately owned ATT in the United States and the many government-run post and telecommunication monopolies in Europe, are worried about rapid growth in private-company-leased line data traffic, impending satellite services using roof-top antennas (Direct Broadcast Satellite), the home video market (Viewdata and Teletext), electronic message switching and other new services wrought by modern electronics. IBM has launched Satellite Business Systems (SBS), Control Data has CYBERNET, and various other companies are branching out into providing equipment to facilitate link-ups and better utilize telecommunication possibilities. Publishers and broadcasting companies increasingly perceive themselves as part of the information industry and are moving in to capture new areas of data and information markets. Micrographics and electronic newspapers are showing the great potential of electronic publishing. The possibilities of "electronic mail" within and between large corporations would see the bypassing of established postal systems in the world. The increasing use of "electronic fund transfer" (EFT) and computerised personal and corporate banking in the global financial networks has reduced money to a form of data stored in a computer and moved via satellites.[7]

Technological developments in micro-electronics and telecommunications have at once generated new forces of production and encapsulated a number of older ones. As it subsumes a number of older, hitherto diverse activities such as printing, publishing, broadcasting, cultural artefact production, communications, data processing, banking, education, and the entire service sector in general, the information industry is now estimated to be one of the largest industries in the advanced countries. According to some estimates of the information industry in the United States, it accounted for more than half the United States GNP in 1979. While such estimates are based on questionable definitions, they crudely indicate a real contemporary trend.[8] As the production, distribution, storage, and processing of information assume a new place of importance in today's world, it is increasingly being realized that information, however intangible it is, is a commodity like any other. The value and importance of information is threefold:

1. Information collection, management, and distribution today consume a sizeable proportion of the financial and human capital of government and business organizations; this portion could significantly increase in the future.
2. Information has become a product and a commodity to be packaged and marketed and, as such information can be valued, bought and sold.
3. Information constitutes a national resource to which regulatory policies relating to taxation, security, sovereignty and socio-cultural values may be attached.[9]

The emergence of information as a commodity has brought about the awareness regarding the power of information. "Information is power and economic information is economic power. Information has an economic value and the ability to store and process certain types of data may well give one country political and technological advantage over other countries. This in turn may lead to a loss of national sovereignty through supranational data flows."[10]

TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

The flow of data and information, and their storage, across the boundaries of nation-states have posed a number of serious policy challenges before governments giving rise to a host of political, economic and legal questions at the international level. Hitherto, in the international debate about the new world information and communication order, the chief concern has been with the imbalances in the flow of news and print, broadcast, film and other tools of mass communication. In the area of transborder data flows (TDF), the concern is with the problems of "data flight" from sovereign states. The marriage of computers and telecommunications has led to increasing mobility of data and information which could be transferred, retrieved, copied and utilised in those countries leading to the information technology boom.

For example, the airlines' booking systems for internal domestic flights of many European countries (including Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia), depend upon a computer situated in Texas-USA. All the information required by the fire departments of Sweden is kept in a special data base in Florida. The personnel records of most transnational companies are held in the country where the company has its headquarters.[11] There are several other reasons why data is passed from one country to another. The most important of these is the nature of the dispersed international operations of the multinational corporation.

Electronic communications now play a crucial role in facilitating the daily operations, decisions, planning and record-keeping of a few thousand companies that are engaged in production, distribution and marketing in nations around the globe. The merging of computer and communication technologies is transforming the way in which MNCs operate. Today a MNC can collect data on its operations and personnel from all parts of the world, and almost instantaneously transmit such data to a single location for storage, processing and use. This provides the central management of these companies current information for decision-making on a scale which was never possible before. Plant siting and production, prices, raw material supply, currency holding and investment decisions can now be made centrally and transmitted at once to company branches all over the world. For system-wide use, the international banking industry provides similar services and facilities. Global computer and communication networks are relied upon heavily for these tasks. Private international communication networks, run by individual banks and by groups of banks, are transmitting billions of financial transactions and data annually.[12]

A supreme example of the threat to national sovereignty from trans-border data flows is seen in the case of the computerized banking system called SWIFT (Society for World Information Financial Transactions). This system allows finance houses to buy and sell in a single world market and to make loans anywhere and at any time. It means that money can be moved around the world with great rapidity and without any physical or legal hindrance. SWIFT holds 300,000 transactions at a time, some of considerable size beyond all national control. The system is run by a computer which generates a kind of "stateless money," hurling it around the globe potentially creating international currency instability as it moves. If SWIFT acquired large sums it could bring catastrophe to struggling currencies in the course of an evening. In the hands of a hostile power (a government or a MNC intent on taking retribution on a small country attempting, say, to substitute local manufactures for cheaper imports), SWIFT could be a devastating tool. Besides increasing the velocity of international money and causing currency and stock fluctuations, such devices could create a kind of electronic "free port" where funds can be placed in unregulated markets.[13] Most countries are yet to come to grips with these problems.

The furtherance of the hegemony of the MNCs and "free enterprise" in general requires the greater use of computer communications. The United States Defence establishment is today one of the largest users of computer communications. In the Pentagon's command and control structures, and in formulation of war (including nuclear war) strategies, computer and satellite communication has become crucial. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration as part of its unprecedented militarization is strengthening and modernizing its military bases and communication facilities all around the globe. The security, political and legal implications for those countries which have allowed communication bases to the United States and consequent integration through TDF into the US military strategy are only now being recognized.[14] The new satellite and computer technologies also facilitate detailed surveillance of the nations of the world by collecting, transmitting, processing the intelligence secured from numerous spy satellites orbiting the earth. Alongwith the surveillance and military communications functions —the "law and order" machinery of global domination—some satellites supply detailed, continental natural resource information, the most useful of which finds its way directly or circuitously, to the research and planning units of the big mining, mineral and agribusiness corporations.

Evidently transborder data flows are of inestimable value to the MNCs and their support structures: the banks, market research firms, advertising agencies, travel companies and the international armed forces of domination. The new communication technology creates unprecedented opportunities for the MNCs to strengthen their international operations. It also permits the advanced industrial states to maintain their ascendancy in the world system, and allows them to keep the underdeveloped countries performing less sophisticated work assignments. For this reason, there is determination among the Western decision-makers that the information industries—computer and telecommunications equipment manufacture, data processing and information services—be developed rapidly. (At the same time there is a great tussle going on between America and other Western nations which are fighting against American domination of the information industry.) The expectation is that this will permit the continuation of the familiar heirarchical international division of labour, with the already advanced industrial nations shifting another notch upward in the scale, while the newly industrializing states put their efforts into older industries.

The transborder data flow from one country to another, driven by computer/telecommunication networks, have hitherto been considered in a technical context rather than in terms of their application and socio-political impact. Increasingly however, the concerns expressed by various nations and international organizations deal with the content of messages rather than just the medium of communication involved. In this way an entirely new set of information issues has emerged. Two alarming facts of life are how facing national governments. The first is that whereas laws stop at national boundaries, data based on modern technology knows no borders. A second is the tremendous difficulty that exists in even finding out the contents of messages which cross borders electronically. In the following sections some of the legal and politico-economic issues of TDF would be discussed.

LEGAL ISSUES OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW

The international legal problems arising out of TDF fall intot hree categories. The first relates to concerns for national sovereignty and cultural identity resulting from the aggregation of transborder electronic traffic and information flow. The second refers to the problems of administration of the affairs of the state. The territorial foundation of national jurisdiction and hence of regulatory law is the immediate source of frustration for a country hoping to exercise control over the storage and data beyond its own borders. Third is the set of problems related to the rights of the individual and the legal difficulties that might arise in his/her attempt to redress wrongs in respect of personal data about him stored abroad.[15]

National Sovereignty

The issue of national sovereignty is the most recurring theme in the debate about international communications in general. The rapid developments in communication technology and their control by a few, are working towards the erosion of national sovereignty of the weaker states in the international system.[16] The issues of transborder data flow has heightened concerns about the very concept of nationhood; technology facilitating TDF it is feared would negate the possibility of secure nationhood for any who permit the unquestioned flow of data across the borders. Accumulation, storage and processing of data are part of decision-making, the effectiveness of which depends to a growing degree on access to massive amounts of data, which are manageable only when computerized. The physical location of computerized data would then appear to be an important factor in regulating access to them and therefore in affecting decision-making ability. The fact that 90 per cent of all the information in the world held in data bases is located in the United States, is the underlying basis for concerns of national sovereignty.[17] For example, the transfer of Canadian data to American data banks would mean, potentially at least, that Americans would have the means to make decisions about Canadians that depend on that data. Conversely to the extent that Canadians lack data about themselves, they would be unable to make decisions about their future. "This can result in a national self-perception of impotence, an inability to effect one's vital choices and the effective erosion of one's political sovereignty."[18]

Issues of cultural identity are also seen as related to the computerized, extra-territorial decision-making process. It has been argued that to the extent that a loss of political power results from the loss of data control, national identity succumbs to imposed cultural values, tastes and attitudes, resulting from the totality of extra-national decisions to which it submits; that is, the extraterritorial exercise of power forces acceptance of cultural norms which the use of that power would reflect. The extraterritorial storage of data has also given rise to concern about the "vulnerability" of computerised societies. If a country allows much of the basic data concerning its business, economy and administration to be stored in another country, thus requiring remote accessing through communications systems, what would happen if the data base or communication system of the foreign state suffered a catastrophic failure or sabotage?[19]

The skewed-up flows of data across national borders has given rise to thorny international legal problems. The multiplicity of international actors —nation states, international organizations, multinational enterprises—has further complicated the legal tangle. These actors engaged in international computer communications perceive advantages in pursuing either "exclusive" or "inclusive" policies over the access, content and use of transborder data flows. "Competition between the exclusive interests of information control and the inclusive interests of unrestricted transfer of information across national boundaries is the taproot of the controversy."[20] Inclusive interests consist of principles, practices and policies grouped under the general term "free flow of information." These policies promote increased sharing, use and exchange of transborder data flows. Principles, practices and policies that represent exclusive interests are grouped under the term "sovereignty over information," and promote controlled use, restricted access, conservation, denial and decreased transfer of data across borders.

States and Domestic Regulation

The curious problems of computerized data traffic and storage are clearly recognisable when its impact on domestic regulatory processes are assessed. The most apparent source of difficulty arises from the territorial limitations of public law. Storage and processing of data beyond the territorial limits of a nation-state necessarily hampers the exercise of state control over the data, unless it is permitted by means of some form of bilateral or multilateral agreement. The foreign location of data, irrespective of the motives for storing data in a foreign country, renders domestic regulation of such data virtually impossible. There is also the possibility that "data havens" would emerge, similar to "tax havens", with sensitive data being shipped to countries without data protection laws.[21] There is also the possibility of electronic tax evasion. Computer service networks can bill a client in whichever country suits his fiscal circumstances.[22] Domestic regulation would also be difficult in areas of monetary policy where aggregated data is necessary for determining credit levels. Thus domestic public control would be frustrated in a number of policy areas.

Regulatory problems may also arise in relation to domestic legal procedures. Data storage abroad poses problems regarding the production of data as evidence in court, either by subpoena or warrant. Since data is subject to the law of the place where it is stored, a foreign jurisdiction can apply its own laws of evidence or confidentiality to prohibit its production, even if no such prohibition applies in the laws of the state seeking access. Concerns about data havens become more understandable in this context; one has only to look at the total inaccessibility of information about bank deposits in some European states. Here the possibilities of "data extradition", and "*habeas data*" are being talked about.

Rights of Individuals

Another aspect of TDF often discussed is, of course, its impact on the civil rights of individuals as "data subjects." This has usually been examined in the context of privacy, computers and other information systems. The increase in computer-aided data processing has produced a fundamental change in records management and use, and a corresponding need to enlarge the scope of privacy rights. The familiar notions of statutory protection against unreasonable search and seizure, which were sufficient in the 19th century when whatever records one maintained were likely to be located at home or some other physical setting controlled by the individual, are clearly inadequate in the advanced societies today when many personal records are created, held and used by large institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and most importantly, governments. Vital decisions affecting citizens' lives are usually made by such distant and impersonal institutions on the basis of personal records whose existence and contents are often unknown to the citizens and whose use or misuse is just beyond their economic and legal control.[23]

Issues of civil liberties and privacy of individuals take on an added dimension in the light of extra-territorial storage of data and TDF. When an individual's rights in respect of personal data stored in an automated data bank arise from obligations imposed upon data bank operators, the law of the place of data, and not the law of the domicile of the data subject tends to apply. Such rights might consist of a right of personal access, verification, and challenge, and possibly some measure of control in determining the extent of the dissemination of that data. But divergence between domestic and foreign law could nullify the civil rights of data subjects. More complications could emerge when a data bank is located in a foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding the rigours of domestic law. Besides the issues stemming from the gulf between domestic and foreign law, the problem of distance raises a number of questions relating to redress of privacy violations in a foreign jurisdiction. Would a plaintiff have to travel to a foreign jurisdiction in order to bring action against the operator of a data bank? Would he/she have any standing before the foreign court? Alternatively, in cases where foreign law may endow the court of a plaintiff's domicile with competence, what is the applicable law? And what rules of evidence apply?[24]

Resistance to Information Hegemony of the United States

Underlying the legal issues of TDF posed in abstract, is the simmering struggle against the preponderant American information hegemony, being challenged by other developed countries of the West, and to a lesser extent by the Third World. The challenge to the American hegemony in the information industry has virtually become a fight against the IBM. Standing like a colossus over the United States information industry, the IBM has become a global force. Its debut in space age communications system through the SBS would make it even more powerful. It has been noted that the vast bulk of automated data bases are located in the Uinted States and most data flows consist of storage of data in the latter country and its manipulation by its firms for others.

The growing controversy over TDF issues which began primarily with concern over personal privacy and individual rights is beginning to reveal several other areas of economic and commercial concern. The United States domination in the information industry has caused considerable apprehensions in Canada, Japan and Western Europe.[25] These countries have considerable investments in information and communication technologies and view the American dominance with alarm. The future trade advantages in capturing the burgeoning information market around the world, are pushing Canada, Japan and Western Europe to protect domestic markets and encourage domestic industry. The fears of these countries have been well documented in France, Canada and Sweden.

In France, there was the celebrated report—*L'Informatisation de la Societe* (also called the Nora-Minc Report)—in June 1978.[26] The report catalogued in detail French fears about the role of the Uinted States in computing, data processing and telecommunications. It made a strong case for France regaining its own destiny in the area of informatics; it was pointed that the *"informatisation"* of society would have serious consequences for France, socially, economically and culturally. Foreign firms, primarily IBM, must not be allowed to be instruments of foreign, primarily US, dominance. It also recommended restructuring of post, telephone and telegraph (PTT) administrations so that the telecommunications portion could be redirected to interact closely with other high technology areas. Another important assertion was that mastery of electronic component technologies was essential for national independence. The Nora-Minc Report represents the initiation of a serious French commitment to information independence.

The Canadians too have highlighted the need for building a domestic industry in information technology. In 1980, the Canadian Deputy Minister of Communications, Bernard Ostry reaffirmed Canada's determination to avoid becoming a passive consumer of knowledge and information: "If a country allows all its vital data on business, economy and culture to be stored outside its borders, it becomes alarmingly dependent on the integrity and reliability of foreign enterprises that provide its computer services."[27]

A large number of Canadian firms in the fields of banking, insurance, mining, consumer industries store and process their data in the United States. The Canadian Government has highlighted the effects of such data flow on its employment and the economy; dependence on the United States resulted in loss of revenue to the tune of $150 to $300 m in 1976, according to an estimate by the Department of Communications, Canada. Further, this practice cost Canadians 30,000 to 40,000 jobs through either loss or lack of creation.[28] It has also been suggested that if this trend continued unchecked, it could result by 1985 in some $1.5 billion worth of Canadian computing services being displaced by work performed in the United States. It was estimated that over the same time about 25,000 directly related data processing jobs could be established in the United States to meet Canadian requirements. Another estimate puts the total number of jobs involved at 100,000 by 1985.[29]

REGULATION OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS

The potential deleterious impact of transborder data flows on employment, the economy and the development and utilization of advanced information technologies has led a number of developed countries to consider the imposition of restrictions, including taxation, on data flows across national frontiers. However, the curious and intangible nature of trade in information would make it very difficult to devise and enforce restrictions. A large number of developed countries—Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland—have adopted national laws for data protection. So far most of the national legislation is concerned with personal privacy issues.

These legislations have a number of common features. Nearly all of them place restrictions on the export of personal data and usually demand the existence of comparable laws in the recipient country. There are limitations on the length of time data can be stored and regulations on secondary use, sharing and dissemination of data. The European approach has been to create a new government agency, empowering it to draw rules and regulations and giving it broad powers over data processing agencies. They also emphasise the need for a binding international treaty to deal with data exchanges between nation states.[30]

A number of international organizations are also seized of the issues relating to TDF. The OECD set up an intergovernmental working party on information, computer and communications policies (ICCP), for studying the social and economic implications of TDF. The working party prepared draft guidelines to harmonize various national efforts in the personal privacy area.[31] The Council of Europe has also been active in this area. It has proposed a convention on international data protection. The convention commits the ratifying states to enact a legislation requiring that personal data be lawfully obtained, accurate and relevant and that its use be restricted to approved purposes. Any information recorded on race, politics, religion, health, sexual behaviour and criminality is subject to extra safeguards, although the convention may be overridden in extreme cases involving state security, public fraud and crime.[32] The United States was invited to participate in drafting the treaty with the further option of acceding to its terms if agreeable. However, it refused to participate citing "free flow" considerations.

The official policy of the United States has been elaborated in a policy statement on international communication submitted to the Congress in 1979. The document clearly describes national security, political, economic and technological interests that the United States has as the leading exporter of communication and information equipment worth $5 billion a year. "Our economic interest is obvious. Our industrial base relies on adequate communications; large corporations have become increasingly dependent on world-wide computer circuits. Moreover, USA is the world's largest producer and consumer of telecommunications equipment and services."[33] An inter-agency task force on TDF research and policy co-ordination chaired by the Department of State and National Telecommunications and Information Administration has been set up to formulate US positions in the OECD. This task force has been charged with the objective of assuring access to US MNCs, to efficient information systems and opportunities to market internationally data processing and data bank services.[34]

The official United States policy reflects the general sense of uneasiness about the motives of the European data protection laws. The data protection laws passed in the name of personal privacy are seen in the United States as a mere facade to protect domestic economic interests and caused by frustration resulting from the long American lead in the field of computer communications. The Americans argue that the European data protection medicine might prove more deadly than the malady it was intended to cure.[35] American trade associations in the field of information are exerting considerable pressure on the government to oppose any restrictive regimes on transborder data flows.[36] In spite of the intensifying "data wars" among the developed countries,[37] a trend of tie-ups between American and European firms in the information industry is also in the offing. American SBS has been looking around to internationalise its operations. It has started negotiations with the French Telecommunication Authority whose satellite Telecom I is compatible with SBS space systems. SBS is also negotiating with the British Telecommunication Authority and British Aerospace.[38]

THE THIRD WORLD AND TDF

The vast majority of the information resources—both natural and industrial—are controlled by a tiny section of mankind. Modern information technologies, generated by a handful of developed countries, enable their users to acquire, hold and to retrieve information more efficiently than ever before. Knowledge regarding mineral resources, atmosphere, market conditions or technology itself provide the nations and companies which have it with enormous advantages in the global system. Indeed the information-backwardness of the developing countries cripples them in their struggle for a new international economic order.

The case of the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979 (WARC-79) at which complex technical arguments over the allocation of the frequencies of the radio spectrum were carried out, is an apt example where the Third World's information impotence led to its inability to technically argue out a just case. The basic argument of the Third World was that the radio frequency spectrum was a capacity of nature and hence the property of entire mankind. Its allocation therefore should be equitable and not monopolised by a few developed nations. The United States, strongly opposed to this, successfully managed to retain its hegemony over the use of the spectrum by taking recourse to complex technical arguments. The American delegation to WARC-79 had a staff of more than 100 compared with one or two from some of the smaller countries. Nearly a 1,000 people had been involved in preparing the US proposals for this conference. It mapped out with its formidable computer expertise a negotiating position covering the entire spectrum from I hertz to 387 gigahertz, with a complex set of fall-back positions. The delegation had also collected all-known facts concerning the stand of the other delegations. The entire information could be held on line and retrieved in a few monents. This tremendous information base provided the United States the power to shape the conference.[39] This is also true of other international negotiations in various issue-areas. According to a study, "Discussions on the reform of the international monetary system, or on the allocation of resources of the sea and space have thus often been pre-empted by the more powerful nations, leaving the developing countries with only a 'yes, but...' role or encouraging them to politicize issues as a substitute for the technical arguments which they did not possess."[40]

The fundamental issue, however, arising from the new information technology and transborder flow of data is the certain possibility of centralization and control of information in the traditional centers of global power, reinforcing the dependence of the Third World on the West and its multinationals. The new information technologies and the global context of their use could seriously erode the already fragile sovereignty of the nascent nation-state in the Third World in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Unhindered data flows across the borders while strengthening MNCs would weaken the developing nations. Availability and quality of information is one of the key elements of the power of MNCs, and the structure of modern MNCs is information-dependent.[41] The ability of MNCs to appropriate information is perhaps as important as its R & D capacity and the control it exercises over markets and technology.[42] The power of MNCs rests as much upon their capacity to marshall and control information and knowledge in a proprietary way as much as their dominance in directly productive activities. Information handling capacity which provides the MNCs considerable economic and political leverage in their interaction with LDCs is concentrated in the West. Much of the information which is gathered, processed and stored for retrieval is not available, easily and cheaply, to the developing countries.

Remote Sensing and National Sovereignty

Modern remote sensing technology illustrates in a dramatic fashion the loss of sovereignty in the Third World resulting from modern information and communications technologies. Carried on for a number of years, originally with high altitude aircraft and now by satellites, remote sensing techniques are utilized to survey the earth and its diverse features, including agriculture, forestry, hydrology, oceanography and mineral resources. Computer and data systems store and process the large amount of data secured. It is only those nations capable of making and launching remote sensing satellites and equally capable of processing electronically the data derived from the satellites that occupy a totally privileged position, for raw data is not of much use. The differential capacity to sense the earth and interpret the data has placed the developing countries at a serious disadvantage. At present only the United States NASA's *Landset* series of satellites have the ability to comprehensively map the planetary resources. On the basis of its supremacy over remote sensing technology the Uinted States has already developed large data bases on the natural resources of developing nations; the knowledge derived from this unilateral capability permits it to secure a comprehensive inventory of the physical characteristics of any nation regardless of that state's willingness to have such a geographical profile developed. Moreover, it allows the United States to process that data for whichever purpose it may desire, without the consent of the nation sensed.

The United States has made available (at a nominal price) the raw data obtained from remote sensing to any nation which requested it. However, very few developing countries are in a position to process and utilize it. On the other hand the major US transnationals dealing in minerals and agricultural commodities have formed themselves into user committees of satellite information.[43] Thus when a developing country deals with these US transnationals on the global market, the knowledge of the MNCs about the resources of the developing country is far superior to the information of the country about its own resources.

Remote sensing poses two issues both affecting national sovereignty. First, there is the basic inviolability of national space. Remote sensing is indifferent to this national prerogative. Second, there is the unequal capability to use the data derived from remote sensing; undoubtedly, the advanced countries can use remote-sensing technology to increase their political and economic power relative to the weaker countries. Knowledge of likely oil deposits, projections of crop yields and better estimates of mineral concentrations can help the governments and multinationals of the developed countries make better judgements and bids in the international markets. The growing usefulness of remote sensing technology has made the US corporations to push for shifting the LANDSAT system from under NASA to private ownership. The French too are seeking to enter the market for remotely sensed data. They have recently formed a company SPOT-IMAGE to acquire and sell remotely sensed data.

The developing countries correctly apprehend that in future they might virtually lose control over their own natural resources, for at the global level there are very few rules governing the gathering and dissemination of data on natural resources. The orbiting cameras in space are "visa-less" and bypass national authority.[44] At the present time remote-sensing technology is an American monopoly. The primary data is available to all takers. However, the processed data is treated as proprietary information. The developing countries have been demanding at the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) a set of norms and rules which would ensure the sovereignty of the developing nations. However, the United States, has been obstructing this process in the name of "free flow of information."[45]

Towards Information Autonomy in the Third World

The issues of informatics in general and transborder data flows in particular, are yet to attain an important place in the agenda before the Third World. A few countries have indeed taken halting measures in restricting transborder data flows. Brazil now requires the registration of foreign data links, not so much in order to control the data content, but help facilitate local data processing services and to strengthen its informatics industry. Venezuela embargoes the external movement of data related to oil production and Mexico has made foreign flows of information of Mexican origin subject to rules and regulations on grounds of national interest.[46] However, most of the developing countries are yet to formulate coherent policies with regard to transborder data flows. Moreover, it is necessary to formulate policies regarding TDF in the overall context of the assessment of the relevance of information technology to the developing countries. The inclusion of informatics in research and action related to domestic development and its external dimensions is essential. Whatever progress is made in redressing inequalities in international news exchange (the only area in which the developing countries have taken some comprehensive action), without self-reliance and sovereign control in the expanding informatics field, equality and independence will remain diplomatic phrases.

The Inter-governmental Bureau of Informatics (IBI) has been the major international organisation working towards the creation of the informatics industry in the Third World. Originally formed as the International Computation Centre (ICC), under the auspices of UNESCO, it served the computing needs of the Third World, when very few computers existed in the world. The proliferation of data processing equipment led to modification of the objectives of ICC. The IBI was born in 1974 and it currently handles a variety of informatics projects for its member countries, which include a large number of developing countries.

The IBI's 1978 Conference at Torremolinos, Spain, on Strategies and Policies for Informatics (SPIN), argued for clear universal access to and implementation of informatics, while recognising the current limitations on money, manpower and infrastructure necessary to close the development gap. The major recommendation of the conference was that developing countries

> should recognise the necessity for a national informatics policy with a view to introducing a comprehensive strategy which should be planned with regard to: the definition of application priorities; the elaboration of a policy governing action to be taken in the matter of acquiring informatics equipment, the drawing up of programmes for training technical and administrative specialists; the formulation of a coherent studies and research policy; and the setting up of a national informatics industry for both software and hardware.[47]

The IBI is launching its second SPIN Conference to be held at Havana in June 1983. The IBI has set SPIN II a target of raising $1,000 million over five years. The fund is broadly intended to assist the development of informatics in the Third World.

The urgency for the creation of a general policy for the development of informatics is felt only in a few nations of the Third World, notably Brazil and India. In India, space technology grew rapidly in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s with some spectacular achievements—launching of SLV-3, Bhaskhara series of remote sensing satellites, APPLE and INSAT-I. However, the computer and electronics technology, the other major component of modern information technology, has been unable to keep pace with world developments. There was indeed an Indian policy of strict centralised control over the import of electronics technology. This protectionist barrier was not however, matched by an effective policy to develop R & D and industrial capabilities in modern micro-electronics. Pressures are now building up to liberalise the import of electronics technology and thus stymie even the existing domestic capabilities in computers and electronics.

APPRAISAL

Our rather cursory look at the information revolution has shown the enormous importance of the technology of informatics. The problem of TDF could be the thin end of the wedge of a whole range of problems surrounding the emergence of information technology. Our analysis of TDF reveals the great threat to national sovereignty in the Third World in the political, economic, strategic and cultural spheres. In India, there is an urgent need to formulate coherent and comprehensive policies for the development of the informatics technology, and grappling with the problems of TDF has to be part of that. Moreover, the national policy regarding informatics would have to be extremely judicious. In the West, the spectre of unemployment haunts the rapid growth of microelectronics and information technologies. In a developing country like India, if the introduction of informatics is not judicious, it could aggravate unemployment problems.

The Third World in general, and India in particular, would therefore have to grapple with the problems of transborder data flows at both international and domestic levels. At the global level to resist the threat to national sovereignty, the need for a comprehensive national legislation regulating the flow of information and data across our borders is immediate. Viable technical mechanisms would have to be devised to keep a track of and have control over the transborder data traffic generated by multinational corporations. India and other advanced Third World nations should strive at the global level to devise an appropriate regime on transborder data flows. Efforts to build such a regime would have to mesh in with the drive to construct an equitable regime on outer space and the establishment of a new world information and communication order.

Such a global strategy on TDF would have to be complemented with a domestic effort for the development of informatics, the key function of which would be to ensure that the developing countries are not critically dependent on the West for their computing and data processing needs. Such a strategy would make it imperative to have a clear assessment of the relevance of rapidly advancing informatics technology to the needs of the Third World. A national informatics policy thus needs to clearly identify the specific sectors and the extent to which informatics could be applied without engendering social tensions, through labour displacement. Given the character of informatics technology, the policy framework must therefore be integrated with the strategies to develop space, microelectronics and computer technologies in a self-reliant manner. This is not an easy task because the above technologies are highly sophisticated and the industrial infrastructure in the developing countries is backward, weak and fragile. It is also essential to create new institutional mechanisms to pursue the development of informatics. Where such mechanisms exist (the National Informatics Centre at New Delhi, India), they need to be expanded and strengthened. These new institutions would also be burdened with the task of coordinating the wide range of governmental and non-governmental entities involved in the production, dissemination and use of informatics. These include the modern sectors in the government such as electronics, space and the older governmental institutions like Post and Telegraph, Communication, Information and Broadcasting, Census bureaus, statistical bureaus, etc. The private sector is also involved in a major way. The problem of devising a national informatics policy is indeed a tall order and it cannot be solved unless initiative comes from the highest political levels of decision-making in the Third World.

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THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

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"You can never plan the future by the past."—Edmund Burke

A central theme of contemporary literature on American political parties—a theme with a broad consensus that is uncommon in the discipline—is that the party system of the United States is in transition due to significant changes within the past two decades that distinguish the operation of today's party system from what it was before 1960. *However, consensus is lacking as to the implications of these changes for the future status of the American party system.*

This paper has four broad objectives: 1. *to review briefly the phenomenon of party re-alignment in American history as a useful perspective on the present party era;* 2. *to identify and discuss significant alterations in the party system since* 1960*;* 3. *to note various scenarios in the literature concerning the future of the party system in 'the United States and* 4. *to hazard a personal assessment of the scenarios as to their plausibility and probability.*

I

EARLY AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS[1]

American electoral history is often divided by political historians into five "party systems," each distinguishable from the other either by different existing political parties or by different competitive relationships of the existing parties. The transition from one party system to another has been marked commonly by a re-aligmment, sudden or secular.

The First Party System, 1788-1824

The first party era[2] began with the election of George Washington as the first Federalist President in 1788, when the new Constitution became operative. During the second administration of Washington, 1793-1797, an opposing faction developed within the Congress under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson, and in 1800, Jefferson was elected as the first President of the Republican-Democrats. When the latter party was also successful in the three succeeding presidential contests, the Federalist Party disappeared. In the ensuing period—1816 to 1824—also known as "the era of good feeling," the Republican-Democrats were unchallenged.

The central issue that divided the Federalist and Republican-Democrat parties was the attitude of their supporters towards the central government.

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The Federalists, dominated by the commercial and financial interests of the more populous northeast, favoured a strong national government with enhanced powers. The Jeffersonians, representing the farmers and rural dwellers of the South and the artisans and other workers of the northern cities, resented the aristocratic tendencies of the Federalists and called for more power for the states.

These first national political parties represented and channelled the emerging pluralism of the new nation and offered choices and vehicles for political participation to the electorate. By developing effective organization at the state and local levels, the Republican-Democrats became the first "modern" political party, based on broad grass-roots support among the voting population, rather than being a mere faction in the national Congress, as was the case with the Federalists.[3]

The Second Party System, 1824-1860

Party competition reappeared with the factionalizing of the dominant Republican-Democrat Party in the 1824 elections; in the elections of 1828, there emerged from this renewed competition the Whigs, representing substantially the same constituencies as the former Federalists and the Democrats, so renamed from the earlier Republican-Democrats and led by the war hero of the battle of New Orleans in 1814, Andrew Jackson. These two parties competed for national power fairly until the 1850's; this period was characterized by increased mass participation and strengthened party organization spurred by party competition.

The salient issue of slavery made it difficult for the existing two parties to cope with the severe sectional differences within their ranks; when the Whigs and the Democrats temporized and compromised about this issue third parties appeared to recognize the insistent demand in the North for the abolition of slavery. One of these, the Republican Party, with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, replaced the exhausted Whigs as the second dominant party.

The Third Party System, 1860-1896

The intense conflicts preceding and following the Civil War resulted in a basic regional re-alignment of party identifiers and supporters, with the older Democratic Party dominant in the South and the new Republican Party dominant in the North. But this regional pattern of partisanship was substantially softened by a measurable amount of support from each party in both regions. The period following the Reconstruction era was characterized by alternative control of the national executive and legislative branches by the Republicans and Democrats, with the sharpest party competition in American history.[4]

Two realities are noteworthy concerning this third party system. First, it was only during this period that a stable two-party system developed, for the first party system was one-party-dominant and the second party system was an unstable, multi-party one. Secondly, the two parties of this period have remained dominant in American political history ever since, for well over a hundred years, and the subsequent re-alignments of the fourth and fifth party systems merely changed the relative competitive position of the Democratic and Republican parties.

The appearance of third parties (most notable the Populists in the Midwest and the South), together with the recession of 1893, weakened the Democratic Party. In the critical elections of 1896, the militant presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, representing a coalition of Democrats and Populists, resulted in a clear victory for William McKinley, the Republican candidate, and the emergence of the fourth party system.

The Fourth Party System, 1896-1932

The elections of 1896 represented a re-alignment in two ways. First, it moved the Republican Party into the position of the majority party; this electoral dominance was to continue until 1932.[5] Secondly, the discriminating issue—basis for the fourth party system was economic, differing from the slavery issue of the Civil War period. The Republican Party advocated rapid industrialization coupled with a *laissez faire* opposition to governmental regulation of the economy while the Democrats represented the intense concern of the agrarian populists and the working classes *re* the abuses of unrestrained capitalism. These issues led to the more economically advanced and advantaged areas of the North solidly supporting the Republican Party and the backward and depressed areas of the South in strong support of the Democratic Party. In the early decades of the twentieth century, party competition was largely confined to the border states and some mountain states.

The Fifth Party System, 1932 to Date

Following the Great Depression of 1929 and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, the Democrats emerged as the majority party nationally and the fifth party system began. In the forty-eight years from 1932 to 1980, the Republicans controlled the Congress for only four years, i.e., 1947-49 and 1953-55, while the party competition for the presidency was markedly closer. The Republicans controlled the office of president for one-third of this period, i.e., 1953-61 and 1969-77, including the landslide victory of President Nixon in 1972.

Roosevelt's New Deal Coalition reflected the policy biases of his tenure of over twelve years: the urban workers, the less prosperous farmers, ethnics, Catholics, Jews, racial minorities, northern white liberals and "the solid South." The minority coalition of the Republican Party consisted of the manufacturing, financial, and commercial interests (including small town businessmen), the more prosperous farmers, Protestants, and the better educated and more affluent middle class.[6] This social class basis of party support, in some ways, resembled the class basis of partisan support in the Jacksonian phase of the second party system. Changes in this party system and their significance for the future are the primary foci of this essay.

II

CHANGES IN THE FIFTH PARTY SYSTEM

Reviewing the above history of party re-alignments in the United States, one notes that, contemporary analysts of each of the previous four party systems appeared either oblivious to or careless of the forces and events that were moving the system from one era to another. Judging the future significance of occuring phenomena is never easy; 'tis more manageable, retrospectively to identify and assess past phenomenon, e.g., in the present context, to relate specific past political developments to stages of the party system.

To their credit, contemporary party analysts are making a serious attempt at a prospective, rather than a retrospective, analysis of changes in the present party system. Since, in the past a significant party re-alignment took place on the average of every 36 to 38 years[7] and since the present party system dates from 1932, a possible sixth party re-alignment could, based on past experience, have been reasonably expected by 1968 or shortly thereafter.

Almost a plethora of books, monographs, and articles have been written within the past decade or so concerning important changes in the present major political parties.[8] The inventory and analysis of these changes are wide-ranging. To lend some coherence to the discussion of recent changes in the fifth party system, the threefold typology of meanings of "party" by Professor Key in the mid-sixties[9] will be employed here, *viz.*, party-in the-electorate (i.e., changes in party identification, support, and loyalty), party-in-the-party (i.e., changes in the organization and activities of the parties), and party-in-the-government (i.e., changes in the operation of the party in the Presidency and the Congress).

Changes in the Party-in-the-Electorate

There have been significant changes in the New Deal coalitions of both the Democrats and the Republicans[10] that were formed in the Roosevelt period. Chronologically the first change was in the traditional regional support base of the two parties. The rural and agrarian South was quite at home in the New Deal coalition of the 1930s, with the Democratic Party's programme for agricultural recovery, but as the South industrialized and as the agenda of the Democratic Party emphasized civil rights and other egalitarian policies, the loyalty of the southern whites began to erode. Thus, the South gave Roosevelt 69 per cent of its vote in 1944, but in the next presidential election in 1948, Truman obtained but 52 per cent of their vote. In 1952 and 1960, the Democratic candidate polled barely a majority in the South. This secular decline has continued to date, interrupted only by the Johnson landslide of 1964 and the elections of 1976, when Georgian Carter carried all but one southern state. But the increasing Republican character of the South was accentuated in 1980, when Carter carried only one southern state, his own.[11]

Similarly, there has been an erosion in the traditional republicanism of the Middle Atlantic and Northeastern regions. The elites of the regions firmly supported the Republican Party from the post-Civil War period until the 1960's. However, since then, there has been a secular shift towards the Democratic Party; until today these regions are the most liberal and democratic in the country. Two primary causes for this shift are the continued increase in the number of blacks in the regions and the transformation of the economy of these northern regions from an industrial to a post-industrial stage, with a strongly Democratic elite.

There has been a marked change in Democratic support among groups prominently associated with Roosevelt's New Deal majority. Roosevelt and Truman carried the farmers, manual workers, city dwellers, Jews and Catholics with much higher majorities than with the public at large. With the exception of Kennedy in 1960 in the case of Catholics, and of Johnson's strong support among workers in 1964, there has been a decided drop in the support level of these New Deal Democratic groups, until in 1980, Carter led by only 8 per cent points among union members and by but 7 per cent points among Jewish voters while the farm vote and almost 40 per cent of the Catholic vote was strongly in support for Reagan.[12]

Professor Ladd describes these changes as "an inversion of the New Deal class order."[13] Professors Nie, Verba and Petrocik summarize the results of these changes as follows : a Democratic electorate that has become "more black, less Southern, and have developed a larger silk-stocking component" and a Republican electorate that has become "more Southern, less black, more Catholic, and relatively less of a silk stocking and Protestant party."[14]

There have been four salient changes in party identification since 1960. The period indicates a secular decline in the proportion of citizens who identify themselves as Republicans though with a decided increase following the Republican victory in 1980. Thus, in 1960 Republican Party identifiers represented 32 per cent of the electorate, 24 per cent in 1964, 28 per cent in 1968, 24 per cent in 1972 and a low of 21 per cent in 1976. On the other hand, Democratic identifiers in the same presidential years were 46 per cent in 1960, 54 per cent in 1964, 40 per cent in 1968, 42 per cent in 1972, and 46 per cent in 1976—much more of a stable pattern of party identification.[15] In February 1981, various polls showed an appreciable gain in Republican identifiers and a comparable drop in the Democratic identifiers. Thus, a

Washington Post-ABC poll on 19-20 February reported that 32 per cent identified as Democrats and 25 per cent as Republican—a margin of only 7 per cent for the Democrats in contrast with the 25 per cent Democratic margin in 1976. During the same post-1980 election period, Richard Wirthin, Reagan's campaign pollster, found an identification distribution of 34 per cent Democrats and 25 per cent Republicans, or a 9 per cent Democratic margin, and two Gallup polls showed a Democratic margin of a high of 6 points and a low of two points (contrasted with a Gallup 12 per cent spread between the party identifiers at the time of the November election).[16] How permanent this pattern would be remains to be seen, since it is not uncommon for the winning presidential party to pick up new identifiers in the period following an election.

The second important change within the past two decades in party identification is a decided drop in the strength and intensity of attachment to both parties. Analyses of the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan reveal that the number of strong Democratic identifiers declined from 21 per cent in 1960 to 15 per cent in 1976, and the proportion of strong Republican identifiers dropped from 14 per cent in 1960 to 9 per cent in 1976. The third change, a function of the drop in party identifiers, is the striking increase in those voters who describe themselves as "independents." Here the increase has been secular: 21 per cent in 1960, 23 per cent in 1964, 28 per cent in 1968, 31 per cent in 1972, 32 per cent in 1976, and 44 per cent in 1980.[17] The post-election polls referred to above reflected a slight drop in the number of independents, *viz.*, the *Post-ABC* poll 43 per cent and the Wirthin poll 41 per cent.

The fourth significant change since the 1960 elections is that, voters are increasingly less likely to see party as the basis for evaluating candidates. As educational levels have been raised and as most voters now obtain more of their information concerning candidates and issues from the media, the importance of party identification in influencing vote decisions has steadily declined.[18] Nie, Verba, and Petrocik sum up these changes in party identification and support thus : "Citizens are less likely to identify with a party, to feel positively about a party or to be guided in their voting behaviour by partisan cues."[19]

Other evidence of the weakening of the parties-in-the-electorate is the steady decrease in straight-ticket voting, from a high of 65 per cent in 1960, plummeting to 43 per cent in 1964, 34 per cent in 1968 and 33 per cent in 1972 and 1976. This phenomenon of ticket-splitting is common to both parties at the national, state and local levels, though it has been more common at the presidential level than at the congressional and state levels, somewhat more common among Republicans than Democrats, and less common among Democrats in 1976 than in 1968, 1972 and 1980.[20]

Still further indications of lessening party loyalty are the apparent increases in third-party movements since the mid-sixties (particularly in 1968 and 1980), the prevalence of divided governments in the post-War II period (in the years between 1946 and 1980, for almost half of the time, i.e., 16 years, the Presidency was controlled by one party and the Congress by the other), and the increasing volatility of voting behaviour, particularly at the presidential level. In the six presidential elections since 1960, three Democratic candidates have been elected and three Republican candidates. In three of these elections, the results were very close while the other three were landslide victories.[21]

Another important change in the-party-in-the electorate since 1920 is of the voter turnout; it was at a high of 62 per cent in the presidential elections of 1960, but in each succeeding presidential contest, the turnout has dropped. Thus, in 1964 it was 60 per cent, in 1968 58 per cent, in 1972 55 per cent, and in 1976, a shade lower at 54.6 per cent.[22] And only about 53 per cent of the nation's voting age population of 160.5 million went to the polls in 1980, the lowest turnout since 1948.[23]

Further, several party analysts have noted the effects of cross-cutting issues in undermining the New Deal governing coalition. Some of these de-aligning issues—race, urban riots, Vietnam, and Watergate—help explain the decline in party identification, ticket-splitting, the Wallace movement in 1968, and the landslides of 1964 and 1972.[24] Other so-called "social issues"—law and order, crime, and life-styles—in the middle and late seventies further destabilized earlier voting patterns of the 1930's and 1940's. In the 1980 election these were the "single" issues of abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, school busing and prayers in the public schools that cut across party lines, still further eroding the partisan voting patterns of the New Deal period.

Changes in Party-in-the-Party

Party organizations played a central and crucial role in presidential politics upto, and including, the presidential election of 1968.[25] Most of the delegates to the quadrennial presidential nominating conventions were party activists selected by a process which was dominated by party leaders. The loyalty of the delegates was thus to the party chiefs, not to the presidential aspirants, and presidential nominations were determined by bargaining and negotiations between coalitions of party leaders, with each leader delivering the votes of his delegate supporters.

Party leaders also had an important role in the presidential campaign; the presidential nominee relied heavily on the party chiefs, both those of his winning nominating coalition and those who supported other candidates at the convention. They aided him in developing campaign strategies and in mobilizing the support of the state and local party organizations in the determinative functions of raising money, staging rallies, canvassing the voters, distributing campaign literature and getting the vote on election day. The national chairman of the party was chosen by the presidential nominee and later he was made his campaign manager.

The parties' role in presidential politics entered a new phase after 1968.[26]

At the 1968 Democratic Convention, a process was begun that drastically altered the traditional dominance of party leaders and their party regulars in presidential nominations by 1980. Eugene McCarthy, Senator from Minnesota, representing the anti-Vietnam War Democrats, entered most of the 1968 presidential primaries winning a substantial majority support of 40 per cent of the convention delegates elected by primaries. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey entered no primaries, but relied on the support of President Johnson and most of the state party leaders. When Humphrey was nominated by the Chicago Convention, McCarthy supporters, claiming "grass-roots" support of party members, created boisterous scenes within the hall while their supporters' demostrations outside in the city's streets developed into a riot and were projected nation-wide on the television screens.

To placate the rage of the dissidents and unify the Party for the upcoming campaign, the Convention created a commission to reform the rules for delegate selection, The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (called the McGovern-Fraser Commission, after its co-chairmen), operated from 1969-1971 making a series of recommendations that were accepted by the Democratic National Committee for the 1972 Convention. Two subsequent commissions, the Mikulski Commission (1972-74) and the Winograd Commission (1975-1978), modified the McGovern-Fraser rules somewhat for the 1976 and 1980 Democratic conventions.

These rule changes aimed at a broader participation in delegate selection by party members and at more representation for women, youth, and minorities among the state delegations and required that, at all stages of delegate selection, the delegations be proportional to the presidential preferences expressed by the primary voters or in non-primary conventions. The Republican Party, in a slower and somewhat less extreme manner, paralleled these changes in their own delegate selection procedures. Moreover, these rule changes in both parties were accompanied by (or perhaps contributed to) a marked increase in the selection of convention delegates by presidential primaries. While there were but 17 Democratic and 16 Republican primaries in 1968, by 1980 there were 34 Democratic conventions and 33 Republican conventions at which over 75 per cent delegates were selected.

The overall result of the rule changes and the proliferation of primaries has been the almost complete loss of control by party regulars and party leaders in the presidential nomination process. The "old presidential elite" of faithful party supporters and financial contributors, together with the party's main elected public officials (Governors, Senators and Representatives), were replaced by a "new presidential elite" of lawyers, teachers, and other professional persons and leaders of women, youth and minority groups, with a marked drop in the proportion of businessmen, workers, farmers, and public office holders. Jeanne Kirkpatrick asserts that the new presidential elite in both parties is less representative of the party rank-andfile members, with the Democratic delegates decidedly more liberal than the membership of the Democratic Party and the Republican delegates more conservative than the Republican Party membership.[27]

The role of the party organization and its activists in the presidential campaign has also been greatly diminished by the increased tendency of the presidential nominees to rely on their own staffs of pollsters, issue specialists, speech writers and public relations experts instead of on the national and state party committees and their party workers. Also, the increased use of television in campaigning enables the presidential candidate to enter the living rooms of the voter without the intervention of party workers. And the public financing of presidential nomination and election campaigns since 1976 relieves the party organization of its traditional money-raising function.

The crimes associated with the Watergate break-in of 1972 and the subsequent illegal cover-up for two years were perpetuated by the Nixon Administration and not by the Republican Party. But, ironically, one of the chief outcomes of the Watergate period was a campaign finance law that further weakened the national political parties. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, as amended in 1974 and 1976, places severe limits on political contributions by both individuals and interest groups and on the campaign expenditure of presidential aspirants (in 1980, $10 million nomination expenditures and $29.4 million for general election expenditures), if public financing is accepted (upto $50 per cent of nomination expenses and the full limit of $29.4 for general election expenses).

The limitations on total campaign expenses in the nomination and general election contests, together with the increasing size of the American electorate (over 160 million in 1980) forces the presidential candidates to allot a major share of their available funds to television appeals. The result is largely personal, non-party campaigns, with the focus on the candidates' personalities and on the dominant issues, with party affiliation downplayed and with less need for the traditional party activities of organizing rallies and parades, distributing campaign buttons and bumber stickers and with less emphasis on party platforms. Also, the fact that the public funds go to the presidential candidates and not to the national party organizations[28] makes the role in money-raising for the presidential campaign a minimal one.[29]

The increased use of TV campaigning has had similar, though less severe, effects on the state parties in gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns and on mayoralty campaigns in metropolitan cities, but public financing todate is largely restricted to the presidential level.[30]

Changes in Party-in-the-Government

In the first edition of Lubell's *The Future of American Politics*, published in 1951, he noted the beginnings of the erosion of the Democratic coalition of the Roosevelt-Truman period. He also predicted that this erosion would continue until it would no longer be effective, but that a Republican majority coalition would not develop in its place.[31] Thus, Lubell projected that, in the decades ahead there would be an absence of "an effective coalition to govern" ushering in the politics of twilight, with the Democratic sun on the wane, but with no new majority sun able to rise into clear ascendancy."[32]

Lubell's prediction that neither party would be able to mobilize and sustain an effective governing coalition has been borne out in the years since 1951. In the 1952 presidential election, Eisenhower won with a decided majority, but his Republican Party gained but a slim margin of control of both houses of the Congress. Also, this control of the two branches of the national government was weakened by the conflict between the more progressive "presidential wing" of the Republic Party and its more traditional "congressional wing."[33] And, for the remaining six years of Eisenhower's two terms—1955-61—the Democrats controlled the Congress, but they, in turn, were riven by conflict between the northern liberal Democratic members and the conservative southern Democratic members. This Democratic schism continued through the three years of the Kennedy presidency, when the Democrats controlled both the national executive and legislative branches.

However, a temporary governing coalition developed with the landslide victory of Johnson in 1964, sweeping into the Congress enough northeastern, midwestern, and western Democratic liberals so that the presidential wing of the Democratic Party was clearly dominant. The result was the passage of more progressive social legislation in the brief period of 1965-1967 than at any time since the early New Deal years. But the Democratic coalition was undermined by the divisive issue of the Vietnam War, and in 1968, the electorate voted for Nixon by a narrow margin as a Republican president but returned a still-divided Democratic Party to control the Congress. This divided party government remained through the entire Nixon-Ford presidency.

The 1976 elections returned the Democrats to control both the Presidency and the Congress, with Carter elected by a slim margin of 2 per cent over Ford but with almost two-thirds of the House and Senate membership Democratic. However for two reasons, there was not an effective Democratic coalition to govern during the period 1977-1981. First, recognizing the strong distrust of the "imperial presidency" as a result of Watergate and an increasing lack of faith of the American people in all governmental institutions, Carter in 1976 ran against "the Washington eatablishment," inevitably reflecting unfavourably on the Democratic Congress. This hardly enhanced the prospects for effective executive-legislative relations. Further, in the early months of the Carter presidency, his parochial staff ("the Georgia Mafia") blithely developed sweeping proposals for SALT II negotiations, civil service reform, energy policy, a new department of education etc., without consulting the Congressional Democratic leadership and appropriate committee chairmen. The predictable result was that Congress rejected or substantially altered both the priorities and the content of most of Carter's legislative programme. Second, during this period, the insistent "single issue" constituencies, both pro and anti, on the emotional questions of abortion, school busing, and school prayers had the cross-cutting effects on both parties noted earlier. And there was a spill-over effect on to other issues, complicating the process of legislative coalition-building.

The 1980 elections continued the tendency towards divided party government evident in American national politics since World War II. Reagan was elected in a landslide victory, contributing to his Republican Party's control of the Senate for the first time since 1955. However, the House of Representatives remains under Democratic control, though a group of some 35-45 conservative southern and southwestern Democratic representatives have been supporting the main elements of Reagan's sweeping bugdet and tax cutting programme. But the extent and stability of this tenuous cross-party coalition remains to be demonstrated.

Earlier political party analysts had asserted that a very important, if not indeed a necessary, function of American parties was to "bridge the constitutional gap," i.e., to harness "the constitutionally antagonistic" institutions of the Presidency and the Congress together to achieve productive governance. The founding fathers hoped to minimize the abuses of the substantial powers of the national government under the 1787 Constitution by creating multiple centers of powers, each with constitutional restraints on the other. Thus, by constitutional design, the Presidency and the Congress were geared more towards control of each other than for co-operative action.

The adaptation of American political parties to this constitutional reality has resulted in what Professor Burns calls "four-party politics," with each major party having "a presidential wing" organized around or oriented towards, the Presidency and "a congressional wing" organized around the Congress. The presidential wings of both parties (based more on urban and metropolitan constituencies) have tended to be more liberal and internationalist, while the congressional parties (with more restricted electoral bases) have been more conservative and domestically-oriented.[34] These real constituency and doctrinal differences between the two wings of each party have compounded the task of the majority party in bridging the constitutional gap, even when the party controls the Presidency and both houses of the Congress. And when the electorate gives control of the Presidency to one party and the control of the Congress to another party, as has been the case for a majority of the years since 1946, the problem of effective party governance becomes all but unmanageable.

Prior to about a decade and a half, the president was the undisputed leader of his party. He influenced the selection of its organizational and congressional leadership, he determined its public and legislative agenda, he set party priorities, and he was the dominant spokesman for the party. But the loss of control by the party leaders and their party regulars of the presidential nomination process in the years following 1968 and the development of "a new presidential elite" that is more issue-oriented and less party-oriented mean that a presidential aspirant's winning nomination coalition is substantially outside the party framework. Also, since his election is more and more due to his personal and media-centered campaigns than to the activities and support of his party, a president is less loyal to, or under obligation to, the party organization and its leaders. Consequently, the party cadre is less inclined to follow the president's leadership or to support him when he could use their help.[35]

Moreover, due to the decentralization and fragmentation of party control in the Congress in recent years, the day is past when a president could negotiate an agreement with the floor leaders of his party and a few important committee chairman and have the necessary votes delivered in both houses of the Congress for his legislative proposals. Finally, given the absence of deference and loyalty of the organizational and congressional leaders to the president, there are many public spokespersons for the party, often challenging or even controverting the public positions and pronouncements of the president.

Further, the Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946, which greatly reduced the number of standing committees in the Congress and rationalized their subject-matter jurisdiction substantially, has had the unexpected result of decentralization and fragmentation of party control in the Congress.[36] For with the reduction in the number of standing committees, the proliferation of sub-committees has proceeded apace and still continues. In the 95th Congress (1979-1981), almost one half of the Democrats in the House of Representatives chaired either a committee or a sub-committee, and three-quarters of the House Republicans were ranking members of a committee or sub-committee. Also, the committee leadership of the Senate was as widely dispersed with even freshmen senators given leadership assignments.[37]

Added to this diffusion of party congressional leadership, the weakening of the seniority rule for the selection of committee and sub-committee chairman, through the expanded powers of the caucuses of the two houses, has diluted the formerly formidable powers of the committee chairman and increased the autonomy of the numerous sub-committees. Further, the pressures of the single-issue constituencies in recent years has encouraged voting defections by members from their party position on an increasing number of issues.

Congressmen Charles Vanik, veteran House member from Ohio, reflected these new realities concerning congressional party leadership and control when at the time of his retirement he said: "There are now 531 political parties in the Congress," indicating that the individual Representatives and Senators place their own constituents' demands and their own re-election above their loyalty to either their party or their president.

III

FUTURE SCENARIOS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

It has already been noted that there is a broad consensus among American political scientists that the fifth party system of the United States is in transition, as a result of the significant changes within the past two decades in the general electorate and in the electorates of the two major parties, in the organization and activities of these parties, and in how the parties operate within the government. However, an examination of the recent literature on American parties reveals a wide divergence as to the implications of these changes for the future of the party system. Apparently, as Ranney has remarked, the crystal ball for divining the future character of the parties is "so opaque."[38] This section will identify and review four general future scenarios of the American party system.

The End of American Party Politics?

Writing in 1969, before the development of a number of alterations in the party system that have been discussed here, Walter Dean Burnham in a boldly titled article—"The End of American Party Politics"[39]— noted "the withering away of the parties." His introductory sentence stated : "American politics has clearly been falling apart in the past decade."[40] He further reviewed the evidence to support this statement by identifying a "long-term trend towards a politics without parties," and concluded accordingly:

> The evidence lends some credence to the view that American electoral politics is undergoing a long-term transition into routines designed only to fill offices and symbolically affirm 'the American way.' There also seem to be tendencies for our political parties gradually to evaporate as broad and active intermediaries between the people and their rulers.... It is certain that the significance of party as a link between government and the governed has now come once again into serious question.... What need have Americans of political parties? More precisely, Why do they need parties whose structures, processes, and leadership cadres seem to grow more remote and irrelevant to each new crisis?[41]

Burnham also observed that "the American socio-economic system has developed and transferred itself with an energy and thrust that has no parallel in modern history." But he decried the fact that the political system had remained static, "based on the same Lockeian formulation that... has dominated its entire history ... with a high wall of separation between politics and government on one side and the socio-economic system on the other."[42] He identified "the ultimate socio-political consequences of the persistence of Lockeian individualism into an era of Big Organization:

oligarchy at the top, inertia and spasms of self-defense in the middle, and fragmentation at the base. One may well wonder whether political parties or critical realignments need have much place in such a political universe."[43]

In a second article, six years later in 1975, Burnham both sharpened and softened his thesis of "no-party politics" in the future. He asserted that the American electorate is going through "a critical realignment to end all critical realignments . . . the most sweeping transformation it has experienced since the Civil War . . . radically different from any in American electoral history" channeled not through political parties as in the past but "cutting across older partisan linkages between rulers and ruled. The consequence is an astonishingly rapid dissolution of the political party as an effective intervenor between the voter and the objects of his vote at the polls."[44]

After developing his arguments in support of this sweeping proposition, Burnham examined the implications of "this functional decomposition of voting behaviour." As a policy analyst, he saw the results as, "first, a concomitant destabilization of domestic policy initiatives and follow-through, and second, a future of policy-making which rests uneasily between the alternatives of reinforced institutional deadlock and of executive imposition of policy on the rest of the system."[45] As a democratic theorist, he concluded that if the process of partisan decomposition "continues under conditions of pervasive public discontent, democracy will be progressively emptied of any operational meaning, as executive-bureaucratic imperatives come to dominate the political system."[46]

However Burnham, assuming a more alert (because of recent painful experiences) and more sophisticated (as educational levels have risen) electorate, continued cultural and institutional barriers to authoritarianism and outstanding political leadership, admittedly "heroic assumptions", concluded that, "quite possibly, the current dissolution of party-in-the-electorate will turn out after all not to be 'a critical realignment to end all critical relignments,' but the prologue to a revitalization of democracy through party."[47]

Another analyst, who saw the possibility of "no-party politics" in the future, Austin Ranney, has criticized recent "reform" efforts as those which would unwittingly seriously weaken the parties. He argued that if another proposed reform, a national presidential primary, were to be adopted, it "would certainly weaken the presidential party organizations still further and perhaps wipe them out." And he added:

> What if it did? The Republic would not collapse, at least not right away. The party labels would persist for a while and serve as cues for the dwindling number of voters for whom they were still meaningful. The candidate organizations, the women's caucuses, the black caucuses, the right-to-life leagues, and the like would become the only real players in the game. The mass communications media would become the sole

agencies for sorting out the finalists from the original entrants and for defining the voters' choices. And the societal functions of interest—aggregation, consensus-building, and civil war prevention would presumably be left to the schools, the churches, and perhaps to Common Cause and Nader's Radiers.[48]

A Rebirth of the New Deal Party System?

James Sundquist, in a 1973 book[49] and in a journal article later that same year,[50] has presented a scenario of the future of the party system that is almost the polar opposite of the "no-party" scenario. After analyzing the party re-alignments that ushered in the third party system in 1860, the fourth system in 1896, and the present party system in 1932, he explained the central changes in the party system in recent decades and the shifts in support of the two major parties. Looking ahead, he has projected not an inevitable disintegration of the party system, but instead a reversal of the current trend towards political independence and a rebirth and reinforcement of party loyalties along lines of cleavage resembling those of the New Deal era.

Sundquist's explanation of the transformation of the fifth system was in terms of cross-cutting issues. He observed:

> The party system is always thrown into turmoil when powerful, cross-cutting issues are at work. Fluidity, independence, and party switching are characteristic of the pre-alignment and re-alignment periods that such issues generate. The present time—when millions of voters have been jarred loose from past allegiances and are floating unattached in political space—has all the characteristics of a pre-alignment period.[51]

He examined four cross-cutting issues that have had disturbing and divisive effects on the New Deal Party System since its inception in the early 1930's: Communism, the Vietnam War, the "social issues" (i.e., really a cluster of issues associated with "permissiveness"—crime, law and order, welfarism, pornography, and homosexualism), and race. He concluded that the first three issues had only limited and temporary effects and were not contributory to a party re-alignment. Thus, the communism issue helped to elect Eisenhower in 1952 and led a number of conservative Catholic Democrats to become Republicans. The Vietnam issue was highly disruptive of the Democratic Party in the late 1960's and probably tilted the close election of 1968 to Nixon. And the "social issue" had a measurable impact on the conservative Democratic Union of members in the North and conservative white Democrats in the South. However, since both parties ultimately ended up on the same side of these three cross-cutting issues, the basis for a major re-alignment of the party system did not exist.

Sundquist saw the fourth issue of race as continuing to have vitality in

1973. As early as 1948, it led to the rise of the Dixiecrat third-party movement that shattered the Democratic solid South; particularly during and after the black ghetto riots of 1965-68, the issue was highly salient in both parties. At that time, it was possible for the major parties to move to opposite poles on this issue—the Republicans opposing black demands and the Democrats pro-black, or conceivably, the Wallace Movement of 1968 could have continued to grow until it supplanted one of the major parties, reminiscent of the Republic Party on the slavery issue over a century before. Neither of these eventualities developed then, nor did Sundquist feel they would in the future though race most probably would continue to have an unsettling influence on the political system.[52]

Looking ahead from the perspective of 1973, Sundquist foresaw the possibility that a reinforcement of the New Deal Party System was likely to occur, counteracting the cross-cutting issues and reversing the process of party decomposition of the past decades.[53] Thus, he believed that the second term of President Nixon, with the settlement of the Vietnam issue, would be "dominated by the same fundamental dispute over the role of government [i.e., government spending and management of the economy] that defined a new party alignment in the 1930's." And he concluded his analysis with this prediction:

> In the long run, the prospect may well be a further gradual decomposition of the party system. But there is at least as much reason to believe that in the short run the headlong march towards decomposition that marked the late 1960's will be checked and reversed, that the New Deal party system will be reinvigorated and that most of those who ceased identifying with one or the other major party in the recent turmoil will re-identify. The parties may not regain the degree of voter loyalty that was accorded to them in the crisis days of the Great Depression. But the bonds between voters and the party would be restored to something like the strength of the late 1950's and the early 1960's—before Goldwater, Vietnam, Watts and Hough, campus riots and draft card burning, and the Chicago Democratic Convention of 1968.[54]

An Emerging Republican Majority?

Following Richard Nixon's election as President, Kevin Phillips in the opening sentence of his book—*The Emerging Republican Majority*, published in 1969, stated : "Far from being the tenuous and unmeaningful victory suggested by critical observers, the election of Richard M. Nixon as President of the United States in November 1968 bespoke the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginnings of a new era in American politics."[55]

Phillips asserted that a new cycle of Republican domination began in 1968, based on developing Republican majorities in the suburbia, the South, the "Heartland" region of the Great Lakes, Midwest, the Mountain States, and the West. He buttressed his argument with detailed historical and statistical analyses of national election results since 1896 in each of the four regions of the Northeast, the South, the Heartland, and the Pacific. Further, he noted that the Northeastern states, particularly New England, had shifted decisively from comfortable Republican majorities, going back to the post-Civil War era, to being the most strongly Democratic region in the country. However, in the Chesapeake Bay states of New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware, a trend towards the Republican Party was apparent. Moreover, since the population of the big northeastern states was dropping, the normal Democratic pluralities there were also decreasing. Finally, with the fastest growing areas of the United States in the South and the West, both increasingly Republican strongholds, the relative political significance of the Northeast was waning, Phillips observed.[56]

Phillips saw the traditional Democratic strength in the South declining, parallelling the decline of the traditional Republican strength in the Northeast. The Dixiecrats began the trend when they deprived the Democrats of four Deep South states in 1948, and Eisenhower captured four Outer South states in 1952 and five of these states in 1956. The strong anti-Catholic vote against Kennedy expected in the South in 1960 was weakened by the presence of Lyndon Johnson, a southerner on the Kennedy ticket; however, Nixon still carried the three states of Texas, Florida and Virginia. And in 1968, Nixon carried five southern states and Wallace won in five other states of the South, with Humphrey winning by a thin plurality in the remaining southern state, Texas, and then only because Nixon and Wallace split the White conservative vote there. One striking statistic sums up this secular Democratic decline: between 1932 and 1968, the Democratic share of the presidential vote skidded from 90 per cent to 26 per cent in the Deep South and from 77 per cent to 32 per cent in the Outer South—the most sweeping political change in this period save for the matching and related black trend to the Democrats, both within and outside the South. Phillips viewed the southern states as an important part of the emerging Republican majority, with the South's contribution to Republican national hegemony increasing, since its share of the United States population was rising.[57]

The 25 Heartland states together represent a total of 223 electoral college votes, only 47 short of the number required to elect a president. And in each of the sub-regions of the Great Lake states, the Farm states, and the Mountain states, a discernible move into the Republican column was noted by Phillips. In 1968, of the twenty-six states carried by Nixon, seventeen were in this region, continuing earlier Republican victories in the Heartland by Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Eisenhower. Phillips said of this developing bastion of Republican strength, that it was the result of the erosion of southern Democratic traditions in the southern Heartland and an important trend base in the northern Heartland of strongly Republican German and Rocky Mountain populists, with the earlier Democratic majorities in these areas shrunken to often a mere one-third of former levels. Though Democratic strength remains alive in some of the region's core cities, the Republican Party increasingly has come to be the socio-economic representative of voters outside of these cities.[58]

Phillips further described the three Pacific states of Washington, Oregon, and California as "a mirror of American political trends," with California "virtually a national socio-political microcosm."[59] Also California, the most populous state in the Union, according to Phillips, was the bellwether of the Pacific region. The two major forces locked in conflict in California were the liberalism of northern California and the conservatism of southern and interior California. Both ideologically and demographically then, the trend was clearly towards Southern Californian conservatism, which was increasing steadily its population and ballot-box lead over the San Francisco Bay liberalism. Washintgon and Oregon were of less political significance, though with more of a Democratic tendency. Phillips concluded his analysis of this region saying: "By all indications, the Pacific should be a major and ever more powerful battleground of the upcoming political cycle. The party able to win a majority of Pacific electoral votes in the quadrennial presidential sweepstakes is also likely to triumph nationally."[60]

Phillips was confident that these pro-Republican trends would continue in the future, for "much of the emerging Republican majority lies in the top growth states (California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida) or new suburbia, while Democratic trends correlate with stability and decay (New England, New York City, Michigan, West Virginia, and San Francisco—Berkeley)."[61]

Phillips' "new Republican majority" thesis was later, just two months before the 1980 elections, updated by two seasoned political observers, Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg.[62] Like Phillips, but with a more current prespective, the authors also saw "the end of an era"—the era of American liberalism and Democratic Party dominance.

Scammon and Wattenberg gave three reasons for their prediction. First, they cited survey research data that indicated a decided change in voter opinions during the 1970's on important public issues. Thus, increasingly, inflation and economic stagnation have been seen as the real problems today, with big government viewed as the major cause of inflation. And, as Vietnam has receded from the public consciousness and concern has increased about Soviet "expansionism", neo-isolationism appears to have lessened and strong demands for increased defense spending are apparent. It is noteworthy that all of these new public opinion positions are in general concerning recently perceived Republican, and not Democrat, doctrine.

Secondly, election results in 1978 suggested a growing rejection of Democratic liberalism; the incumbent Democratic Senators who lost their seats were liberals, only one liberal Democratic Senator won. Also, late in the 1980 campaign, public opinion polls indicated that the most liberal Senators and Congressmen were in serious trouble and the more moderate Democrats running appeared slated for easy wins. Hence, Scammon and Wattenberg predicted that the Republicans would pick up at least four or five Senate seats and a good number of House seats. Moreover, they saw the odds in favour of the Republicans winning control of the Senate in 1982, since nineteen Democrats and only fourteen Republicans would be up for re-election. Further it appeared that Reagan would beat the Democratic incumbent, Carter, in the 1980 presidential race.

Third, in terms of partisan perceptions, the polls indicated that on the leading issues of the 1980 campaign, the Republican Party proposals for severe cuts in government spending and in taxes had significantly more voter support than the Democratic plan to curb inflation and rejuvenate the economy. All told, Scammon and Wattenberg concluded that a political re-alignment was indicated by these three realities and that the Republican Party stood in a better position to capitalize on the changes in public opinion, the shift away from liberalism, and *re* perceptions of which party could better handle the important problems facing the country. They thus saw the Democratic Party, for the first time in four decades, as seriously on the defensive and lacking in new ideas and policy positions to replace their outmoded New Deal ideology.

A New Party System for Post-Industrial America?

It is interesting that Kevin Phillips is the leading articulator of two of the four scenarios of the future of the party system reviewed here. Six years after publishing his *The Emerging Republican Majority,* Phillips took an entirely different tack in analyzing the enormous changes in the American political system in recent decades and in exploring the implications of these changes for the party system. In the preface to his 1975 volume,[63] Phillips clarified its purpose and theme, as follows:

> Too little attention and analysis have been devoted to the political impact of a post-industrial, or communications revolution. In an age of mass media, the old Republican and Democratic parties have lost their logic. Effective communications are replacing party organisations as the key to political success; and, beyond that, they are becoming an increasingly dominant force in national life. As the first communications society, the United States is on its way to becoming the first 'mediacracy'.[64]

Also in the book's preface, Phillips offered a brief explanation of why he abandoned his 1969 scenario of a developing Republican hegemony in the United States. He noted that Nixon's 1972 campaign was directed solely at his own re-election, with no attempt whatsoever to lead a bottom-to-top Party effort to exploit the electorate's movement to the right and away from Democratic liberalism. Secondly, the Watergate scandal arising from Nixon's obsessive and unprincipled actions to ensure his re-election made impossible the fashioning of a positive and lasting Republican political coalition out of the huge 1972 victory.[65]

The organizing principle of Phillips' 1975 study is that there is a political re-alignment, resulting in a new party system, whenever there is a radical transformation in the American society and economy. Thus, the first party system, with its limited franchise and hence limited participation, and its elitist, aristocratic political leadership, was replaced by the second party system with the broadening of the electorate in "the era of the common man" and with a new, non-elite leadership. Both these party systems operated within the matrix of a pre-industrial economy. The third party system reflected the catastrophic polarization of American society over the slavery issue and evolved into a largely regional party pattern. Moreover, the Civil War prompted the development of an industrial economy, but the 1896 presidential election marked the end of the Civil War party system and ushered in a new party alignment in keeping with the unchallenged dominance of *laissez faire* capitalism over the American political economy. The Great Depression of the late 1920's and early 1930's created a new ideological divide and a new party alignment, with the Democratic Party responding to the need for governmental action in ensuring a stable economy and a social security "safety net", while the Republicans still clung to the *laissez faire* philosophy.[66]

Phillips also traced the genesis of the Post-Industrial Revolution in the United States from World War II and the 1940's, its "breakthrough" in the 1950's, and the phenomenal increase in extent, momentum, and importance during the 1960's. Further he examined the central characteristics of the Post-Industrial era: the metamorphosis of the economy from manufacturing industries to knowledge industries (education, research and development, technological innovations, insurance, information and other services, etc.); the increasingly almost dominant role in American life of the media; the new and powerful knowledge elite (media specialists, educators, computer technologists, and highly specialized professionals of all kinds); a widespread affluence, including a substantial proportion of the working class; a terminological obsolescence of the old liberal-conservative cleavage of American political liberalism and new post-industrial social conflicts (where conflicts over life style, morality, bureaucratic regulation, internationalism and media power replace the older conflicts of poverty *vs.* affluence, labour *vs.* management, youth *vs.* elders, etc.)[67]

Phillips' study then indicated how the fifth party system, a product and a prisoner of an earlier, quite different America, lacked relevance and effective response to the fundamental changes in American society and economy of the past three decades and to the new aspirations, needs, and expectations of American voters. This functional obsolescence of the existing party system, Phillips argued, was the real cause of the decomposition of American parties and for the taking-over of many of its traditional functions by other new institutions of post-industrial America. And it was this fundamental incompatibility of the industrial era with its revolutionary communications technology, that presaged a necessary, perhaps overdue, political re-alignment.[68]

This re-alignment, Phillips asserted was imminent and inevitable; a new political system must evolve that could effectively aggregate and convert popular preferences for political leadership, but which would be compatible with the realities of post-industrial America. In the final chapter on "The Future of American Politics," he attempted to answer two pointed questions: 1. Can a post-industrial party, or sixth party system be expected to use the existing Republican and Democratic party framework? and 2. Once new party alignments are clear, can we expect post-industrial party organizations to function in the traditional nineteenth-twentieth-century style?

In answering these questions, it is apparent that his crystal ball is quite opaque, for his responses are more general than specific and more guarded than confident. However, with positive confidence he asserted that the existing party system was doomed, organizationally, ideologically, and operationally. But, he restricted himself to four broad generalizations while describing the sixth party system: 1. The sixth party system would be more ideological than its predecessor, with more of a focus on social (life-style) issues than on economic (labour-capital) issues; 2. The new presidential parties would be—more concerned with both ideology and communication technology than the fifth party system; 3. The sub-national parties would not have the organizational depth of its predecessors (i.e., with increased reliance on communication technology, the older, grass-roots organizations will no longer be needed), and 4. The Democratic name is more likely to survive (because it is linked to a majority past and is perceived to be associated with change) than the Republican name since it is linked to a minority past, has been less friendly to change, and may be a cultural block in wooing many southerners, ethnics, and labour-union members.[69]

Agreeing with Phillips on the failure and the increasing non-relevance of the existing party system, Everett C. Ladd, a respected name on the American party system, was less confident of an imminent political re-alignment.[70] He asserted that the present party system was "de-aligned," with neither party capable of what Lubell would call "a coalition to govern," and with neither having "a presidential majority of an enduring sort now on the horizon." However, unlike Phillips and Scammon and Wattenberg, he did not visualize political re-alignment in the near future resulting in one party having a "majority status of the kind the Democrats enjoyed in the New Deal era and the Republicans held from McKinley to Hoover."

IV
FUTURE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

In this final section of the paper, an attempt will be made to assess the four scenarios of the future of the American party system that have been described. In this endeavour, I shall have the benefit of hindsight—ranging from nine months to as much as twelve years. In this regard, the reader should remember the date or dates of the predictions made by the various authors: 1. The "no-party politics" scenarios of Burnham (1969 and 1975) and of Ranney (1978); 2. "The revival of the New Deal party system" scenario of Sundquist (1973); 3. "The emerging Republican majority" scenario of Phillips (1969) and of Scammon and Wattenberg (1980); and 4. "The post-industrial party system" scenario of Phillips (1975) and of Ladd (1978 and 1980).

A General Caveat

In the past three decades, a number of American political scientists have devoted a substantial portion of their research efforts to an increasingly sophisticated analysis of voter behaviour in the United States and to the development of a nascent body of causal theory about parties and elections. Understandably, these researchers have gone "hunting where the ducks are," i.e., they have, in most instances, researched questions where hard data was readily available or where survey techniques could generate such data most productively.

Election satistics are maintained by public agencies for almost all of the half a million elected public officials, from county courthouse to the presidency. With elections commonly held every two or four years, the productive use of this mountain of raw data demands limitations and priorities. Thus, the development of in-depth, longitudinal, and comparative analyses of election results have been restricted largely to the presidential level, with somewhat less attention to congressional and gubernatorial politics. Three realities dictate this emphasis. First, the data banks developed by the Center for Political Studies and the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and by other similar academic agencies throughout the United States (with the data centered at Michigan's Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research), together with the published studies of these institutional research processes, emphasized presidential (and to a lesser extent congressional) voter trends and voting attitudes. Secondly, the data generated by the periodic public opinion surveys of the major polling agencies (Gallup, Harris, NBC-*NY Times*, etc.) focus on national issues and on presidential contests, with their polls on the Senate and Congressional races only at the macro-level. The third reality is that, for both the public and the researchers, analyses of presidential elections and the political processes related to such elections are deemed of more interest and importance.

This does not mean that micro-level election and voting studies are not being done (i.e., at the state legislative, city, and county levels), but only that these studies lack the comparative, over-time character of the presidential studies and hence, have less of a useful theoretical basis for purposes of interpretation and guidance of future research.

It should therefore not be surprising that the literature reviewed here is, almost exclusively, concerned with the presidential parties, with little insight into the operation and reality of the sub-presidential parties. It should be noted that the main focus of each of the future-of-the-party-system scenarios described here is only one part, admittedly an all-important part, of the American party system. A quick check in the index of the volumes reviewed here revealed virtually no references at all to state and local political parties. Hence, care should be exercized in extrapolating the empirical findings and projections of these scenarios of generalizations about the entire political party system.

The End of American Party Politics?

This general caveat applies with particular relevance and force to the "no-party politics" scenario sketched by Burnham and Ranney. Granting the manifest weakening of the presidential parties and the serious erosion of their functions, the situation at the state level and local levels is measurably different.

"Party decomposition"—as evidenced by a decrease in party loyalty, an increase in the number of independent voters, and split ticket voting—is evident at the sub-national party levels, but is appreciably lower in extent and impact.[71] An exception to this generalization would be statewide contests for the offices of Governor and Senator in populous, urban states and in the mayoralty elections in the largest metropolitan areas. For these elections have some decided similarities with presidential politics. But, as Ladd observes, "the weakening of party loyalties and hence of party regularity is clearly evident at all levels of the electoral process . . . but the most dramatic effects have centered around presidential ballotting."[72]

To put it differently, the total party system is by no means losing its identity, its relevance, or its functions of aggregating voter preferences and converting them into an elective leadership. For state legislative offices and at the congressional and country levels, party identification is much more important and party organizations much more active and effective than the picture painted by Burnham and Ranney. Thus, their obituary of American party politics, like Mark Twain's, appears somewhat premature.

A Return of the New Deal Party System?

The rationale of Sundquist's 1973 scenario for a revival of the New Deal party system in the years ahead was that, as the cross-cutting issues of Communism, Vietnam, the "social issue" and race lost their salience, the perennial conflict associated with economic stress would lead to the traditional party cleavages, resulting in a Democratic majority coalition much like that over which FDR presided in the 1930's. And certainly, since the energy crisis of 1973, the problems of inflation, unemployment, increased taxes and economic stagnation represent as much economic stress as America has known since the Great Depression.

Futhermore, Sundquist could cite the results of the 1974 congressional election in support of his thesis. For in that year, Democratic representation in the Congress increased much more than those gains normal for the non-presidential-party in off-years. But most informed observers credited these Democratic gains to public outrage due to the Watergate scandal culminating in President Nixon's resignation some three months before the November 1974 elections.

Again, the election of 1976 lent some real credence to Sundquist's prediction; Carter's winning coalition consisted of the South (every Southern state except Virginia), mostly all the industrial states of the Northeast and North-central regions, union members, ethnics, Catholics, Jews, and Blacks, with a larger proportion of the latter two groups voting Democratic than in the 1930's. Moreover, the Democratic Party controlled both Houses of the Congress by an almost two-thirds majority. This national Democratic Party hegemony was reminiscent of the New Deal days.

However, this Democratic "coalition to govern" was shattered in the 1980 presidential elections in winning by a landslide, Reagan carried every southern state except Carter's home state of Georgia and captured most of the traditionally Democratic states of the northeast and north-central regions, with a higher proportion of nationwide support from union members, ethnics, Catholics, and Jews enjoyed by any Republican presidential candidate since 1928. It is interesting to note though, that in the 1980 campaign and in the recent debates in the Congress, the central and crucial issue has been the very one that Sundquist asserted—*viz.*, a dispute over the fundamental role of the federal government. If this issue continues to dominate national politics, as seems quite probable, Sundquist's thesis remains to be more fully tested in the years ahead.

An Emerging Republican Majority?

In presenting his 1975 scenario for a "new post-industrial party system," Phillips apparently abandoned his 1969 scenario for an "emerging Republican majority," for the expressed reasons reported earlier here. But judging from the 1978 and 1980 elections, Phillips' earlier scenario appears as potentially valid as when he wrote it twelve years ago. Furthermore, Scammon and Wattenberg's predictions of a Republican resurgence in 1980 was accurate, even proving a bit too modest concerning Republican control of the Senate.

In the 1978 Congressional Elections, the Republicans made an encouraging comeback from their serious losses in 1974 and their more modest losses in 1976. They also made some modest gains in the state Houses and state legislatures of the country. But it was the 1980 presidential election that revived the relevance of the Phillips' 1969 prediction. Consistent with Phillips' model of a winning Republican coalition, Reagan carried every state west of the Mississippi except Hawaii and Minnesota—Vice-President Mondale's home state, and every southern state except Georgia—President Carter's home state. While his winning vote margin of 10 per cent was substantially less than Johnson's margin in 1964 and Nixon's in 1972, his electoral college vote of 489 was slightly higher than Johnson's 486 in 1964 but lower than Nixon's 520 in 1972.[73] The Republicans picked up twelve additional seats in the Senate, the largest net gain for either party since 1958, and gained control of the Senate, for the first time since 1955, by a margin of 53 to 47.[74] In the House of Representatives, Republican gains reduced the margin of Democratic control from a two-thirds majority before the election to a majority of just fifty-one.[75] In the states, four new Republican Governors were elected and over two hundred new Republican state legislators (all in states west of the Mississippi, again consonant with Phillips' model).[76]

This certainly was an impressive electoral sweep by the Republican Party in 1980. However, today in 1981, neither Phillips nor Scammon and Wattenberg would be able to claim that the Republican Party was the majority party in the United States. For, more American voters still identify themselves as Democrats than as Republicans (though the Democratic margin has dropped decisively from its peak in 1976). The House of Representatives is still controlled by the Democrats. Democratic Governors outnumber Republican Governors by 27 to 23, and the Democrats control 31 state senates to the Republicans' 17. Further, Democratic state lower chambers number 32 while Republican state lower chambers are only 17,[77] giving the Democrats a great advantage in the congressional and state legislative redistricting process to follow the 1980 census.

The question remains, though, as to whether President Reagan can and will build his party's 1980 electoral success into Republican control of both houses of the Congress in 1982 and of a majority of the state legislatures and state-houses and into a Republican majority among party identifiers. Unlike Nixon in 1972, Reagan apparently has the inclination to attempt such a new Republican hegemony.

Several political commentators have recently remarked on the huge gamble the Republican Party has taken in supporting whole-hog Reagan's proposals for the most sweeping changes in the role of the Federal Government since President Roosevelt in the 1930's.[78] In a nationally-televised address to the Congress in early May (after his recovery from the assassin's attack), Reagan renewed his demand for and defended his plan for severe cuts in federal taxes and expenditure, a sizeable increase in defense outlays and a substantial dismantling of government controls of the private sector. He also promised that this plan would produce a four to five per cent growth rate after 1982 (compared to 1.1 per cent in 1980) and that it would reduce inflation from double digits in 1980 to 8.3 per cent in 1982 and to 5.5 per cent in 1984. Further, he argued that his plan not only would balance the budget but meet the aims of "controlling government spending, reducing the tax burden, building a national defense second to none, and stimulating economic growth and creating millions of new jobs."[79]

If Reagan's plan were to be approved by the Congress and would result in all or even most of these objectives by 1984, then he would become the most popular American leader since FDR a half a century ago and the chances are good that the Republican Party in the 1980's would gain the majority status the Democratic Party enjoyed in the 1930's. However, if (as most economists, including conservative Wall Street economists, expect) the Reagan programme has little effect on inflation, unemployment and economic stagnation, then he would become a political "bum" and the Democratic Party would most probably be returned to power in 1984.

A New Party System for Post-Industrial America?

If one accepts, as do Phillips and Ladd, Daniel Bell's seminal 1973 thesis that the United States has moved from an industrial era into a post-industrial era, with profound implications for, and changes in, the American economy and society,[80] then Phillips' 1975 scenario for a new party system for the new era is logically appealing and perhaps persuasive. Also one can understand and substantially accept Phillips explanation for the serious "decomposition" of the existing party system: the fifth party system, a product of the earlier industrial era, is no longer relevant and effective in the new post-industrial era and the dysfunctional character of the parties, increasingly apparent, has resulted in a marked lessening of partisan loyalty and support by the American voters. Furthermore, logically, one can expect a new party system to develop that is more relevant and responsive to the realities of post-industrial America, i.e., the knowledge industries, the communications revolution, the new knowledge elite, the higher levels of education and affluence, the new patterns of social conflict, etc.

However, one can accept these general premises and predictions of Phillips without embracing *in toto* his scenario for the future of the American party system. Because, as with the other scenarios discussed here, the Phillips and Ladd scenarios are preoccupied with the presidential parties and, to a marked lesser degree, the congressional parties, with virtually no meaningful analysis of the sub-national parties.

Phillips asserts that "the presidential-level Republican and Democratic parties have tentatively re-aligned themselves along ideological, regional, and demographic lines fundamentally compatible with post-industrial cleavages,"[81] but, as noted earlier, he has only several broad generalizations to make concerning the expected new party system as it would operate at the state and local levels. And it is this part of Phillips' scenario that measures up poorly as to its plausibility and probability.

It is the judgment of this writer that the effects of the "Post-Industrial

Revolution" have been, and will continue to be in the immediate future, more powerful on the presidential parties and to a somewhat lesser degree on the elections of Senators and Governors of populous, urban states and perhaps, on mayoralty races in the largest metropolitan areas. For it is at these levels and for these urban offices that the communication revolution results in media-utilization and media-assessed candidates and that the new computer technology permits direct mailing for fund-raising and campaign appeals, all without the identification with or involvement of the parties. Also, it is in these macro-campaigns that television has more extensively taken over the information furnishing and voter-mobilisation functions of parties. Hence, the title for Phillips' scenario should, more properly and accurately, have been "A New Presidential Party System for Post-Industrial America."

One final comment on Phillips' 1975 scenario—his prediction that, in the new party re-alignment that he projects, the Republican Party is less likely to survive, at least in name, rings false today after the sweeping Republican victory in 1980. Rather, it remains to be seen whether, in the four years ahead, the Republicans will proceed to become the new majority party or whether they would sink again to a decided minority status, as has been true for most of the period since 1932.

V

APPRAISAL : A FIFTH ECLECTIC SCENARIO

With the benefit of hindsight and the ideas and insights of the four other scenarists, I offer here tentatively (my crystal ball is also "so opaque"), the broad outlines of a fifth scenario of the future of the American party system, to wit:

1. A post-industrial presidential party system with more ideology and more emphasis on issues, with media-utilizing and media-assessed candidates, with widespread use of communications and computer technology in its operation, and with the same names employed as now for the two major parties.
2. A somewhat similar party system for the election of Senators and Governors of populous, urban states and for metropolitan mayoralty elections.
3. A state and local party system not markedly dissimilar to that existing today, since its focus would continue to be on the more traditional, non-post-industrial issues (e.g., administration of justice, institutional care, health and welfare programmes, paving of highways and streets, law and order, garbage collection, water supply and sewerage systems, etc.). Judged by party loyalty and support and by party identification, this party system will be much weaker than that existing in the

New Deal period but appreciably stronger than the present presidential system.

4. In the 1980's, the two probabilities of either a new Republican majority, along the lines of Phillips' 1969 scenario, or a revived New Deal Democratic majority, akin to Sundquist's 1973 scenario.
5. A Republican Party coalition of the business, financial, manufacturing and mining interests, mostly all the Western states and particularly the Rocky Mountain states, the white voters of the South, the owners of the media, the Protestant moralists, the more prosperous farmer and town-dwellers of the midwest, the more affluent union members, the more conservative Catholics, and the bulk of retired persons. A Democratic Party coalition of the northeastern states, and Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii in the West, the blacks of both the north and south, the ethnics, the professionals of the knowledge industries, the journalists of the print and electronic media, liberal Protestants, and college graduate students. The Jewish vote will switch from party to party as the group perceives one party or the other favouring Israel at a given time.

In sketching this scenario of the future of the American party system, I am sobered by the demonstrable truth of Burke's observation that the past is a poor guide to the future.

December 1981.

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1 This section draws from William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale, *Political Behaviour of the American Electorate* (Boston, Mass., 1979), Fourth Edition, pp. 38-42; W. Dean Burnham, Jerome M. Clubb, and William H. Flanigan, "Partisan Re-alignment: A Systematic Perspective," in Joel Sibley, Allan Bogue, and William Flanigan (Eds.), *The History of American Electoral Behaviour* (Princeton, N.W., 1978) and William N. Chambers and W. Dean Burnham (Eds.), *The American Party System: Stages of Development* (New York, 1975).

2 For the story of the genesis in the United States of what the author asserts was the first modern political party in the world, see, William N. Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience 1776-1809* (New York, 1963). See also John F. Hoadley, "The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803, *The American Political Science Review* (Washington D.C.), Vol. 74, September, 1980, pp. 757-779.

3 William N. Chambers, n. 2, pp. 95-112.

4 During the Reconstruction Period, 1865 1877, the Republicans controlled the Presidency and the Congress by excluding the southern Democrats from electoral participation. This accentuated the partisan loyalty of southerners to the Democratic Party.

5 It should be noted however, that in this period there was more Democratic support at the presidential level, with the Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912 and re-elected in 1916,

6 See Everett C. Ladd, Jr., *Transformations of the American Party System* (New York, 1978), Second Edition, pp. 31-177, and Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1965), Third Edition, pp. 43-105, *re* the party coalitions of this period.

7 Thus, the time span of each of the four party systems was as follows: first, 36 years; second 36 years; third 36 years and fourth, 42 years—or an average of 36-38 years.

8 Examples are: Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Politics," *Trans-Action* (New Bnuswick, N.J.), Vol. 7, no. 2, 1969, pp. 12-22; Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York, 1970); David S. Broder, *The Party's Over* (New York, 1972); Walter De Vries and Lance Terrance, Jr., *The Ticket Splitters* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1972); James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the American Party System: Alignment and Re-alignment of Political Parties in the United States,* Washington, D.C., 1973); John S. Saloma III and Fredrick Sontag, *Parties: The Real Opportunities for Effective Citizen Politics* (1973); Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America* (California, 1975); Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (London, 1976); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976); Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick. *The Presidential Elite* (New York, 1976); William J. Crotty, *Political Reform and the American Experiment* (Scranton, Pa., 1977); Everett C. Ladd, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party System,* (New York, 1978); Jeff Fishel (Ed.), *Parties and Elections in An Anti-Party Age* (Bloomington, 1978); Anthony King (Ed.), *The New American Political System,* American Enterprise Institute, (Washington, D.C. 1978); Michael J. Malbin, *Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance,* American Enterprise Institute, (Washington D.C., 1980).

9 V.O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1964), Fifth Edition, pp. 163-165.

10 See Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Competition" in Anthony King, n.8, pp. 258-63, and Ladd with Hadley, n.8, pp. 129-177 and pp. 233-244.

11 A distinction should be made between southern whites and blacks *re* Democratic support. No Democratic candidate for president since Johnson in 1964 has carried the White vote of the South, while the Democratic loyalty of the southern blacks has increased since 1964, due substantially to the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 1970 and the increased level of electoral participation by southern blacks. Thus, in 1976, Carter carried most of the southern states only by his large plurality among blacks: in 1980, though, Carter's strong black support was overwhelmed by Reagan's decisive dominance of the White vote. See, *Congressional Quarterly* (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 38, November 1980, p. 3297 for the state-by-state results of the 1980 election.

12 Ibid.

13 Everett C. Ladd with Charles D. Hadley, n.8, p. 238.

14 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, n.8, p. 241.

15 Gallup surveys, *Public Opinion* (New York), Vol. 1, March/April 1978, p. 23.

16 *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 2 March 1981, p.3.

17 Gallup surveys for the appropriate years.

18 See Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, n.8, Chapter 4 and Kevin P. Phillips, *Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age* (New York, 1975), Chapter 2.

19 Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, n.8, p. 57.

20 Ibid., p. 53. See also De Vries and Terrance, n.8, throughout.

21 Specifically, Kennedy (D) won by only two-tenths of one per cent in 1960, Johnson (D) won by a landslide margin of 22.6 per cent in 1964, Nixon (R) squeaked through by only four tenths of one per cent in 1968 but was re-elected by a margin of 24.0 per cent in 1972, Carter (D) had a winning margin of but two per cent in 1976, and Reagan's (R) winning margin in 1980 was 10.1 per cent. A margin of 10 per cent or more is considered a landslide in American presidential politics. Cf. Gallup surveys for appropriate years.

22 Quoted in Richard A. Brody, "The Puzzle of Political Participation in America," in King (Ed.), n.8, p.291.

23 *Congressional Quarterly,* Vol. 38, 8 November 1980, p. 3297.

24 See Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Competition," n. 10, pp. 281-283, and James Sundquist, n.8,

25 See Austin Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," in King (Ed.), n.8, pp. 236-241.

26 Ibid., pp. 222-236. Also see, Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction Party Reform in America,* n.8; Theodore White, *The Making of the President* 1972 (New York, 1973), and William J. Crotty, n.8.

27 See Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, *The New Presidential Elite* (New York, 1976), Chapter 10.

28 Under FECA, the national parties are awarded funds for their presidential conventions, plus two cents per voter in the general election campaign, or $4.7 million in 1980.

29 For more details *re* the effects of FECA on the finance function of national political parties, see, Delmar D. Dunn, *Financing Presidential Campaigns* (Washington, D.C., 1972), Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," in King (Ed.), n.8, pp. 241-245, and *Congressional Quarterly,* Vol. 38, 1980, pp. 2011, 2968. For the information-furnishing and voter-mobilization functions of the national parties vis-a-vis the FECA, see Kevin P. Phillips, *Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age,* n.18.

30 There has been a great deal of talk about public financing of congressional elections, but members of Congress evidently view this proposal as minimizing their advantages of incumbency. Since 1975, the State of Iowa has created a fund for campaign financing through a voluntary check off on state income tax report forms and, commendably, the public funds go to the state parties and not the the candidates.

31 Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1951), Chapter 10.

32 Ibid., p. 243. See also Lubell's. *The Hidden Crisis* (New York, 1970).

33 See James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), pp. 195-203,for an analysis of "the Presidential wing" and "the Congressional wing" of both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, dating from the first party system.

34 Ibid.

35 See David S. Broder, n. 8, Chapter 8.

36 See Samuel Patterson, "The Semi-Sovereign Congress," in King (Ed.), n. 8, pp. 125-177 and *Congressional Quarterly,* Vol. 38, 13 September 1980, pp. 2695-2700.

37 Patterson, Ibid., pp. 167-169.

38 Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America,* n. 8, p. 208.

39 Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Politics," n.8, pp. 12-22.

40 Ibid., p. 12.

41 Ibid., p. 20.

42 Ibid., p. 21.

43 Ibid., p. 22.

44 Walter Dean Burnham, "American Politics in the 1970's: Beyond Party," in William N. Chambers and W. D. Burnham (Eds), *The American Party System: Stages of Political Development,* n.1, pp. 308-357.

45 Ibid., p. 352.

46 Ibid., p. 354.

47 Ibid., p. 355.

48 Ranney, "The Political Parties: Reform and Decline," in King (Ed.), n.8, p. 247.

49 James Sundquist, n.8.

50 James L. Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?" *Political Science Quarterly* (New York), Vol. 88, December 1973, pp. 559-581.

51 Ibid., p.579.

52 Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System,* n. 8, pp. 308-373.

53 Ibid., pp. 369-370 and Sundquist, "Whither the American Party System?" n. 50, 579-581.

54 Sundquist, n. 8, pp. 373 and 581.

55 Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1969), p. 25.

56 Ibid., pp. 43-186.

57 Ibid., pp. 187-289.

58 Ibid., pp. 290-411.

59 Ibid., p. 412.

60 Ibid., p. 460.

61 Ibid., p. 474.

62 Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, "Is it the End of an Era?" *Public Opinion,* October-November, 1980.

63 Kevin P. Phillips, *Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age,* n.18.

64 Ibid., p. *v*.

65 Ibid., p. *viii-ix*.

66 Ibid., Chapter 1.

67 Ibid., Chapter 2.

68 Ibid., Chapters 3 and 4.

69 Ibid., Chapter 5.

70 Everett C. Ladd, Jr., with Charles D. Hadley, *Transformations of the American Party Systems: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the* 1970's (New York, 1978), Second Edition. Also see, Everett C. Ladd, "Re-alignment? No. De-alignment? Yes," *Public Opinion,* October-November, 1980.

71 See Ladd, *Transformations of the American Party System,* n.70, pp. 326-328 and surveys by Michigan's Surveey Research Center.

72 Ibid., p. 328.

73 *Congressional Quarterly* Vol. 38, 8 November 1980, p. 3297.

74 Ibid., p. 3300.

75 Ibid., p. 3325.

76 Ibid., Vol. 38, 15 November 1980, p. 3372.

77 Ibid., Vol. 38, 8 November 1980, pp. 3325 and 3327.

78 E.g., Tom Wicker, "Reagan Faces a Paradox," *International Herald Tribune,* 4-5 May 1981, p .4; James Reston, "Some Doubts Raised on Reagan's Victory," *International Herald Tribune*, 14 May 1981, p. 4, and David Broder, "Reagan: A Nervous Wall Street," *International Herald* Tribune, 9-10 May 1981, p. 4.

79 Quoted in Wicker, Ibid.

80 See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1973).

81 Phillips, *Mediacracy*, n.18, p. 194.

RIOTS IN BRITAIN : AN ANALYSIS

By B. VIVEKANANDAN*

Peace and tranquility in Britain was seriously disrupted by a spate of riots in different parts of the country from April to July 1981. It is estimated that the riots, which affected Birmingham, Brixton, Liverpool, Manchester, Southall, etc., caused damage to properties worth about £45 million.[1] *Although some commentators have collectively characterized these riots as "racial," a closer look into their nature and participation would reveal that the riots were caused by a combination of factors, including race, unemployment, hooliganism, alienation of the youth, unsatisfactory housing conditions, suspicion over the impartiality of the police, etc.*

I

RIOT CAUSES ANALYZED

RACIAL FACTORS

The racial factor evolves mainly around the presence of coloured immigrants in Britain. Britain's immigrant population is about 1.8 million composed of peoples of Chinese, Italian, Jewish, West Indian, African and Asian origins out of a total of 57 million. Their presence in notable numbers has made the British society multi-racial. If one looks back to the post-Second World War history of race relations, it may be found that at least until the race riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958, seldom had the racial element been a contentious factor in Britain's social relationships. Indeed, one of the spillover effects of the race riots in 1958 was a louder demand for curbs on Commonwealth immigation into Britain, as a result of which the racial factor became a part of Britain's immigration policy.

Measures Restricting Immigration

It may be recalled that the coloured population in Britain in 1958 was only 1,90,000 out of which about 50,000 were from the Indian sub-continent.[2] However, following the racial disturbances of 1958, restrictions on Commonwealth immigration were sought on the ground of problems arising out of the concentration of immigrants in certain localities of Britain. Though these disturbances seem to have resulted in the development of a new attitude in official circles towards Commonwealth immigration to Britain, the British Government introduced a Bill to restrict Commonwealth immigration only in 1961, that too, according to R. A. Butler, then Home Secretary,

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"only after long and anxious considerations and a considerable reluctance."[3] It was stated that the government had initiated this measure due to pressures of certain social problems like inadequate housing, overcrowding and unemployment.[4] The Bill became an Act in July 1962. Since then immigration control has been progressively tightened. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, in the wake of the influx of Asians from Kenya to Britain following the "Kenyanisation" programme in Kenya, the Immigrants Act of 1971, which contained a "patrial" clause also and the British Nationality Bill passed by British Parliament this year, have applied severe restrictions on immigration—especially from the new Commonwealth countries—to Britain.

It is understandable that in order to deal with, or forestall, a particular social or economic situation, in this case to stem the tide of a large and sudden influx of people from outside, which also had the potentiality of added strain on the country's economy and social services, the British Government came forward with new legislations to end the open door policy hitherto pursued as regards Commonwealth immigration. But, at the same time it was also imperative to see that social relationships in Britain, especially between the majority and the ethnic minority already present, remained harmonious. Unfortunately, what has happened in Britain during the last two decades was that simultaneous to the introduction of restrictions on Commonwealth immigrants, the complexion of immigrants—black and brown—was highlighted and an alarming picture painted of its effects on the future composition of the British population. Imaginary figures of a highly exaggerated nature have been presented by persons like Enoch Powell; for example, about the would-be coloured population in Britain in the year 2000 in order to stir up hatred against immigrants already settled in Britain. Enoch Powell, as an individual, and the British Movement and the National Front as organizations have become the disseminating centres of this racist-loaded propaganda against the coloured immigrants in Britain.

Today, Britain has a coloured population of about 2.3 million out of which about 7 lakhs are from the Indian sub-continent with an Indian component of about 4 lakhs mainly drawn from a few districts of Punjab. Others hail mainly from the West Indies and Africa. If one goes by the statistics, it is obvious that in the midst of 55 million whites the presence of 1.5 million coloured population is too insignificant a number to make any impact on the overall complexion of Britain. But it can create problems if there is concentration of immigrants in certain localities after effecting substantial displacement of the local whites in Britain. Indeed, this has occurred in certain areas like Birmingham, Brixton, Manchester, Southall, Toxteth, Wolverhampton, etc. To a great extent this clustering has hampered the assimilation process of the immigrant population with the British way of life.

Role of Fascist Political Organizations

In recent years considerable pressures have been built up in Britain against the coloured immigrants. Besides the various social and legal measures, some of them were also subjected to harassment by the overzealous immigration officials at various entry points in Britain, including the Heathrow airport. Fascist organisations like the British Movement and the National Front have emerged in the country with an avowed objective of harassing coloured immigrants and making their lives miserable. They lead physical and verbal assaults on the non-white population through their arm band—the Skinheads.[5] This developing hostile environment has forced the coloured peoples to seek safety by clustering together.

The National Front in its manifesto published in 1979, reiterated its pledge to repatriate "all coloured immigrants and their offspring." Such repatriation, they believed, would alleviate the suffering of "non-white people condemned to live in an increasingly hostile Britain."[6] The Front believes in the superiority of the White race and thinks that there is a "cultural clash" in Britain between the Whites and non-Whites. It believes also in cultural nationalism, the expression of which is its advocacy for repatriation of the coloured immigrants as the only possible policy which would meet Britain's needs—i.e. White.[7] *The Bulldog,* the newspaper of the Young National Front, is full of stories aimed at incitement of racial hatred against the coloured immigrants in Britain. The July 1981 issue of the newspaper wrote: "The blacks have our jobs, our homes and, if we don't fight back they will soon have our country."[8] In another article, captioned "Coloured Immigration Can Seriously Damage Your Health," the paper wrote that the immigrant doctors were killing, injuring and raping their patients.[9]

In recent years, the National Front, which has a 20 per cent component of Skinheads, has been concentrating its efforts on school children in order to convert them to the cause of racialism. This is being done by the adoption of Nazi methods—effective and enduring indoctrination of immature minds. In the process, the Front radiates a message of hatred against the coloured immigrants and depicts the latter as the sole cause of Britain's ills. Indeed, of all the activites of the National Front, this one, unless effectively curbed, has highly dangerous potentials since it instils in the upcoming generation racism, violence and other fascist methods which can cut at the very roots of the value system upon which the British political and social edifices are built.

British Society Rejects Fascist Race Propaganda

Without much doubt it may be said that British society as a whole is basically receptive to the concept of a multiracial Britain and is tolerant to the coloured immigrants. A cross-section of the British people openly acknowledge the contributions that immigrants have made to the health and wealth of Britain, conceding them the right to enjoy a respectable position, free from discrimination, in British society. At the official level also, several measures have been taken to promote harmonious race relations. In 1965 the first Race Relations Act, which outlawed racial discrimination in public places and made incitement to racial hatred unlawful, was passed; it set up a Race Relations Board to enforce anti-discrimination laws. In 1968, the Government passed the second Race Relations Act which outlawed racial discrimination in housing, employment, facilities and services and set up the Community Relations Commission in order to promote racial harmony. Again in 1976, the third Race Relations Act was passed which gave power to make formal investigations against companies or any other organisations suspected of discrimination and gave individual complainants direct access to courts. In 1977, the Commission for Racial Equality emerged out of the old Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission, arming it with wide powers to eliminate racial discrimination and promote racial harmony. The record shows that during the four years of its existence, the Commission had completed inquiry into 10 cases and found that widespread discrimination was prevalent at different areas and levels of employment.[10] But, the Commission's effectiveness has not yet been felt in Britain.

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the British population undoubtedly detest racism and treat the racists with revulsion; they have also never approved the extremist line followed by racist groups like the National Front or the British Movement. It is important to note in this context that the National Front and its pernicious programme of the repatriation of "all coloured immigrants and their offspring" got a severe rebuff from British society when it totally rejected all its 303 candidates who contested the 1979 General Elections in Britain. The rejection was so total and resounding that all the Front candidates lost their deposits miserably; except John Tyndall, the Chairman of the Front, none of the others polled more than 2,000 votes. In all the National Front could collect only a dismal 0.6 per cent of the total votes polled.

At the political level also, no major political party in Britain has shown any inclination to support racial discrimination against the coloured immigrants. It may be recalled that when Enoch Powell, whose views in the matter approximate to those of the National Front, made an inflammatory speech at Birmingham on new Commonwealth immigrants on 20 April 1968, saying that "like the Romans, I seem to see the river Tiber foaming with much blood," it took hardly 24 hours for the Conservative Party leader, Edward Heath, to condemn the speech and dismiss Powell from the Shadow Cabinet as a punitive measure. Although Mrs. Margaret Thatcher is credited with her pre-election reference to the fear of Britain being "swamped" by immigrants, and although Edward Heath criticized her policies as breeding racial hatred, she has not lent any support, as Prime Minister, to discrimination or harassment of the coloured immigrants in Britain.[11] On the other hand, the Government has expressed determination to fight racism in the country. William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, while emphasizing "our duty to fight racial hatred," reaffirmed the Government's "complete" commitment

> ...to a society in which every one has equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities. We want a society in which people are treated acording to their merits as human beings and fellow-citizens, and not on the basis of irrational preconceptions; a society in which individual customs and traditions are respected; a society in which equal opportunities are open to all. I do not believe there are separate roads to equal society for black or brown or white.... All our citizens are entitled to equal treatment and equal opportunity."[12]

Racist Explosion in Southall

Coloured immigrants are seen all over Britain—from the Scottish Western Isles in the north, through many of the industrial cities of the north and midlands, down to the districts of London in the south. They occupy important positions as doctors, magistrates, civil servants and elected members of local authorities. But, since the vast majority of them are attached to industry, their larger concentration is in the industrial towns. Nevertheless, interestingly enough, although the recent riots were largely in the cities where there is a concentration of coloured immigrants, it would be a travesty of truth to say that racism was the principal element of violent outbreaks in these areas. In fact among the riot-affected areas in recent months Southall was the only instance of a racist explosion, and that too was caused by the intervention of racist elements from outside.

Southall has the largest concentration of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent. These Asian immigrants, mostly Indians from Punjab, began to settle in Southall in the 1950s and early 1960s displacing the local Whites. In fact, the 1961 census shows that there were 2,000 Commonwealth immigrants in Southall—1600 from India.[13] Since then however, Southall has witnessed a steady flow of Asians. As a result, today out of a total population of 70,000 in Southall, about 35,000 are Asians, mainly Indians from Punjab. It is true that this concentration of an ethnic immigrant group in one locality and its spillover effects have given rise to certain genuine complaints from the local population. These complaints from the local population, that the immigrants in Southall showed little sensitivity to the feelings of the local white population appeared to be genuine. For instance, the local people had complained that there was no facility to see an English movie in Southall. The author during a visit to Southall, three years ago, found that there was substance in this complaint. Some enterprising Indian entrepreneurs have bought all the three cinema theatres in Southall and not one was showing an English movie. Instead the movies shown in them were either Hindi, Punjabi or Urdu. However, despite complaints of this nature, they never reached a point of acrimony such which would spark off violence between the local population and Asian immigrants. Further, it has also been widely recognized that community relations between Whites and non-Whites in Southall were by and large harmonious.

Southall has been the scene of violence only twice—in 1979 and in 1981; on both occasions they were triggered off by the White extremists from outside. In April 1979, Blair Peach, a New Zealand teacher, was killed and scores injured, during a demonstration against a National Front meeting at the townhall in Southall.[14] In July 1981, the area was invaded by 200 Skinheads from London's East End on the pretext of playing "Oi" music at the Hamborough Tavern in Southall. They attacked the Asian shops in Broadway, and the Asian youth countered them.[15] Therefore, the riots in Southall in July this year could well be called race riots deliberately started by the Skinheads through provocative actions against the Asians.

BRIXTON: INEPT HANDLING BY POLICE

Barring Southall, the riots in other parts of Britain fall under a different category. In Brixton, for example, the riots—in April and July 1981—were caused by the inept handling of certain situations by the local police. The April riots were sparked off by the delay on the part of the police in taking a stabbed black youth to hospital on 10 April 1981, though there were certain other underlying local causes like unemployment, poor housing and economic and social deprivation.[16] Similarly, the 10 July riots were caused by the beating up and arrest of a young Black businessman who went to the police to plead in favour of a friend who was being roughed up by them.[17] Although the riots that followed could also be described as an expression of anger against the police, in actuality the disgruntled youth took it as an opportunity to loot the shops in the area. But, the riots which broke out five days later, on 15 July 1981, were undoubtedly caused by the heavy-handed and provocative police raids at midnight on a number of houses in a vain search for petrol bomb factories.[18] It was reported that during the search, the police used sledge-hammers, pick-axe handles, and crowbars to break open the doors and windows of the houses and smashed floors and furniture.[19] Reportedly, the looting in Brixton was the work of a group of White and Black youths—Whites 40 per cent and Blacks 60 per cent. Thus, all available evidences show that the principal cause of the riots in Brixton was the insensitive or high-handed police behaviour rather than racism. The high rate of unemployment among the youth was also a contributory factor.

TOXTETH: A COMBINATION OF HOOLIGANISM AND FRUSTRATIONS

Riots in the Toxteth District of Liverpool however, present a different scenario, although, as in Brixton, they broke out as a result of a small incident involving the local police. It may be pointed out that the problems of Liverpool are more complex than elsewhere in Britain. It has a sizeable section of the Irish community and a notable contingent of Black West Africans and West Indians settled since the late nineteenth century. The size of the Black population in Liverpool today is about 30,000, out of which about 40 per cent are British born. In addition to this the city has a sizeable Chinese community also. The presence of the Irish people has been responsible for a tradition of Protestant-Catholic fissure. Besides, Liverpool has a history of confrontation between the Blacks and the Whites; these occurred in May-June 1919 and in July-August 1948, when large sections of Black labour was displaced in order to rehabilitate the ex-servicemen returned from the Second World War. However, these confrontations did not lead to any street clashes.

A recent survey conducted by the Liverpool University reveals that the overall unemployment level in Liverpool-8 District (Toxteth included) is 43 per cent among the Whites and 47 per cent among the Blacks.[20] This thus is the dismal economic situation in which Liverpool, once a highly prosperous sea port, is placed today. Recession is also taking place in a progressive manner so that many large firms in the area have either closed down or are resorting to labour retrenchment. Among the notable firms which have closed in recent months in Liverpool are the Courtaulds factory, Tate and Lyle sugar firm, English Electric, Plessey, Thorn Colour Tubes, Cammel Laird, Western Ship Repairs, Tillotsons, Bird's Eye, Standard Triumph, Dunlop, Mecanno, and Massey Ferguson.[21] In addition to this, housing conditions also remain extremely unsatisfactory.

As in Brixton, riots in Toxteth were ignited by a small incident; on 3 July 1981, a Black youth chased by the police fell off from the motorcycle and was caught by them. Soon, about forty Black youths gathered there, grabbed the youth and disappeared. Riots followed when a crowd of about 150 Black and White youth appeared on the scene and clashed in the Upper Parliament Street—the main artery of the area. Notably, the rioters were both Blacks and Whites—of all ages and of both sexes—and the police were the direct and common target of their attacks. Cars were burnt and shops looted. Out of 63 persons arrested in connection with the riots—12 were Blacks and 51 Whites. Thus, taking into account the totality of the situation, it appears that the underlying causes of riots in Toxteth were a combination of hooliganism, unemployment and frustration among the Blacks and Whites who were awaiting a pretext. However, they cannot be described as race riots.

Similarly, in cities like Manchester, Leicester, Huddersfield, etc., the rioters indiscriminately damaged the establishments owned by the Asiams, West Indians and Whites and the police was again the common target of these multiracial rioters.

It is not necessary to survey, in detail, the recent riots which have taken place in other places like Bristol, and parts of London like Woolwich, Delham, Dalston, Fulham, etc., since all of them fall within the patterns detailed above. However, to a great extent these riots have served as a pointer to the test of the quality of the British society today. It is true that Britain is undergoing a difficult economic situation and recession; the unemployment figure has reached a record level close to 3 million. This mass unemployment, coupled with the bleak prospects of new job opportunities, has resulted in brewing unrest in Britain. As Peter Walker has rightly observed: "The history of cities has shown that irrespective of being black or white, high unemployment among teenagers has always meant a massive increase in crime."[22]

II

POSSIBLE PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Observers have given some thought to possible preventive measures which would help forestall recurrence of similar troubles. According to Roy Hattersley, Shadow Home Secretary, the problem could be combated by a policy of positive discrimination to help the young Blacks get jobs; special incentives to private companies in inner cities; major investments in housing, schools and amenities, and by the relocation of public enterprises to city centres.[23] William Whitelaw, Home Secretary, is of the view that the government should develop policies designed to promote mutual tolerance and understanding on which the whole future of a free democratic society depends. He expressed his determination to see that the evils of extremist, racialist activities are isolated and eliminated.[24] He also assured the minority communities of the Government's complete commitment to a society in which none is a second class citizen and in which people are treated according to their merits and as fellow citizens.[25]

Conceding that Britain has a multi-racial society and that the vast majority of the British population is a tolerant community detesting racism, one cannot overlook the racist fringe among the peoples and the cases of discrimination against coloured immigrants. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Coggan, publicly affirmed that the coloured people suffer discrimination in obtaining accommodation and employment.[26] Indeed, a recent survey in Liverpool reveals that out of a total of 22.000 City Council jobs in Liverpool, where a sizeable section of the population is Black, only 169 went to the latter.

As regards the role of the police force there is suspicion; in fact its handling of the riots has come under severe criticism. In a few cases at least the police behaviour has been put as the immediate cause of the eruption of riots, e.g., riots in Brixton, and Toxteth. Instances like deliberate driving in of police vehicles into crowds—once resulting in the death of a person in Toxteth on 29 July 1981—are cited as examples of the rash behaviour of the police which aggravated tense situations. Similarly, there is a widespreed feeling that police actions are at times prejudiced against the coloured population. Therefore, it is imperative to restore the confidence of the ethnic minorities as regards the impartiality of the police force.

Another remedial step would perhaps be concerted economic measures to find solutions to the economic and social causes of the riots in Britain. The British Government in the aftermath of these riots, seems to be addressing itself to steps which would lead to the creation of more employment opportunities in the deprived inner city areas—the scenes of riots—by reopening some of the factories already closed down and reversing the trends of recession through the provision of incentives to industries.

But the most difficult problem to tackle would be the scourge of racism which is being slowly injected in the minds of the upcoming generation in Britain by fascist organizations like the British Movement and the National Front, which preserve racial hatred as their principle asset. However, in the present situation, neither the "you have seen nothing yet" attitude of Enoch Powell, nor his imaginary talk of a future "civil war,"[27] nor the talk of "keep Britain white," can contribute to the promotion of racial harmony in Britain. If fear and animosity becomes the order of the day, it would destroy the very fabric of a good and tolerant society which Britain has boasted of until now. Indeed, the stream of disaffection and hatred spread by fascist organizations like the National Front poses an enduring threat to the very foundations of the social relationship in Britain based on equality, liberty and tolerance. However, to deal with the racial problem, a more tolerant mental outlook towards the ethnic minorities—especially the coloured—is necessary; so that the complex of "unwanted" does not get rooted in the minds of the coloured immigrants. Besides, in a positive sense, the coloured people should be made to feel at home in Britain, and efforts should be made to provide them with sufficiently higher level opportunities in the civil service, military and police—as is done in the United Sates—so that they ould have a sense of belonging and recognition that they are partners in the building up of a new Britain. As Edward Heath said, those who deal with racial questions should bear in mind that they are dealing not only with statistics "but with people, with human beings, who have families and who have lives to live and who have problems just like everybody else."[28] However, dependence on CS gas, water cannon or rubber bullets or additional powers to the police, or even imposition of penalty on the parents of the youth involved in riots could hardly be a viable or durable solution.

As the recent riots in Britain seem to have been caused by a combination of racial-cum-economic-cum-social problems of the British society, it becomes imperative to adopt a multi-pronged approach to combat these problems. Racial hatred is undoubtedly an expression of dehumanisation. And to launch planned attacks on innocent people in the name of their colour, to make their lives miserable and unsafe, is further degradation. There is no doubt that fear is corrosive and destructive—whether it is the fear of police for a law-abiding citizen or the perennial fear of an instant fascist attack. What an onslaught it would be on Britain's esteem if its streets were to become unsafe and the pedestrians constantly intimidated by the lurking fear of murderous assaults anywhere at anytime at the hands of fascist, racist groups?

In this context, the findings of the Scarman Committee, which enquired into the riots, published in November 1981, makes interesting reading. The 154-page Report could well constitute a landmark in Britain's race relations and police-community relationship. Although the latter relationship in Britain remains the main focus of the Report, the Commission has extensively analyzed the riots and devoted a substantial portion of its report to focus the social causes—especially unemployment, housing, discrimination, education, insecurity, etc.[29] The Report underlines the point that racial disadvantage suffered by Britain's 2.3 million non-white population is a current fact of British life and that "urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic, ineradicable disease, threatening the very survival of our society."[30] It also blamed the police and the community at large for the outbreak of the riots and urged the Government and the local authorities to take steps to eliminate racial inequality.

> The attack on racial disadvantage must be more direct than it has been ....A policy of direct and co-ordinated attack on racial disadvantage inevitably means that the ethnic minorities will enjoy for a time a positive discrimination in their favour. But, it is a price worth paying if it accelerates the elimination of the unsettling factor of racial disadvantage from the social fabric of the United Kingdom.[31]

Further, Lord Scarman took note of the provocative nature of marches by extreme right-wing groups through areas of high ethnic minority settlement and observed that the sight of those marchers, heavily escorted by columns of police, had led significant numbers in the minority communities to conclude that the police were present purely to protect those marching and were therefore in agreement with their political beliefs. " 'Institutional racism' does not exist in Britain, but racial disadvantage and its nasty associate, racial discrimination, have not yet been eliminated. They poison minds and attitudes; they are, and so long as they remain, will continue to be a potent factor of unrest," it concluded.[32]

Most of the blame for the breakdown of community relations was laid at the doors of the police force. Their racial prejudices and consequent tough policing tactics against young blacks, the Report stated, was largely responsible for their social harassment. The Brixton riots, the Report added, were "essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police." There was a strong racial element in the disorders but they were not a race riot.[33] In Southall, the Committee observed, the Skinheads were to blame. "The disorders which ensued appear to have been a response to what the local Asian community saw as an intrusion into its area by a racially hostile group of white youths. To that extent, the circumstances of the disturbances differ from those in other areas."[34] The riots in Liverpool, the Report observed further, were a case of deprivation in the inner city areas.

In order to forestall the recurrence of similar situations, Lord Scarman called for a new approach both from the police and the Government. His recommendations, in this context, included: 1. The introduction of an independent element into the police complaints procedure; 2. The increase of the initial police training period from 10 weeks to six months as a step to eliminate racial prejudice from the police force; 3. A statutory framework for police-community consultation; 4. Recruitment of more police officers from the ethnic minorities; 5. Use of existing law to ban racist marches; 6. Inclusion of racially prejudiced behaviour as an offence in the Police Discipline Code, normally punished by dismissal; 7. Review by local authorities of their housing policies to check discrimination; 8. Better education for ethnic minorities; etc.[35]

The initial reactions, both official and unofficial, in Britain to the Scarman Report were quite favourable and encouraging. Roy Hattersley, the Shadow Home Secretary, expressed the view that "to reject any of its proposals would set back the cause of community relations in an unacceptable way."[36] Later, in a debate in the House of Commons on 10 December 1981, he said that if the Scarman Report was implemented it could make a dramatic improvement in two areas of concern: in the confidence that the police enjoyed among the ethnic minorities and policy of policing in the inner city areas.[37] David Lane, Chairman of the Commission of Racial Equality, called the Report a historic document which offered "a brilliant analysis of Britain's urban and racial problems and an urgent prescription for action."[33] *The Guardian* observed that the Report had created a watershed in Britain's policing policy.[39] The Association of Chief Police Officers welcomed the recommendation to increase the period of initial police training from 10 weeks to 6 months.[40] Leaders of the minority groups in Britain also welcomed the Report.

At the official level, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw instantly accepted two of the recommendations made by the Scarman Committee and promised careful examination of the others. In the House of Commons he stated on 25 November 1981, that he was preparing to introduce an independent element into the police complaints procedure and was also increasing the training period for the police. Discussions would also be held on arrangements for statutory consultation between the police and the community, he added, and efforts would be made to progress on the issue of banning marches considered racist.[41] Later, during a debate on the Scarman Report in the House of Commons on 10 December 1981, Whitelaw accepted Scarman's recommendation that vigourous action was required if the composition of the police force was to become more representative of the community it served.[42] In this connection, he pointed out that throughout the 1970s the number of police officers from the ethnic minorities from England and Wales had registered a steady increase. In 1970, he observed, there were only 33 non-white police officers in England and Wales, including 8 in the Metropolitan Police; but in 1981 it was 334, including 134 in the Metropoliton Police; Hereafter, he added, more candidates from the ethnic minorities would be encouraged to come forward to join the police force.[43] Needless to say that one would have to wait before making a proper assessment of the impact of these recommendations on Britain's social life until their actual implementation.

Nevertheless, one may ask the question: What can an outside world do in this context to help tackle this problem? The situation calls for moderation and understanding of the basic issues. Certainly, outright condemnation of the entire British society for the mindless racist behaviour of a few fascist elements is unfair and can prove to be counter-productive. In fact, unjustifiably condemnatory outbursts can hardly contribute towards the promotion of better relationship between Britain and, say, a country like India, from where about 4 lakh people have migrated to Britain. The efforts should be to strengthen the hands of those who genuinely try a multi-racial society in Britain.

November 1981.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

INTRA-NON-ALIGNED DISCORDS AND INDIA

"THERE exists today a paradoxical situation with respect to the movement of non-alignment."[1] Although its membership has increased from 25 plus at the First Non-Aligned Conference at Belgrade in 1961 to 93 plus at the Sixth Conference at Havana in 1979, the non-aligned movement has not emerged stronger as a factor in international relations. On the contrary, it has been weakened, and its "credibility" has been eroded.[2] One of the factors responsible for this weakening is increasing conflict between and among the non-aligned countries. Intra-non-aligned discords may be divided into two categories, ideological discords and bilateral disputes. Ideological discords have undermined the unity of the movement by virtually splitting the non-aligned countries into two groups: pro-Western and pro-Communist countries. In recent years there has been a move by Cuba and some other pro-Communist countries to nudge the movement closer to the Soviet bloc on the grounds that the Socialist countries are "the natural allies" of the non-aligned states. At the Havana Summit in September 1979 much time was taken up by some Arab countries trying to condemn Egypt for signing a peace treaty with Israel and by others, such as Somalia and Vietnam, to condemn their particular "enemies" within the movement.[3] Burma, disillusioned with the trend of deliberations at the summit meetings, withdrew from the movement soon after the Havana summit. Similarly, bilateral conflicts such as conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia, between Iran and Iraq have affected the unity and solidarity of the non-aligned group adverrely, and several non-aligned countries are disturbed over the future of the movement.

India has a special association with non-alignment; it is not only its founder-member, but has also been a prominent one. It has been taking an active part in shaping its character, course and direction. That is why a study of its responses to the problem of intra-non-aligned conflicts deserves our attention.

Since the origins of non-alignment India has been solicitous about the unity among the non-aligned countries. Jawaharlal Nehru, who formulated the policy of non-alignment in September 1946, was cautious lest there be differences among Asian countries on this policy. This was discernible in his speech at the Asian Relations Conference that he convened in March 1947. He said, the countries of Asia should work for the larger ideal of "one world" and not for any group which came in the way of the larger world group. However, he made no reference to the policy of non-alignment. Possibly he thought that "this idea would be too novel and controversial to recommend to this Conference."[4] It is likely that he was circumspect because of the advent of the Cold War.

INDIA'S ROLE IN INTRA-IDEOLOGICAL DISCORDS

Nehru's Role in the Fifties

"Ideological issues became the burning realities of international life," in the post-Second World War period.[5] The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States in the wake of World War II had grown intense towards the mid-fifties; it was "almost impossible to consider any matter logically, reasonably or by itself." Everything was considered from the Communist or anti-Communist point of view because the major part of the world was divided into the Western and the Communist blocs.[6] Such an international milieu tended to divide the non-aligned countries along the sides of the rival cold war antagonists. This could be discerned at the Asian-African Conference which was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955. The Conference, attended by independent countries of Asia and Africa, reflected the cold war attitudes of the time. All participating countries were opposed to colonialism, but several of them, including a few non-aligned countries such as Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), wanted to oppose what they described as Soviet imperialism.[7] Sir John Kotelawala, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, called on the Conference to condemn "all forms of colonialism" including "Soviet colonialism" as evidenced by Soviet domination of Central and Eastern European States. "Are not these colonies," he asked, "as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa and Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty to openly declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism."[8] Nehru apprehending that such a view would split the conference, made a prolonged intervention in the debate opposing Kotelawala. He reminded the delegates that some of the states alleged to be subjects of "Soviet colonialism" like Poland and Czechoslovakia—were represented in the United Nations. Many of the participating countries recognized those states and had diplomatic relations with them. Some Western countries also recognized them. The United Nations recognized them as sovereign, independent states. Nehru made it clear that it was not proper for the Conference then to challenge the basis of that recognition. He said: "It seems to me rather extraordinary that we should discuss nations as such whose people we have recognized in the capacity of sovereign nations and then say that they are colonial territories." He appealed to the delegates to take a broader view of the issue and desist from taking a stand such as would split the Afro-Asian countries between rival ideological groups.[9] Nehru opposed the "war of ideologies which he said, "smacked of all the bigotry, fanaticism and intolerance which characterized the religious crusade of Europe." He endeavoured to keep this part of the world free from big power politics and desired to turn this region into an "area of peace."[10]

These ideological differences crystallized by the 1960's leading to the emergence of two distinct groups: radicals and moderates. While the radicals stressed the need for a struggle against the established order, the moderates sought its continuance so as to solve their domestic problems. Both groups wanted to secure full independence—political and economic—from the Great Powers; while the radicals believed that the only means to achieve this objective was to continue their struggle against the imperialists, the moderates felt that their salvation lay in international co-operation. For them, the idea of orderly change and industrial and technological progress with capitalist co-operation was the ideal.[11] But for the radicals, confrontation was a basic precondition to economic progress.

The rival non-aligned groups, i.e., the radicals and moderates, projected their differences at subsequent non-aligned conferences. At the Non-Aligned Preparatory Meeting in Cairo in June 1961, the radicals—Indonesia, Guinea, Mali and Cuba—advocated a "narrow" concept of non-alignment and attempted to make the non-aligned group a closed society by granting admission only to a few countries.[12] India feared that the radicals might attempt the formation of a third bloc, something repugnant to its conception of non-alignment. Later, supported by Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Egypt and Yugoslavia, it recommended a "flexible" definition o fnon-alignment. The leader of the Indian delegation, R.K. Nehru, the then Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry pleaded for the extension of the perimeters of non-alignment. India finally won the day when its conception of non-alignment prevailed.[13] It along with the sponsoring countries, adopted a broad criteria, representative of diverse elements, for defining non-alignment.[14]

If the radicals had had their way, they would have confined themselves to condemning Western "colonialists" at the Belgrade Conference. It was Nehru who stressed that the Belgrade Conference should desist from indulging in negative fulmination against "Western imperialists" and strive for "constructive" results. At the Conference, the radicals led by President Sukarno of Indonesia laid the blame on Western colonialism and imperialism for all the problems confronting the world. He reiterated the view that "there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other."[15] Nehru, on the other hand, without getting bogged down by ideological conflicts stressed the importance of maintaining peace in the world and highlighted the "dangers of modern nuclear warfare" which overshadowed all other issues. Nehru said:

> Imperialism, Colonialism, Racialism and the rest—things which are vitally important—are somewhat over-shadowed by this crisis, for if war comes all else for the moment goes. Therefore it becomes inevitable for us. . . to make sure that the dominant note of our thinking and action and what we say and put down is that it is that crisis that confronts humanity.[16]

India Breaks China's Drive for Influence in Afro-Asia

Ideological differences increased among the non-aligned countries in the years following the Belgrade Conference. Although the Cold War had been eroded towards 1962-64, China intensified its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union during this period and made a vigorous bid to win allies in the Third World; it used Indonesia and Pakistan as its cat's paw. The campaign for a second Asian-African Conference during this period was part of the China drive for influence in the Afro-Asian countries.[17] Thus Afro-Asia and non-alignment which ran parallel in the 1950s became "openly competitive" towards the mid 1960s.[18] India contributed to the growth of the non-aligned movement by discountenancing the move for a second Asian-African Conference and by taking active part in organizing a second non-aligned conference. However, Nehru's death in May 1964 left the moderate non-aligned states in disarray. At the Second Non-Aligned Conference which took place in Cairo in September 1964, the radicals such as President Sukarno of Indonesia and African leaders like Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modeiba Keita and Ben Bella stressed "almost exclusively the struggle against colonialism."[19] Besides, Sukarno advocated a policy of confrontation with the developed countries. He stated: "There will be peaceful co-existence between us the developing countries and the imperialist states only when we can face them with equal strength."[20] Lal Bahadur Shastri, on the contrary, stressed the importance of peaceful co-existence, nuclear disarmament and peaceful settlement of disputes; he said: "We must continue to strive for peace, to resolve all differences through peaceful methods by conciliation, as distinct from confrontation and by trust instead of suspicion."[21]

Mrs. Gandhi's Contribution to a United Non-Aligned Group

Nevertheless, towards the mid-1960s India's position in the international sphere was low; its debacle in the war with China in 1962 had already shattered its global image. Worsening political and economic conditions that followed in the wake of the death of Nehru further weakened its international standing. It thus maintained a low posture in world affairs, and its low profile synchronized with the eclipse of the non-aligned movement.[22] There were two main reasons for it. First, "cohesion between the more radical and moderate member countries proved to be precarious."[23] Secondly, with the relaxation of tensions between the two Super Pewers in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, non-alignment seemed to have fallen into desuetude inasmuch as it was considered less relevant. However, it became active in the following decade when India's domestic situation improved.

India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, overcame the trauma of the earlier reverses in the 1962 war with China by strengthening militarily and politically. It also began to improve its global image. The non-aligned group recovered and came to life again in the seventies.[24] Mrs. Gandhi played a major role in reactivating the movement; she not only highlighted the relevance of non-alignment but also sought to strengthen the movement by emphasising economic co-operation among the non-aligned countries. In an interview with the Yugoslav news agency, *Tanjug* in August 1970 Mrs. Gandhi said: "Non-alignment at present has more value than ever before because there exist two hostile blocs. The theory of domination of Super Powers and spheres of influence is still very much present. Therefore, it is important that nations declare themselves to have their own independent policies." She discerned that "the biggest danger" to non-alignment "is the conomic pressure of large countries," and laid stress on developing economic co-operation. She said, "Non-aligned countries in essence have the same problems. They are all poor countries....and therefore, I think, they must try to find ways to support each other and to help every country to consolidate its independence. If we do not become economically stronger, our independence will to a certain degree be in danger."[25] Mrs. Gandhi regarded "neo-colonialism" as a threat to the non-aligned countries; at the third Non-aligned Summit in Lusaka, she stated: "The old comes back in a new guise. There are subtle intrigues to undermine our self-confidence and to sow dissensions and mutual distrust among us. Powerful vested interests, domestic and foreign, are combining to erect new structures of neo-colonialism."[26] In fact, non-alignment changed its character and content in an important aspect in the 1970s. "From a primarily political strategy individually and collectively followed by the new states it has transformed itself fundamentally into a collective economic movement of the Third World Countries."[27] India under the premiership of Mrs. Gandhi took a leading role in bringing about this transformation of non-alignment. She recommended that economic issues be discussed at non-aligned conferences. In an interview to *Tanjug* in August 1973 Mrs. Gandhi said, that the most significant subject that the non-aligned summit at Algiers should address itself was to secure a better deal economically to the developing nations. She added that the conference should try to "influence the world economic forces in such a way that developing nations, especially those in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Caribbeans can overcome their poverty and secure a fairer return for their experts."[28]

India Checks Tilt Towards Soviet Union

Ideological differences surfaced again at the Algiers Summit. Fidel Castro of Cuba made a special plea for treating the Soviet Union favourably and refused to paint the two Super Powers with the same brush. He was opposed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Col. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. While Prince Sihanouk strongly dissented with Fidel Castro, Col. Gaddafi branded both the United States and the Soviet Union as colonialists and imperialists.[29] India did not get involved in the ideological dispute but criticised the old power politics' game practised by Big Powers.

At the Algiers Summit, Mrs. Gandhi welcomed *detente* between the Super Powers but pointed out that domination, external interference, coercion and occupation of other lands were continuing. She also warned against threats to world peace by the deliberate induction of arms in the name of promoting regional balance.[30]

As Super Power rivalries increased by the mid–seventies, particularly in the Indian Ocean region, and the two intensified their struggle for influence among the non-aligned countries, the major challenge before the latter was how to resist pressures, political or economic, from the Big Powers. In fact, some of the non-aligned countries were being used by the Super Powers as surrogates for fighting their battles by proxy, as it were, in non-aligned conferences. This could be discerned not only at the Algiers Summit Conference but also at the Colombo Summit meeting where Singapore's Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam presented the case for co-operation with the West, whereas the Cuban Deputy Prime Minister, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, reiterated that the non-aligned movement must recognise the Soviet Union as its chief ally.[31] Nevertheless, India stressed the unity of the non-aligned countries and cautioned against pressures from the Big Powers to divide and weaken them. In a speech at the Colombo Summit Conference, Mrs. Gandhi emphasised unity and said that a united non-aligned group would make an impact on world peace and on the evolution of a new economic order. She called for vigilance against attempts to split the movement, violate its integrity or introduce discords from outside. Colonial rule had almost, she observed, ended, but the legacy of the Cold War continued and many nations remained politically vulnerable to Big Power pressures.[32]

Cuba and other pro-Soviet countries, however, made vigorous efforts to commit the non-aligned movement to an alliance with the Soviet bloc[33] and were disinclined to put up with innuendoes critical of the Soviet Union. At the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in Belgrade in July 1978, they took exception to the inclusion of the word "hegemonism" in the draft political declaration since this term is normally associated with or seen as a reference to Soviet domination. At one stage, the uncompromising stands of the pro-Soviet group and their opponents on this particular word threatened to wreck the Conference and it was India which finally brought about a compromise. The word "hegemonism" was not deleted from the declaration but it was incorporated in such a way that it could be interpreted as referring to Western or Soviet hegemonism.[34] Similarly India played a role of a moderator at the meeting of the 25-nation Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries at Maputo (in Mozambique), in February 1979. The original draft communique prepared by the host country referred to socialist countries as "natural allies" of the non-aligned movement. India rightly pointed that while the help rendered by socialist countries to the liberation movement could not be minimized, a reference to that bloc as "natural allies" could well offend non-socialist countries critical of the minority regimes in southern Africa. It clarified that it was not in the interests of the liberation movements themselves to be deprived of support from all sources, socialist or non-socialist. The Indian view finally prevailed.[35]

The move to have the Soviet Union recognized as the "natural ally" of the non-aligned group,[36] mooted at the Algiers Summit and then reiterated at the Colombo meet, was openly campaigned for by the host country at the 1979 Havana Non-Aligned Summit Conference. India expressed the view that the concept of non-alignment ran counter to the philosophy of "natural alliance."[37] S.N. Mishra, the then Indian Foreign Minister, opposed the Cuban move to line up non-aligned nations behind the Soviet bloc in its ideological war with the Western bloc. He made it clear that—"We cannot have one foot in non-alignment and another in alignment."[38] Although Cuba and other pro-Soviet countries were not able to have their way at the Havana Summit, they succeeded in shifting the emphasis of non-alignment towards a more "anti-imperialist" stance. The Havana Declaration not only condemned imperialist states, in particular the United States, for seeking to "increase and consolidate their military presence in the (West Asian) region" but also criticised Egypt for signing a peace treaty with Israel.[39]

INDIA'S STAND ON BILATERAL DISPUTES

The Issue of Egypt's Suspension from Membership

Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979. President Carter, who had earlier initiated the Camp Devid Agreement, justified his sponsorship of the treaty by stating that it would open the way for peace in the West Asian region.[40] But the treaty which bore the "Made in USA" stamp assumed ideological overtones; whereas it was warmly welcomed by the governments of Western countries, it was vehemently condemned by official Soviet sources and other Communist bloc countries. Speaking at a banquet in Damascus on 27 March, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, said that the treaty struck a blow at the interests of all Arabs without exception and could not lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East because "its real purpose is to try to consolidate the results of the imperialist aggression of many years against the Arabs."[41] Most of the Arab states registered strong opposition to the treaty and demanded the suspension or expulsion of Egypt from membership of the non-aligned movement on the ground that it had acted contrary to the decisions of the non-aligned conferences over the Arab-Israeli conflict. This demand "divided not only the Arab states but the entire membership of the movement."[42]

India took a critical view of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty because it ignored the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict; it did not provide for Israel's full withdrawal from Arab territories it occupied by force in the 1967 War and the Palestinian people's legitimate rights in statehood and self-determination.[43] Nevertheless, it maintained friendly relations with

Egypt and was averse to the Arab move to suspend or expel it from the membership of the non-aligned movement. Intra-regional disputes, it believed, should not bring into question the membership of any member of the movement. Morarji Desai, the then Indian Prime Minister, took a principled stand; he stated: "Whatever may be the trouble with the Arab countries, there is no provision for removal of any country as long as the country fulfils the commitments of the non-aligned movement and Egypt fulfils them."[44] The dispute between Egypt and other Arab states on the former signing a separate peace treaty with Israel was in fact an intra-Arab issue and was "extraneous" to the non-aligned movement.[45] The Havana Summit criticised Egypt for signing the treaty with Israel but shelved the question of suspension until February 1981 when the conference of non-aligned foreign ministers took place in New Delhi. At the New Delhi conference India dissuaded the Arab states from pressing their demand for suspension of Egypt. In fact, the suspension demand receded into the background and the issue of the Iran-Iraq war posed a greater problem at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in New Delhi in February 1981 where Tehran and Baghdad demanded the suspension of each other from the non-aligned movement.[46]

Disputes Between and Among the Non-Aligned States

In the early years of non-alignment, conflicts between and among the non-aligned states were few and were "lightly dismissed,"[47] but as tensions relaxed and their numbers swelled a number of disputes arose—particularly in the 1970s. This was largely because many non-aligned countries began to practise the traditional power model in international relations contrary to the theory of non-alignment and took recourse to arms in order to settle their disputes. Besides, some countries began to use the forum of non-aligned conferences for airing their bilateral differences.

India has been opposed to using the forum of non-aligned conferences for ventilating bilateral differences. It stressed unity of the non-aligned nations for achieving common objectives such as the goal of a better world economic order. At the Colombo Summit in August 1976 Mrs. Gandhi said:

> We should not allow such differences as may exist between some members on certain issues to affect our unity. With so many leaders the conference is too important to spend time on bilateral matters. There are risks when national goals completely supersede the collective purpose.[48]

India also mobilized support for the view that bilateral differences among the non-aligned need not be projected at summit conferences but should be resolved by direct negotiations.[49]

In the second half of the 1970s many armed conflicts, such as the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Cambodia and Vietnam, took place among the non-aligned states. The threat to the unity of the group became so grave in 1978 that this issue dominated the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers. A.B. Vajpayee, the then Indian External Affairs Minister, called for a code of conduct for non-aligned nations with a view to ensuring strength and unity of the movement. He explained that the main element of that code should be an agreement among the nations that they should respect established frontiers and not resort to force for settling disputes.[50] The Belgrade Conference decided to offer the good offices of an informal ad-hoc group of fellow non-aligned nations for peaceful settlement of disputes between members without outside interference.[51] In consonance with this decision some non-aligned states offered their good offices and endeavoured to bring about peace between Iran and Iraq when the armed conflict between them began on 22 September 1980.

The Iran-Iraq War

India was concerned over the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. The bulk of the crude that it imported came from these two countries and it rightly felt that a prolonged conflict would cause serious problems.[52] Nevertheless, India adopted a "wait-and-see attitude."[53] It had cultivated friendly relations with both the countries and was keen to maintain them; it was therefore cautious with its peace initiatives for fear of being misunderstood. It also probably wanted to await the outcome of the Islamic Conference peace endeavours. The Islamic Goodwill Peace Mission, comprising the President of the Conference, Gen. Zia-ul Haq and the Secretary General, Habib Chatty, visited Tehran and Baghdad towards the end of September 1980. However, Zia-ul-Haq's initiative did not succeed. Shams Ardakani, Iran's special envoy who visited New Delhi on 29 September to deliver a message to the Indian Prime Minister from his country's top leadership, announced that Iran did not accept the Pakistani President's mediatory role. He said that his country expected the non-aligned countries, such as India, to play a "great role" to bring the Iran-Iraq hostilities to an end.[54] Similarly Iraq also sought India's initiative in bringing its conflict with Iran to an end.[55]

India's peace initiatives were started in October when it found that the earlier endeavours of the Islamic Conference did not get off the ground and that there were no indications of the conflict abating. Mrs. Gandhi wrote letters to Presidents Saddam Hussain and Bani Sadr making an impassioned plea for a peaceful solution of the problems between the two countries. Mrs. Gandhi expressed apprehension that the conflict between two non-aligned countries would weaken the unity and solidarity of the movement. She also pointed out that a prolonged conflict between these two countries would lead to increased interference by super powers in the region to the detriment not only of Iran and Iraq but also other nations of the region.

She further stressed the need for both belligerents to observe restraint and take immediate steps to halt the fighting.[56] India also decided to send Romesh Bhandari, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, on an urgent mission to Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to impress upon these countries the urgency to make efforts to see that the conflict did not spill over to the rest of the region. It was also aimed at securing oil supplies for India from these countries.[57] Romesh Bhandari also met the Iraqi President on 27 October and expressed India's concern over the conflict. India intensified its efforts to bring about a ceasefire towards the end of October. On 30 October Mrs. Gandhi convened a high level meeting to discuss the war situation. The meeting attended by the External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathe and the Secretary for External Affairs, Romesh Bhandari, who had just returned after talks with the leaders in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait, discussed the outcome of Bhandari's talks with President Saddam Hussain of Iraq, King Hussain of Jordan and the Amir of Kuwait. It also discussed the results of Narasimha Rao's visit to New York where he had had talks with the foreign ministers of several countries including those of the Non-Aligned Co-ordination Bureau on the Iran-Iraq War. The Indian Government decided to send Sathe to Iran on 31 October as a special envoy of Mrs. Gandhi to confer with the Iranian leaders on the war.[58] He met Bani Sadr, the then Iranian President and delivered a letter from Mrs. Gandhi expressing grave concern at the conflict and a wish for an early end to the hostilities.[59]

Thus India not only made individual peace efforts, it also assisted the collective non-aligned initiatives to end the war. The Co-ordination Bureau of non-aligned countries which met in New York on 27 October decided that a goodwill committee would be set up offering its services. However, the foreign ministers of seven non-aligned states, who met in Belgrade in the beginning of November failed to institute a goodwill committee. There was a stalemate over its composition. While Iraq objected to the inclusion of Algeria on the committee, Iran insisted on the Algerian candidature. External Affairs Minister, Narasimha Rao, conceded that the non-aligned efforts to end the conflict had not made any notable headway. However, India would not relent in its efforts to restore peace between Iran and Iraq. In his statement in Parliament on 18 November, Rao said:

> We will continue to offer our good offices in whatever way both the countries or the international community may require of us. We are prepared to play this role because we believe this conflict to be one of the most unfortunate that has taken place in recent times.[60]

Again, at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference which met in New Delhi on 9 February 1981, Mrs. Gandhi made a pointed reference to the "unhappy conflict in West Asia between two of our own brothers" and pleaded with the two belligerents to end the war.[61] The Delhi Conference appointed a four-member Goodwill Committee to bring about peace between Iran and Iraq. The Committee consisting of India, Cuba, Zambia and the Palestine Liberation Organization met in Geneva, New Delhi, Nicosia and Lusaka and visited Tehran and Baghdad three times in search of ways to end the war. However, they failed to effect even a cease-fire. When the Goodwill Mission arrived in Tehran on 7 August 1981, for the third time, to offer its good offices, the Iranian President, Mohammad Ali Rajai told the mission that its "comings and goings" were "fruitless" and that the fate of the war would be decided on the battlefield.[62] Thus one of the factors that obstructed the efforts of the non-aligned Goodwill Mission was the rigid and irreconcilable position adopted by both Iran and Iraq; while Iran wanted a condemnation of the Iraqi action, coupled with the total Iraqi withdrawal, Iraqi leaders insisted on a recognition of the Shatt-al-Arab boundary before the Iraqi troops would withdraw. Apart from their differences over the boundary there also are historical animosities between them. The conflict between Iran and Iraq "is an elemental fight on both sides, a fight for honour and dignity—the deepest nationalist sentiments have been aroused and it has become a question of life and death."[63] Thus the conflict has turned itself into a war of attrition.

CONCLUSION

India's response to intra-non-aligned discords has primarily been motivated by its desire to maintain unity and solidarity of the non-aligned group. India has shown tolerance of differing ideologies and endeavoured to avoid an extreme ideological position at non-aligned conferences. By and large it attempted to play the role of a moderator between the two ideologically extremist non-aligned groups, that is, between pro-Western and pro-Communist groups at these conferences. It also endeavoured to strengthen the non-aligned movement by emphasizing its economic aspect especially when the policy of non-alignment seemed less relevant with the advent of *detente* and polycentrism. Moreover, it has made earnest efforts to prevent the weakening of the non-aligned movement by dissuading the member countries from broaching bilateral issues at the non-aligned conferences.

India's response to bilateral disputes between and among the non-aligned countries has been marked by circumspection. Possibly its circumspect response resulted from its policy to maintain friendly relations with all countries. This was particularly so with, regard to the conflict between Iran and Iraq. India endeavoured to continue friendly relations with both the countries. It did not support a stand which smacked of partisanship or self-righteousness. Thus when in November 1980 Iran urged it to condemn Iraq as an aggressor, it refused to oblige. However, it has been deeply concerned over the conflict and has made sincere efforts to bring it to an end. The failure of Indian efforts and those of the non-aligned goodwill peace missions shows intransigence on the part of the belligerents as well as the limitations of the non-aligned countries as a peace-making group.

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THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION: THE ROLE OF THE US IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

WITH the election of Ronald Reagan as the President of the United States, the latter's enthusiasm for promoting an Arab-Israel settlement has considerably waned. The assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has further impaired the prospects of the negotiations. That leaves only Israel, which was lured to the negotiating table by the United States in the first place. In the present circumstances, therefore, a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict seems to be beyond the horizon. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to assess the United States' mediatory role in the dispute.

CONFLICT AND MEDIATION DEFINED

A widely used definition of a dispute under negotiation is given by Fred Ikle: "There must be both common interests and interests of conflict; without common interest, there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflict, nothing about."[1] The Arab-Israeli dispute—basically a contest between two distinct nations staking their claims on the same territory—has become a very complex problem in the course of almost half a century of its existence, involving issues like the border settlements, recovery of lost territories, disengagement of armies, liberation of Jerusalem, compensation and repatriation of refugees and a plethora of subsidiary issues flowing therefrom. Over the long decades, the Arab-Israeli dispute has attracted new disputants with the result that it has now become a crowded battle-arena: there is the Palestinian Zionist dispute at the centre, the Israeli border disputes with the frontline Arab states, the conflict between Arab nationalism and the state of Israel, and the Super Power contest at the outer-most perimeter. The battle arena, therefore, does not represent a neatly drawn picture as there are crooked lines, broken angles and overlapping borders.

The disputants' perceptions of the dispute are also different. The Israelis perceive the problem as one of survival and security. The Arab perception is not uniform. For the Palestinians, it is essentially the reassertion of their right to a nation-state. For Saudi Arabia, the principal issue is the liberation of Palestine. For the Baath ideology, it is the task of erasing Israel which is considered a blot over the vast, continuous stretch of Arab land, and so on. Even on the political plane, there are variations in the Arab perceptions of the problem at any given time, which are reflected in the rival groupings, mutual denunciation and an ever-shifting alliance pattern among the Arab countries.

Thus, from a mediator's point of view, the Arab-Israeli dispute is a very complex and a difficult task. At the same time, because of its complexities it is open to clever manipulation and exploitation—if the mediator is so inclined.

ROLE OF A MEDIATOR

A mediator is a person acceptable to both the parties in a dispute; by implication therefore, a mediator should be a disinterested person as far as the substance of the dispute is concerned. The role of a mediator is to create conditions in which the parties join in identifying, defining and solving the problem. The mediator may fulfil this function either as a polite middle-man whose task is to encourage the convergence of interests between the two warring camps without making his presence felt or he could adopt a fiercely interventionist style of mediation and might even be willing and able to carry out the results of his mediatory efforts. An example would be, if the two parties agree on a general principle on the demarcation of the boundaries between their countries, the mediator may willingly take over the responsibility of sending his own team of trekkers to mark out the points along the border, or he may himself lead such a team. The point is that the mediator should accept whatever solution is agreed upon by the parties.

A relevant background to the United States' role in the Arab-Israel conflict is the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947. The resolution partitioned the Palestine territory into an independent Israel, an independent Arab state and an international city of Jerusalem. The United States was one of the important signatories of this resolution and as such, is committed to the recognition of Palestinians as a distinct nation and to their right to a sovereign, independent state. Since then therefore, it has been associated with the developments on this issue and has, at times, proposed elaborate plans for its resolution.

The United States' mediation, which was essentially an exercise in personal diplomacy in an on-going dialogue over a period of time, can be traced back only to Kissinger and his shuttles. Kissinger's mediatory role can be assessed at three separate levels.

Kissinger's Personal Diplomacy

In Kissinger's own words:

> ... by the summer of 1970, it was clear to him [William P. Rogers. Secretary of State], that he was being excluded from key decisions on almost all issues except the Middle East .... Neither Rogers nor I mustered the grace to transcend an impasse that we should have recognized was not in the national interest ... Rogers was reluctant to face the prospects that it [the Rogers' Plan] might fail; he was acutely sensitive to any hint of White House interference. He tended to consider my concerns as an attempt to deprive him of his own field of glory.[2]

From then onwards, Kissinger set himself the task of elbowing Rogers out of his only field of glory. Within a few months, the civil war in Jordan came as a God-send. In his autobiography, there are repeated references to his role during that episode; "... on 9 September 1970, I activated the WSAG, [Washington Special Action Group] the NSC [the National Security Council] machinery." "... I convened WSAG twice that day." "... my calender shows repeated meetings with the President that day." "... my records show that the President and I met five times alone between 9.30 a.m. NSC meeting and 2.50 p.m." Kissinger was performing in the prestigious Washington power-centres, not relating himself to the developments in Jordan.

By December 1971, he had pursuaded Nixon to adopt a dual-track approach under which Sisco would pursue the Roger's Plan by conducting "proximity talks" whereas Kissinger would work in a parallel back-channel. The understanding was that the two channels would continuously feed each other. But predictably, Kissinger got rid of the front-channel altogether and himself emerged out of the back-channel to be seen and heard across half the globe and with hundreds of tele-cameras and mikes trailing him for three years and more.

US Initiative on the Arab Israel Problem

What are the credentials of the United States on the Arab-Israel dispute? Does it have a record of objectivity and impartiality? Since Israel's birth the United States Government is committed to its national existence and territorial integrity and has put up with, and at times encouraged, the Israeli expansionist and adventurist policies *vis-a-vis* the Arabs.

Even on the popular level, the Arab-Israel issue is the most sensitive foreign policy issue. No other country attracts so much national attention and debate at the popular level. The emotional responses which Israel evokes are unique. It may also be noted that the pro-Israeli sentiments are deliberately and systematically articulated by the Zionist lobby.

Also, the domestic political circumstances were peculiar at the time of the United States' initiative on the Arab-Israel problem. The Arab-Israel war had jerked American public opinion into a realization of the need for a response to a drastically changed situation; the oil embargo and the price-hike had exerted an added pressure on the United States Government and the public alike. And significantly, Nixon was a Republican, whose constituency did not include the Jews. In fact, the 1972 Presidential Elections had witnessed a swing in the Jewish vote in support of Nixon—a positive outcome of McGovern's blundering on the Israeli issue. According to Kissinger, "The President was convinced that most leaders of the Jewish community had opposed him throughout his political career. The small percentage of Jews who voted for him, he would joke, had to be so crazy that they would probably stick with him even if he turned on Israel."[3]

US Interests in West Asia

(a) Energy Interests: Was the US mediation prompted by the Arab-Israel War of 1973 or by the Arab oil politics of the same period? It is a question to which there are no authentic answers although all circumstantial evidence points to the second contingency. At least once during the negotiations, even Nixon acknowledged this when he said, "It is in the interest of these countries that imposed it as well as the United States that it be lifted. The two should be parallel. Inevitably, what happens in one area affects the other, and I am confident that the progress I am going to continue to make on the peace-front in the Mideast will be very helpful in seeing to it that an oil embargo is not reimposed."[4] There definitely was a linkage between the Arab oil politics and the United States mediatory role. In fact, it was the Arab oil which fueled and lubricated the Kissingerian shuttles.

(b) Strategic Interest: Kissinger's own rationale for the mediation was:

> A comprehensive approach involving all the parties would inherently favour the radicals by giving the most intransigent governments a veto over the entire process. If a settlement then appeared to result from the Soviet pressure or blackmail, the radical regimes with their anti-Western and pro-Soviet orientation would be strengthened. Territories would be seen as returning to Soviet clients. We needed to work not just for any solution but also to demonstrate that progress could be achieved best by our friends, that in other words, the moderates held the key to peace in the Middle East.[5]

In the light of the above analysis, the United States' mediation can be seen as arising out of four broad considerations:

1. Kissinger's personal political ambitions to come out of the wings to the centre of the stage;
2. Domestic political circumstances favouring an active US role on the issue;
3. Opportunity to enhance the prestige of the United States' allies in regional politics and thereby secure US predominance in the area, and
4. Freedom to conduct an exclusively American exercise. The Soviets would be kept out of the mediation process by dangling the carrots of SALT and the grain deals, if need be.

THE MEDIATION PROCESS

On taking over as mediator Kissinger commented, "Now there are four Arab parties, and one Jewish party, and I think that's a script worthy of Dante's inferno!"[6] It gives an impression as if Kissinger's was an impulsive plunge into the inferno. Far from it. It was a meticulously calculated programme.

The rationale behind the shuttle was the step-by-step approach. This was justified on the ground that the West Asian situation was too entangled a problem to yield a general comprehensive solution. The tangles needed to be resolved by a tedious, gradual craftsmanship. The various knots in the situation, however, were never identified nor was the route to tackling them made clear, which should rightly have led to the final knot, the Palestinians. On 17 October 1973, when the Arab Foreign Ministers met Nixon and Kissinger in the middle of the war in West Asia and the cease-fire deliberations in the United Nations, Kissinger made it clear that he would not get involved in the Palestine problem. He argued that any talk of the Palestinian rights could mean "either the destruction of Israel or the destruction of Jordan."[7]

The shuttle mediation held out a case-by-case treatment to various issues. The issues were kept isolated and the parties were offered separate proposals. Thus, in his shuttle in October 1974, Kissinger's proposal to Sadat was a complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in return for an Egyptian declaration ending the state of belligerency.[8] The proposal to Jordan offered an Arab administration in the West Bank with Israeli military presence in the strategic areas there in return for a similar declaration.[9]

An interesting side-light of United States' mediation during the Kissinger years was the informal contact between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the Lebanese Civil War. It sought the assistance of the PLO, then controlling important land-roads and Muslim-dominated areas, to evacuate local Americans to safer areas. Later, Kissinger publicly confirmed these dealings with the PLO through the Egyptian, Tunisian and Saudi Arabian intermediaries.[10] This was a reversal in the play-acting. The mediator was in need for mediation, seeking help from a party it had deliberately kept out from the negotiation table.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF US MEDIATION

In January 1974, the Egyptian and the Israeli armies agreed to the first disengagement accord.

In May 1974, the Syrian and the Israeli armies agreed to the Golan Heights disengagement.

On 2 June 1975, Israel announced a reduction in troops, artillery and tanks along the Suez and on 5 June Egypt reopened the Suez Canal.

On 1 September 1975, Egypt and Israel concluded the Second Sinai Accord.

The United States agreed to supervise one Egyptian and one Israeli strategic warning system and man six tactical warning stations in the Suez area. It also sanctioned substantial economic and military assistance to Egypt, automatically increasing assistance to Israel.

By the end of his shuttle-diplomacy, Kissinger had built up a regional power-structure of his own choice which consisted of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Soviet Union was effectively contained—at least for some time. Oil politics was in a shambles. In fact, the oil rich Arabs were more than ever dependent on the industrial west.

Carter's Role: Mediation to the Rapid Deployment Force

Jimmy Carter's foreign policy was committed to the preservation of human rights in the world. On West Asia, he drew heavily on the Brookings Institution study *Towards Peace in the Middle East,* which envisaged an ultimate solution of the Palestine problem either as a federation with Jordan or as an independent state. It also recommended the representation of the Palestinians in peace negotiations either as a single Arab delegation, or a delegation of the PLO after it had recognized Israel, or a delegation of the PLO and the non-PLO Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.

Carter's initial statements marked a definite advance over the previous Administration on at least three points. On 23 January 1977, he announced that the Geneva Conference was likely to be held in 1977.[11] Secondly, on 31 January, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, relented on the PLO condition of Israeli recognition while insisting on their acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 to qualify the representation at Geneva.[12] Third, Carter made a historic declaration on 17 March that the Palestinians were entitled to a "national home."[13] The term "national home" aroused memories of the Balfour Declaration, as the expression used was identical; it gave rise to hopes that exactly half a century after the Balfour grant of nationhood to Jews, which had resulted in the liquidation of the Palestinian nation, the mistake was being rectified.

The Carter Administration however, started wriggling out of each of the three commitments almost as soon as they were made. In October, Carter made his penance when he declared that he would "rather commit suicide" than harm Israel.[14] In the same month, during Moshe Dayan's visit to Washington, a "working paper" was prepared, in which Carter dropped his insistence on the Palestinian participation in the Geneva Conference.[15] Brzezinski finally put the whole matter to rest when he declared, "we have done everything possible to urge moderation on the PLO. We made every possible overture to them. They did not respond. Now, bye-bye, PLO."[16]

After that, Carter conveniently fell back upon the Kissinger strategy of a step-by-step approach. In November 1977, Sadat accomplished the *mubaadarat* (initiative) when he paid a state visit to Israel. The peace-process between Israel and Egypt, although a direct bilateral negotiation, provided for a limited US role. The United States association, this time, was no more the spectacular one-man show of the earlier years. It now was a bewildering array of movements involving a large number of actors: Carter, Cyrus Vance, Edmund Muskie, Sol Linowitz, Robert Strauss, Alfred Atherton, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and so on.

On 17 September 1978, it bore results, when two agreements were signed between Sadat and Begin: A framework for peace in the Middle East, which stipulated an agreement on a self-governing authority on the West Bank and Gaza within five years; and a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which envisaged bilateral negotiations. The linkage between the two agreements remained a point of disagreement between the two. As autonomy talks limped along, the parallel Egyptian-Israeli negotiations fructified in the Israel-Egyptian Treaty in March 1979, Israel's phased withdrawal from the Sinai, lifting of Egyptian embargo against Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two.

There was one more interesting episode in Carter's West Asia policy. On 1 March 1980, the United States voted a Security Council resolution which called Israel "to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967 including Jerusalem." Two days later, the White House issued a statement repudiating the vote on the ground that there was a failure in communications. The episode provides an interesting insight into the personal, political considerations which tend to submerge all national and rational calculations, especially in the presidential election year.

Towards the second half of his term, Carter was caught up in the revolutionary upheaval in Iran, the takeover of the Iranian Embassy in Tehran, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and so on. By the end of his term, his attention was already diverted from the Arab-Israel problem to immediate strategic considerations. The United States quietly left the mediator's office to put on a marine's uniform in the service of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Reagan: Mediation to Consensus

In December 1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan sent Kissinger on a private visit to West Asia. It set the world wondering if the shuttle was being put back on the rails again. However, even if the gesture was meant to convey an indication of a future revival of the earlier mediatory role, it is highly debateable whether it would succeed this time.

A more pertinent question is whether it would be revived in the first place. There are three distinct circumstances which would prevent its repetition: Secretary of State Alexander Haig's visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel in April this year in a quest for a "strategic consensus." The US West Asia policy is now likely to be fully subservient to this one supreme goal. Secondly, in recent months Israel has emerged to be almost the only strategic asset that the United States has in West Asia. US policy-makers are aware of this fact and would be under a tremendous constraint against putting the slightest pressure on Israel asking it for even the most minor concessions. Finally, even if the Kissingerian wheel were given a momentum, it would only be for appearances' sake as he is no longer a member of the inner sanctum of power. In such circumstances, Kissinger may not even agree to get involved in a useless exercise.

CONCLUSIONS

A recent study on the United States' role in the Arab-Israel dispute titled *Broker or Advocate? The U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-1978*[17] brilliantly conveys the author's assessment of America's role.

There never was a US mediation in the Arab-Israel conflict. It was a short-term US response to Arab oil politics. However, Kissinger took up seriously what was originally meant to be only an optical illusion.

Carter started off with a search for a comprehensive solution, soon got reconciled to bilateral negotiations and ultimately lost interest in the whole exercise—resigning the mediator's role for a more effective role of a policeman.

Reagan is neither committed to a solution of the problem, nor does he see any incentives for doing it. His despatch of Kissinger and Phillip Habib are merely diplomatic gestures showing concern where none really exists.

If the United States did not mediate, what did it do? One credible answer can be derived from an interesting comment by George Ball on Kissinger's shuttles. "He is first and last a unilateralist, firmly committed to a policy of manoeuvre in which the United States reserves full freedom of action to make decisions and play a lone hand, while it utilizes friends and allies only as instruments for its own tactical purposes."[18]

If the expression "unilateral" could be stretched to cover not just the Kissingerian shuttles but also the US mediation in general; and if the process itself could be described in a more accurate term, the "management"—it would provide a better and a more appropriate title to the present paper: The US Unilateral Management of the Arab-Israel Conflict.

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1. The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening session, the conference will split into working groups.

2. The working groups for the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows :

Egypt-Israel; Jordan-Israel; Syria-Israel and Lebanon-Israel.

3. The West Bank and the Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Arabs.

4. The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and of the Jewish refugees (who fled the Arab countries) will be discussed in accordance with the terms to be discussed and agreed upon.

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BOOK REVIEWS

EUROPEAN ENERGY CONSTRAINTS AND OPTIONS

A Review Article

I

INTRODUCTION

THE energy crisis and Arab unity (1973-74) were proximately founded on the basis of an obverse western disunity in face of the Arab-Israeli War. The particularized embargo, by the Arab petroleum exporting states, of the Netherlands, seemed to reinforce this perception. A gradually unfolding sequence of events tended further to lend substance to this perception of western disunity, especially in the laboured genesis of the United States sponsored International Energy Agency (IEA 1974), together with the carefully disruptive, later isolationist, role played by the French within this context.

By 1974 therefore, two lines of tension within the broader framework of the Atlantic Alliance had been exposed. There was, first, the continuing strain within the monetary sphere, dually reflected in a gradual US retreat from the free-trade precepts of GATT since 1971. After 1973 there was additionally also the question of OECD energy in face of the energy crisis. (It is notable that both these tensions owed to a degree to the French, in terms of initiative).

In the more specific context of the European Economic Community (EEC), the first oil-shock (1973-74) was equally ineffective in inducing much policy convergence in practical terms. Saving a few conditioned-reflexes and some conjunctural declarations of unity, the EC member states tended on balance to devise their own separate responses depending mainly on individual needs and abilities. The only manner of common distinction that, with any degree of resolution, can be drawn is relating to Community energy consumption policies which, while not homogenous, were yet far more restrained than the ones followed by the United States.

Finally we note that this portfolio of individual responses had served quite fairly for a while to regenerate OECD activity-levels, tied albeit to OPEC apronstrings. Even this was, however, not to last out. The earlier, post-1974, scenario with the established rules-of-play has thus, since 1979 been drastically revised.

II

STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE CRISES

It would, at this stage, be appropriate to introduce the book under review as being devoted to an analysis of the European Community's policies and reactions following the first oil-shock.* These had included of course, apart from in the area of energy, attempts at collective action, or policy convergence also in areas of monetary harmonization and the North-South Dialogue. Of these, harmonization in monetary and energy areas further carried aspects of a joint Community conflict-resolution *vis-a-vis* the United States. The book devotes itself, however, to only some particular modalities of the EEC's energy-interface with the outside world. The particular emphases culled by the author from his theme are given below.

Part I of the *opus* deals with energy *demand* (including import-dependence factors) and with indigenous *production* competence of the EC Member States. Included are the choice of technique aspects attending upon the latter, and oil is assessed as the balancing factor. (pp. 76-86) Part II of the book deals primarily with the aspect of *supply*, in the sense, especially, of delineating the mechanics of the trade in oil and in related energy products. Included in this part also are analyses of trade-power, its shifting balance and also, in brief, the modalities of the OPEC Members' development strategies. In Part III the author supplies a discussion of EC objectives relating to energy policy. He here treats the matter of price-determination as a bargaining outcome between host and consuming governments. The oil-majors are here described and their function delineated at relative depth. The respective viewpoints of host and major are discussed although not from any "national" point of view relating to incentives for pricing, reallocation or diversification in production. Finally, the energy crisis having provided the proximate motivation for the North-South Dialogue, Part IV of the study deals at depth with the EC's place and motivations within this extended framework. The discussion here responds ably to the Community's spread and heterogeneity in global North-South matters; it distinguishes carefully between regional, global, bilateral and multilateral modes of attack.

III

THE EVOLVING CRISIS : THE DISARRAY OF RESPONSE

It is evident, therefore, that the author has attempted to provide a large compass to his study. It is arguably the case that any analysis of the EC's post-1974 energy-dynamic should cover all that the author indeed has. But it is perhaps also true that, despite the above, the spirit behind the Community's own many-faceted and multilateral dynamic still eludes this *opus*. The spirit to which we here allude includes such seemingly unrelated details as the striving since 1974 for a common monetary identity as well as the essential place of fiscal convergence within the Community in an attempt to unify externally along the energy axis. Indeed, relating the central

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*Hanns Maul : *Europe and World Energy* (Sussex European Research Centre, Butterworths, London, 1980), viii, 342 p., £ 16.50.

issue of price-formation and its evolution, the author has unequivocally this to state:

> Politics, thus, determine the level of international oil prices for the time being: *the price of oil is a consequence of the relationship of prices in the international oil market.* This is the central assumption of our model. (p. 203)

Having said which, of course, the intra-Community dimension loses resolution and appears to stop playing any determining role. Member States as actors in the energy markets are relegated to the role of price-takers. The subtler, and often conclusive, leverage which domestic or Community-level fiscal-policy might have been able to exert is thus largely lost to analysis or assessment.

It is also in this way that the book's vintage (writing was complete by 1979-80), most clearly dictates its *metier*. For, after 1974, the EEC, within the larger OECD context, had rapidly come to (profitable) terms with the new price-supply configurations. We allude, here, not to indicators of industrial production (down 8 per cent between 1974-75), to unemployment levels (increased from 3.5 million to 5.5 million, 1974-76) or to the GDP calculus.[1] We allude instead to the commercial conquests, which enabled the EEC, as also other OECD states in terms of increased flow of goods and finance with the OPEC. The flow of finances, in particular through the "recycling" of OPEC surpluses through the western banking system, exhibited also the former's characteristic of sharing in the financial burden of the OECD in their efforts to channel aid-quanta to the non-oil-producing LDCs. This, apart from sustaining NOLDC demand for petroleum products, served also to support their internal development programmes—an important factor in keeping their demand for OECD machinery (and allied infrastructural) imports alive. The related manner in which the developed market economies succeeded in transferring the incidence of the oil-price increases was through the speedy reversal in the terms-of-trade between exportable manufactures and LDC exportables which were mainly non-oil primaries. With their exportables rising slower in terms of price, there was a 12 per cent fall in the NOLDC terms-of-trade in 1974 alone, followed by a smaller one in 1975. Meanwhile developed market economy manufactures had increased 40 per cent in terms of price over 1973-75.[2] The OPEC surpluses were recycled by the Western banking and financial system with the Euromarket playing the major role in this framework. Net Euromarket lending to NOLDCs, by the end of 1979, stood at US $68.5 billion; Latin American countries got $65.1 billion, with Asia and Africa getting $6.5 and $4.7 billion respectively, while the Middle East was a net lender of $7.8 billion into the system.[3]

Altogether, then, despite the notable lack of any long-term view (this even despite the EC Commission's promptings)[4] and also given the attending absence of policy convergence, the Community record till 1979, managed yet to demonstrate some restraint relating to external energy sources. It is true that this was at the cost largely of lower and more sluggish activity levels leading, as earlier instanced, to unemployment and under utilization on the rise. So, whereas the Community GDP, over 1973-78, increased by 10.7 per cent, yet energy consumption was estimated lower by 7-8 per cent than might otherwise have been the case in the 1975-77 period. It was lower by as much as 10 per cent in the 1978-79 period. Dependence on external energy sources was also curbed; from 63 per cent (1973), to 55 per cent (1978), while (over the same period) the proportion of oil in total energy consumption declined from 61 per cent to 55 per cent.[5]

By 1977-78 therefore, it had been evident that, attending upon the setbacks in terms of unemployment and lower rates of growth, various Member State policies were, nevertheless, adding up to a degree of restraint relating to energy imports. This was buttressed by the Community's policy of internally expanding the production of oil and natural gas (the North Sea) as well as by its policies of helping LDCs in attaining, wherever feasible a semblance of energy self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, the contrasting United States profligacy relating internally to cost-insulated (subsidized) energy consumption by leading to an 11.2 per cent depreciation of the Dollar against the Deutschmark (1978), had further provided a source of help in aiding EC energy imports (denominated in dollars).[6] Already US oil imports had increased from an average of around 20 per cent of its total oil consumption in the 1960s, to 48 per cent in 1977. (The Carter Administration was the only one which had moved a few tentative, and hard-to-implement, paces towards conservation measures; these did not bite.) Indeed, by 1977 the United States current account balance was in deficit to the tune of $15 billion, as compared to the surpluses of Japan and West Germany of $11 and $4 billion respectively.[7]

1979 saw, therefore, the relative positions of the United States and some member states within the Community (and the OECD in general), somewhat metamorphosed. Thus, a situation which had cumulatively built up,[8] would have held true had there not occurred the 1979 Iranian Revolution or the subsequent spate of uncertainties and supply disruptions on the part of a a cartel (OPEC) with its unity then on the wane. The advent, at this juncture, of the second oil-shock (on the plea of eroded terms-of-trade), served the *coup de grace* to an already uncertain economic situation for the OECD. And when, by 1980, the EEC was on the verge of a resuscitated Euro-Arab Dialogue[9] plus economic recovery, the United States Administration decided to progressively raise the rates of interest, unconsulted, to their highest levels since the Second World War. Perhaps a reaction in chagrin at the setting up by the EEC of the European Monetary System (EMS 1979), and the relative strengths of the Deutschmark and the Guilder, this ploy has served, nevertheless, to scotch the EEC's upturn after 1979. Of allied interest, in the current, has been the Reagan Administration's strenuous attempts at finally nullifying limping remnants of the EEC-USSR gas pipeline deal on the basis of Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Poland, *inter alia*. It is forgotten that the conception of this pipeline can be attributed to the Nixon Administration's early years, a period which had just followed hard on the heels of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968).[10] But US economic interpenetration of the EEC was, at that period, proceeding apace and yielding handsome dividends; the relative strength in the position of the EEC and Japan in the allied fields of money and trade had yet to materialize.

The situation, as it has now evolved bears, of course, scant resemblance to the earlier unity visible amongst either the OPEC or the OECD. Interestingly, however, the renewed context of dollar ascendancy, a US rate of interest with debilitating consequences for its allies[11] and the stubbornness of the current recession has forced the Community to go back to the drawing board. Fiscal convergence and transparency in the pricing of EEC energy supplies have been newly adopted for implementation; and, in this development, one also notes, finally, a convergence between the Council and Commission points of view. The Commission had long been advocating the formation of homogeneous pricing of energy within the Community; supply situations and economic strengths were, however, held different sufficient to warrant divergence.

Meanwhile, even the OPEC, in the current situation of an OECD recession, internal disunity, and the excess supplies portended by the Mexican (and other) finds, have as well been selectively driven off their vantage position of nurturing seemingly illimitable surpluses.[12]

After the second-shock has reopened, therefore, the era of normatives and of designs to again reduce the functional linkages between GDP and oil-consumption rates of growth.[13] The entire gamut of policy instruments are being brought to bear and include the provision of adequate finances to evolve the technology of diversification and factor redeployment; the intention is to re-emphasize coal and to accelerate the transition to nuclear energy as well.

To the extent, therefore, that the book reviewed compels our attention to the pragmatic set of tactics employed by the EEC after the first oil-shock, it would be hard to fault it. Given, however, that there had, throughout, underlain a strategic dissension between the Commission and Council, and given further that it has finally been the Commission which has induced the Council, on the basis of circumstances, to accede, one feels the book a trifle poorer for having missed these matters out. There is, however, no dearth of information if one could fill in these details.

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4 For a survey of the EC Commission's recommendations, since 1962 see : European Economic Commission, n. 1, pp. 17-21, and Commission : *The European Community and the Energy Problem* (Luxemburg, 1980), European Documentation 2/1980, pp. 20-1.

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6 Michel Godet and Olivier Ruyssen, *The Old World and the New Technologies* (Luxembourg, 1981), p. 88.

7 David Gisselquist, *Oil Prices and Trade Deficits* (New York, 1979), p. 78.

8 C. Fred Bergsten, "The Costs of Reaganomics," *Foreign Policy* (New York), Fall, 1981, pp. 27-8.

9 The Euro-Arab Dialogue was suspended from April 1979 till May 1980; for a resume and the new positive interests behind this resumption, see *Bulletin of the European Communities*, (Luxembourg) 11/1980, pp. 13-15.

10 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "US Foreign Policy and the Soviet Energy Predicament," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Fall, 1981, pp. 557-78.

11 C. Fred Bergsten, n. 8, p. 33.

12 *The Economist* (London), 10 July 1982, p. 66.

13 *Bulletin of the European Communities*, (Luxembourg), 5/1980, p. 24.

RSS: MYTH AND REALITY

A Review Article

THE spectre of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has for long been haunting the leftists and all political parties except the former Jana Sangha and its new incarnation, the Bharatiya Janata Party. Practically the entire National Press and the intellectual community have been anti-RSS almost since its inception in 1925. Most leaders of the Muslim and Christian communities have seen in the RSS their greatest enemy and together with the leftists have spared no effort in attacking it as the worst obstacle to democracy, socialism, secularism, and national integration. The RSS has also been accused of fomenting communal violence and having planted its agents in the state machinery, including the police and the army.

And yet during the past 55 years the RSS has steadily grown in strength, so that it now has more than two million *Swayamsevaks* (Volunteers) in the country.

How is this phenomenon to be explained? What is the true nature of the RSS and what danger does it pose to the ideals enshrined by the Founding Fathers in the Constitution of India? Is it anti-Muslim and anti-Christian, and does it want to convert India into a Hindu state, as alleged by its critics? Or is it, as asserted by its spokesmen, a basically cultural organization which has no political ambitions but which merely seeks to restore the self-confidence of the Hindus and promote unity among them on the basis of their own culture and tradition? Is it a fascist organization as the leftists charge, a liberal one as the Sangh itself proclaims, or an expression of the authoritarian Hindu tradition?

These are some of the questions to which the reader would seek answers in the two books under review.* Unfortunately, both are partisan in the extreme. Goyal writes from the well-known leftist point of view; to him the RSS is a revivalist, communal, anti-Muslim and anti-Christian Hindu organization, based on the fascist principle of leadership and controlled almost exclusively by Maharashtrian Brahmins who resented the rise of Mahatma Gandhi as a national leader after Lokmanya Tilak. Further, according to Goyal, the RSS prepared the ground for Gandhi's assassination and has been the main culprit in most, if not all Hindu-Muslim riots after its birth. Worse still, "rather than joining hands with Gandhi and the nationalist forces to defeat the partition designs, the RSS came into action to finally prove, through provocative as well as retaliatory actions, that Hindus and Muslims could not live together." (p. 95) The evidence that

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*Dina Nath Mishra : *RSS : Myth and Reality* (Vikas Publishing House, Sahibabad, 1980), xiv, 219 p., Rs. 60.
D.R. Goyal : *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (Radhakrishna Prakashan, New Delhi, 1979), 232p., Rs. 30.

Goyal presents in support of these charges is one-sided and therefore highly misleading. Take, for instance, the charge regarding Hindu-Muslim riots; he does not care to explain the occurrence of these riots for more than 30 years before the birth of the RSS or even of its founder. He concedes that "the aggressiveness of the Muslim National Guards and the Khaksars of Allama Mashriqi contributed in no small measure to impress on the Hindus the need for organized counteraction." (p. 94) But he does not refer to the aggressiveness of the Muslims who followed other leaders and political parties. Nor does he explain why there should have been few, if any, Hindu-Christian riots in spite of the questionable methods adopted by the missionaries.

The answers that Goyal provides to other questions are equally unsatisfactory. His thinly veiled attempt to fasten the responsibility for Mahatma Gandhi's assassination on the RSS is not only unconvincing, it is nauseating.

This is not to suggest that the RSS is a combination of the Boy Scouts and the Ramakrishna Mission as Mishra's book naively seeks to make out. But Mishra is not as clever as Goyal, and therefore reading his book is not as trying an experience. However, he too does not provide satisfactory answers to the questions formulated above and, like Goyal, is misleading as regards the true nature of the RSS, though in the opposite direction. For him, the RSS is a cultural organization dedicated to the building of Hindu solidarity on the basis of the universalistic principles of Hindu culture—tolerance and respect for all religions, a sense of social obligation, discipline, a feeling of kinship among all Hindus, and a legitimate pride in the greatness of their past on which foundation alone a nation can be reared and live with self-respect. As is to be expected, Mishra takes some pains to rebutt the charges of the RSS being anti-Muslim or anti-Christian and of its involvement in Gandhi's murder or in Hindu-Muslim riots. Indeed, he asserts that the RSS does not believe in violence and it is ridiculous for the leftists, in particular the communists, to accuse it of resorting to violence. As in most such cases, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes. It is true that the RSS as an organization has never been convincingly convicted of having fomented Hindu-Muslim riots. Individual members might have been guilty of it, but a similar statement can be made about almost every other group except the Sarvodayists and the Socialists. For any other group to assume the mantle of self-righteousness and condemn the RSS would be like the pot calling the kettle black. As a matter of fact, while talking of violence Goyal himself gives up the game when he distinguishes "between revolutionary or communist violence and counter-revolutionary or fascist violence of the RSS kind." (p. 141) In other words, leaving aside the RSS case as undecided, Goyal would suggest that the concentration camps of Hitler deserve condemnation but those set up by Lenin and Stalin, and the actions of the Communists in Indo-China, call for sympathetic understanding if not unreserved support. I suspect that even Marx would turn in his grave if he were to be told of Goyal's theory of revolutionary *versus* counter-revolutionary violence.

As to the RSS involvement in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the record is clear: it had nothing to do with the event. Mishra establishes this fact by a mass of documentary evidence. Nor is it true that any leader of the RSS—I do not know about the ordinary *swayamsevaks*—advocated violence except in self-defence, much less against any political leader, let alone Gandhi. If the RSS believed in violence, and political assasination in particular, it could have easily bumped off Jinnah who pushed the partition demand till the bitter and bloody end, and Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, but for whose acquiescence as "tired old men" in Lord Mountbatten's proposal, Gandhi would not have been so forsaken and isolated in the last two years of his life. It is also not true that the RSS distributed sweets on learning of Gandhi's death; this was done by some members of the Hindu Mahasabha. Goyal obviously does not distinguish between the two organizations, though soon after he became *sarsanghchalak*, Golwalkar described the Hindu Mahasabha as a *tamasha* in a speech at Sangli and for ever alienated it from the RSS. Godse and Apte were products of the Hindu Mahasabha rather than of the RSS. It was the Hindu Mahasabha leaders who had created the atmosphere of hatred against Gandhi, not those of the RSS as Goyal asserts. The latter were, and though it may sound anachronistic today, are still inspired by the vision of a resurgent Hindu India that can be traced to Vivekananda and Dayananda Saraswati who were primarily moved by the degradation of Hindu society rather than by hatred of the non-Hindus in India.

I am aware that it is dangerous in contemporary India to make such statements: one is bound to be stigmatized as Hindu chauvinist, a Muslim and Christian-baiter, a *gobrahmanpratipalaka* and a defender of the faith. However, as a result of persistent leftist propaganda over the past fifty years, the thinking of Indian intellectuals on certain controversial issues has been so perverse that they do not care to verify even elementary facts. Someone has to do the scavenger's job in the interest of the nation's intellectual health.

Goyal also misses the point that the creation of Pakistan was, among other things, the result of Congress appeasement of Muslim separatism—of which even Tilak was guilty—and the failure of the nationalist and leftist political leaders to understand the sources of this separatism as well as the Hindu's sense of having been let down when Nehru and Patel agreed to partition. More important, the appeasement of the Muslims of Pakistan no less than of India continued even after partition—from the noblest of motives, no doubt, but it pushed the "nationalist" Hindu psychologically to the wall. One of the outcomes of this approach was the Godse phenomenon. Where Goyal goes wrong is in singling out one factor out of the many that led to the tragedy. This may suit the propagandist's purpose, but it does not help in understanding the real nature of the problem and thereby evolving a solution in keeping with the principles which secularists, real and psuedo, profess.

It is important to understand the complexity and historical background of the Hindu-Muslim problem in the Indian sub-continent if the two communities are to come out of the stage of tribal sniping.This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis; for the purpose of this review, suffice it to say that militant Hindu nationalism can, with more than enough of historical evidence be shown to be mainly a reaction to Muslim and, to a lesser extent, Christian aggressiveness. It would therefore be not only futile but counter-productive to single out the RSS and go on condeming it without judging Muslim and Christian organizations by the same norms. This is all the more necessary in the interest of the non-Hindu minorities because the Hindus feel that for the first time since 15 August 1947 they have been masters in their own home after being ruled by others for more than 800 years.* Fortunately, most Hindus harbour no ill-will towards the Muslims or Christians. However, unless the minorities realize the change in the situation and shed their superiority complex which makes no sense in a democracy with unversal suffrage, they would weaken the hands of liberal Hindus and drive most of them into the sphere of influence of the RSS in so far as the minorities problem is concerned.

This is not to hold a brief for the RSS. On the contrary it is important to note that the RSS poses a greater threat to liberal Hindus than to the religious Muslims or the Christians. The latter two groups can, as in other situations, they have often done in the past, accept the status of second-class citizens and wallow in orthodoxy without any harassment from the RSS. The Christians, for example, do not feel particularly unhappy on the ground that they are not allowed to carry on proselytizing activities in Muslim or Communist countries; they are at peace with themselves and with their God if only they are allowed to live according to the teachings of Jesus Christ. The Muslims too would be happy as the RSS has given them a guarantee that their personal law will not be touched. It is the liberal Hindu, who takes seriously the values embodied in the preamble of the Constitution and who wishes to see his country develop into a vigorous, modern and open society, who will be the worst sufferer in a state which is governed by the traditional ideology of the RSS.

This ideology is not fascist as is usually thought. It is authoritarian in the special Hindu sense in which benevolence is combined with heartless exploitation and a denial of individuality. It is also backward-looking in its conceptions of knowledge, ethics and the good society, and leaves little scope for creativity and the operation of the critical spirit. Its adherents look down upon "mere ideas"—perhaps because, as Vivekananda often asserted, the ancient Hindus had anticipated all the major findings of modern science and what now remains to be done is to take this knowledge to the ordinary mass of people. The RSS wants social change, but without pains, which explains why it has undertaken work among the tribals but completely neglected the Scheduled Castes. Its leaders are innocent of modern social science thought and would regard a total ban on cow-slaughter as more important than meeting the protein requirements of an undernourished population. In this respect by the way, they are nearer to Vinoba than to Vivekananda.

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*V.D. Savarkar, in spite of all his distress over the partition of India, hoisted the tricolour on his house on 15 August 1947. When asked by Nathuram Godse why he was celebrating the creation of Pakistan, Savarkar is reported to have retorted : "My life's dream has come true; an Indian now sits on the throne of Delhi. If may not be the united India I had longed to see free, but even if truncated it is a free India now."

They say that the RSS is changing. Perhaps this is true, but the change in that case must be proceeding at snail's pace. Meanwhile, those who, like the present reviewer, feel concerned over its growing strength have to think of a suitable strategy for combating its influence. I am convinced that whatever the details of this strategy, it will have to be based on a firm commitment to democratic secularism and an even-handed attitude to all the religious groups which make up the people of this land. The kind of shrill propaganda carried on against the RSS by honest as well as dishonest leftists is not going to help.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

MICHAEL BRECHER (with BENJAMIN GEIST) : Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980, xvii, 479p., $24.95.

BUILDING a theory of international crisis behaviour can hardly be dismissed as an idle academic exercise in a world plagued with recurrent crises. Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration have conducted some researches on effective use of quantitative methods to decipher decision-makers' perceptions. Michael Brecher, co-author of the book under review, heads an International Crisis Behaviour Project in Canada.

Brecher defines crisis as a situation with three necessary components: threat to basic values, high probability of involvement in military hostilities, and finite time for response to threat. The study concentrates on the perceptions and behaviour of a single state—Israel—in relation to the 1967 and 1973 crisis. It employs three comprehensive typologies: dimensions of crisis (its source, gravity, complexity, intensity, duration and communication pattern); attributes of a crisis actor (systemic context, geographic context, belief system, economic development and military capability); and crisis decisional unit (its structure experience, psychological environment, and options).

After trudging a tricky forest of obfuscating jargon the reader desperately gropes for light. In the last but one chapter the authors sum up the findings in a relatively less obscure diction. One notable finding concerns the impact of "changing crisis-induced stress on cognitive performance." The evidence from Israel's 1967 and 1973 crises shows that (i) as stress increased, decision-makers relied on past experience as well as new information, and (ii) there were notable examples of impaired performance due to extreme fatigue and strain (witness Prime Minister Eshkol's stammering broadcast on 28 May 1967 or Dayan's loss of customary self-assurance during the Yom Kippur War). Net addition to knowledge: the current hypothesis that the greater the crisis the greater the tendency on the part of individual (s) dealing with it to rely on past experience stands partly modified.

Another finding is about the effects of changing stress on the type and size of consultative units and on group participation in the consultative process. We are told that the "only relevant finding" from experimental work on groups is that, "as stress increases both the frequency and intensity of interaction tend to rise." The present research supports this finding. Hence its net addition to knowledge is admittedly nil.

It is perhaps unnecessary to belabour the point. Suffice it to say that this elaborate inquiry gives no new insights into international crisis behaviour that a rugged common sense and careful perusal of contemporary newspapers would not readily yield.

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Foreign Policy

USSR

DARSHAN SINGH, (*Ed.*): Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, 1978. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xiv, 312 p., Rs. 100.

THE volume under review is in a way about Soviet policies and activities in the world and about preparations for their further activities. The documents contained in the volume show the new pattern of Soviet aggressiveness towards the United States of America and the West. This pattern emerged in the 1970s.

A major landmark of the last decade has been the attainment of strategic parity by the Soviet Union. The Moscow Declaration of 1972 is a recognition of this fact. The attainment of military parity, naturally, has exercised a tremendous influence on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. It has enabled the country to pursue more aggressive policies not only towards the United States and the West, but also in other parts of the world.

Thus one finds a new pattern of aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy of the seventies. This new pattern has been made possible by changes in the overall correlation of forces in the world. As Leonid Brezhnev put it: "Having assessed the overall correlation of forces in the World, we came to the conclusion several years ago that there existed a real possibility of securing a radical turnabout in the international situation."[1] The military attainments have permitted the Soviet Union to assert its global role: "Today no question of any importance in the world can be decided without our participation and without consideration of our economic and military might,"[2] declared a Soviet General.

The new pattern of Soviet policies is a manifestation of the Soviet leaders' conviction that the United States is undergoing a steady decline in power and in its ability to influence world developments. This facilitates ever greater commitments of the Soviet leadership to use various means including the use of military force to achieve its objective successfully. The forty-seven documents included in the volume under review reflect a wide spectrum of Soviet activity in the world in 1978.

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), 15 June 1975.

[2] Quoted in Major General V.S. Ryabov, *Dvina : Voiskovye Manevry Provedennye na Territorii Belorussii v Marte 1970.* Goda (Moscow, 1970), p. 8.

The documents included are official language texts made available by Soviet embassies from time to time. Many of them are TASS statements. The volume is useful only to the extent that it brings together various documents which are otherwise not easily available. Its value could have been enhanced by a substantive and analytical introduction by the author. While the author includes in the volume all kinds of statements whose usefulness is questionable, it is not clear why he has omitted the text of the communique issued at the end of the former Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee's visit to Moscow in September 1978.

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JAPAN

RAJENDRA KUMAR JAIN: The USSR and Japan 1945-1980. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, xx, 397 p., Rs. 130.

THE Japanese perception of Russia as a threat from the north has not changed over the years. As Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council stated, the threat (*kyoi* in Japanese), is a perception which is independent of the intentions of the country to view it as a threat. The term, *odoshi no chikara* (power to intimidate), is probably more appropriate than the term *kyoi* or threat. Russia looming large in the north of Japan with abundant potential capability, straddling both over the West and the East and the only nation with whom Japan had to delinate its frontiers has always been a significant factor in the international relations of the latter. It was the Russian approach from the north and Khvostov-Davydov raids of the Kuriles and the Sakhalin, organized by Nikolai Rezanov in 1804, angered by the refusal of the Shogunate to open Japan for trade, that made Japan think in terms of national defence. Even after the amicable settlement of the national boundaries by 1875, Japan's realisation of the potential capability of Russia to restrain its expansion obliged it to be on the offensive. The West encouraged the Japanese perception of Russia as a threat on two counts. Japan would be the bulwark against Russian expansion and thus protect their possessions in the East. Secondly, Japan would be too preoccupied with Russia and fritter away its strength in its confrontation. In this way its attention would not be diverted to the United States possessions in the Pacific. In the 1980s, we find that not only the West but China is also interested in maintaining the pressure on Japan, so that the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat, is continuously heightened. As in the past, the government finds this "threat" situation very advantageous, as it affords enough justification for increases in defence expenditure, sophistication of the self-defence forces, etc. In the pre-World War II situation, this was considered advisable in order to maintain its significance in the region for the West or even to make the West take a tolerant attitude towards its policy of expansion in China. In the present situation, Japan's policy is conditioned by its commitments to the United States and and the greater advantages perceived in security and economic spheres by not taking a stand different from the USA. From the Soviet point of view, the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States granting the latter military bases in Japan, as well as the continuous efforts made by the Self Defence Forces to co-ordinate their strategic plans with USA keeping the Soviet Union as "the hypothetical enemy" constitute a "threat" from which it should protect itself.

The threat perception, however, does not prevent the two nations from taking pragmatic positions in economic relations, e.g., trade, fisheries, joint development of Siberia, etc. The USSR would continue to be looked upon as supplier of strategic raw materials for Japan. The book under review gives details of all these aspects.

As in the case of his other books, Jain has made a compendium of details of relations between the two countries, supported by documents. He has drawn extensively from the various published sources on this subject and compiled it in this volume, so that it would become a ready reference.

The author himself avoids the word "analysis" in the Preface, and therefore it would not be correct to expect any new view-point or penetrating analysis in this book. The book is titled, *USSR and Japan*, so that probably it finds an extensive market particularly in India where the title *Japan and the USSR* might not have attracted much attention. However, the treatment is weighted more from the Japanese side and the title is, therefore, deceptive. Again, although sporadic references to Japanese titles, Russian titles, etc. are made, the contents do not reveal that the author is conversant either with Japanese or Russian language sources. Such gimmicks could have been avoided. But probably, such strict standards can be expected only in a research publication, while, as stated earlier, this is more of a compendium. It is also noticed that the author, even while quoting verbatim from other writings, sometimes with quotation marks and sometimes probably this has been overlooked, may make a mention of it in the footnote, but has carefully avoided including the publication in the bibliography. Since it is apparent that the author has got extensive help from many research assistants (though not acknowledged), he might like to prepare a more comprehensive bibliography in his future works, which he is planning, to make the book more useful to students and researchers.

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CHINA

ANDREW WATSON, (*Ed.*)*:* Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of the Border Region (A Translation of Mao's Economic and Financial Problems). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, xii, 271 p., £5.50.

THE debate on China's development strategy has continued to generate world-wide interest; the significant policy changes enforced in post-Mao China and the reassessment of Mao Zodong's ideas has given added importance to this discussion. Tracing back Mao's ideas to the days of the people's democratic revolution, especially of the Yanan (Yenan) period has been a familiar exercise. But many such references were based on journalistic reports of those years or general impressions of visitors. Gradually studies by Chalmers Johnson, Mark Selden and Govind Kelkar appeared on the scene giving more substantive data on the Shen-Gan-Ning Border Region. The present book which is a translation of an important document of that period, accompanied by an analytical introduction, is a valuable addition to this literature.

This document is the speech given by Mao at the Senior Cadres Conference at Yanan in December 1942, in which he analyzed the situation arising out of the virtual collapse of the United Front with the Guomindang (KMT) and the serious economic crisis in the Border Region and spelled out new policies. Parts of this speech appeared in Volume III of the Selected Works of Mao in 1953, and now Watson's translation makes an English version of the full text available for the first time. In this speech Mao enunciated the economic perspective of the new democratic revolution by criticising the "left" as well as the "right" deviations and advocated a policy of mixed economy, mass mobilisation and maximum utilization of resources.

By 1941, the Border Region under the effective control of the Communist forces had stabilized at 29 counties (Xian) and 266 districts (Qu) with a population of around 1,500,000. The Party membership had risen to nearly 800,000 and the Red Army strength to 500,000 by the year 1940. The KMT's blockade and attacks on the Red Army and the ongoing Sino-Japanese War on the one hand and the sudden expansion of Party and army strength on the other, created a series of problems. The Rectification Campaign of 1942 and the economic drives of the period were some of the responses to these developments. The Rectification Campaign was an education in Marxist ideology for the members which called for a non-dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and adoption of a "mass line" as the method of organization. In the sphere of economics, the policies were put forth in the form of the following slogans: "Develop the economy and ensure the supplies," "Give consideration to both public and private," and "Give consideration to both troops and civilians."

Laying enormous stress on the need to increase production, Mao advocated that private agriculture and small industry by private individuals must be protected and enouraged for it provided the supplies to maintain the livelihood of the bulk of the population. At the same time, agriculture, industry and commerce by the government, troops, official organisations and schools should be developed in a harmonious way. Analyzing the experiences of the Yanan county, he recommended that its lessons should be the basis for the policies of the entire region, even though the specific conditions obtaining in each area had to be respected. A list of eight policies that Mao propounded gives us an idea about the approach to agricultural development in the Border Region which inspired the policies in later decades. They were: (1) the reduction of rents and the interest rates, (2) an increase in the opening up of uncultivated land, (3) an increase in the planting of cotton, (4) not violating agricultural seasons, (5) better adjustment in the use of labour power, (6) an increase in agricultural credit, (7) improvement in technical skill, and (8) implementing progressive taxation. In addition to these, emphasis was to be laid on the development of animal husbandry, handicrafts, cooperatives, salt industry, self-supporting industry, productive undertakings by the Armed Forces, official organizations and schools, each of which was discussed in detail by Mao Zedong.

In the above package not only lay the new democratic economic outlook which brought together various anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes to co-operate in the anti-Japanese war efforts but also the origins of the Chinese communist approach to agricultural development. It considered generation of resources from within the rural sector as significant for a self-reliant economy and at the same time emphasized on the interrelatedness of industry and agriculture and the potentiality of developing a diversified rural economy that included commercial crops, animal husbandry, handicrafts etc. Production was to be accompanied by structural changes to an appropriate level, hence the need for reduction of rent and interest. But nothing like the radical structural measures of the Jiangsi period were proposed. Emphasis on combining available traditional technology with innovative methods was yet another feature of this approach. This line paid dividends during the Yanan years, miseries of the population were considerably reduced and economic support for the war efforts was moderately ensured with popular support. On the other hand, the economy in the KMT areas was in a shambles with inflation rising high, scarcities worsening and corruption mounting day by day.

Yet, this approach has been the centre of controversy in the People's Republic. In the early fifties when China was experimenting with the Soviet model of development this approach was relegated to the background. Perhaps that is why the portion of Mao's speech published in 1953 in the third volume of the Selected Works contained these additional lines: "This self-supporting economy, which has been developed by the troops and the various organizations and schools is a special product of the special conditions of today. It would be unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions, but it is perfectly reasonable and necessary at present."

The post-Mao leadership which has dropped commending references to the Dazhai Model which had a similar orientation may also stress these additional lines since it has denounced the Great Leap Forward. But the political as well as economic experiences of the Yanan period has already become part of the world legacy of the struggling people even though they have to avoid reductionist formulations at all cost.

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MANORANJAN MOHANTY

H.D. MALAVIYA : Peking Leadership : Treachery and Betrayal. New Literature Co., Delhi, 1979, viii, 178 p., Rs. 25.

THIS book, the forty-seventh by the author, is a sad commentary on our politician-intellectuals. The book is pure and simple propaganda reminding one of the pen-pushers in the West who wrote plain cold war nonsense on Socialist states in the late forties and early fifties. This book is even worse because the "bourgeois pen-pushers" are consistent within their own system which Shree Malaviya is not. In short, this book does not deserve a review in an academic journal.

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G.P. DESHPANDE

PERSIAN GULF

JAMES H. NOYES: The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and US Policy. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Calfornia, 1979, xvii, 144 p., $6.95.

WEST Asia has always been, more so in the last three or four decades, one of the most turbulent regions of the world. The relatively quick transition from a semi-feudal stage to contemporary times is powerful enough to break the societies at their seams. Coping with the challenges posed by such massive and revolutionary change by itself would have been an uphill task for the fragile governing institutions in operation. Added are many other sources of disarray, discord and disharmony—creation of Israel, discovery of oil and its development into a vast industrial and technological enterprise, super power rivalry in the political, ideological and economic realms, and the more recent fundamentalist Islamic revivalism have transformed the region into a virtual volcano. The recurrent and frequent eruptions should not surprise us as much as the fact that so many things are still in place and not razed to the ground.

By the 1970's the industrialised West, Japan and even the United States became dependent on foreign oil, mostly from the West Asian region; their economies and wealth became critically vulnerable to the flow of oil from West Asia as was dramatically demonstrated by the events of 1973. The OPEC countries were able to use oil as a political weapon and jack up the price of oil at will. It is now clearly established that the world's known key reserves and potential for increased production of oil lie in the Persian Gulf region. James H. Noyes' book seeks to analyse the contours of American policy in the Gulf and its implication for the "security" of the countries in the region.

The Clouded Lens clearly reveals that Noyes is intimately familiar with the region as well as the intricacies and dilemmas of his country's policy towards the Gulf. As a result of the traumatic legacy of the Vietnam War, the Press and mass media have concentrated attention only on the risks of American involvement. Consequently, the American public, to Noyes, has not been made aware of the risks of non-involvement for their country's security. Furthermore, there is no concern for "the natural defence interests of the Gulf states" either, he points out.

In his well-reasoned analysis, Noyes draws attention to a number of "misreadings" of the situation. He asserts that the conventional assumption of looking at the middle classes as a source of instability has been proved wrong by recent events and developments in the Gulf countries. Countering the usual adverse comment about the supply of arms to the Shah of Iran on a large scale, Noyes argues that the weapons enabled Iran to successfully meet the threats from Soviet Union's proxies in the region. With those arms Iran could not be expected to cope with the Soviet Union itself, a task which can be done only by another super power like America.

Noyes' analysis of what he calls "debates" of America's Gulf policy is particularly interesting. His approach and perspective are refreshing, whether one agrees with them or not. For example, he disagrees with the popular view that America's arms sales policy tended to destabilize the delicate military balance in the Gulf; according to him, that overwhelming Israeli military superiority over the Arabs was always the key American objective. "Delicate military balance" was only an euphemism for a clear and massive Israeli military superiority. Noyes asserts that Jordan was and should be given arms and weapon supplies to make it strong enough to cope with Syria and/or Iraq, but not so much as to threaten Israel.

The Clouded Lens, however, suffers from one crucial blind spot. In his brief chapter on the British military rule in the past, Noyes asserts that the British departure was a net gain for Gulf stability. He reasons that this was so because the Gulf states were able to sort out mutual problems without hang-ups and ideas about the compulsions of British interests. Noyes seems to be unaware that a similarly benign context will be created for the Gulf states to sort out their mutual problems if they are not to respond to the real and imagined national interests and security concerns of the United

States and the Soviet Union. But then, it is not very reasonable to expect such objectivity even from an othersise thoughtful analysis.

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B. RAMESH BABU

PETER SINAI: New Lamps for Old: The Arabs and Iran Meet India's Energy Needs. Arab Cultural Centre, New Delhi, 1980, 79 p., Rs. 20.

SINCE the beginning of the 1970s the world oil scene is undergoing a rapid change, and to comment upon this one needs to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach. For instance, the sudden spurt in oil prices both in 1973 and 1979 was the result of a series of political developments that took place in West Asia and Iran. Similarly, some of the new oil-rich Arab countries interests in economic co-operation with the developing countries was not guided by economic interests alone; it had other motives too. For example, Iranian economic co-operation with India during the 1970s was believed to be to neutralize a potential threat to that country from within the region. In addition, if the Arabs and Iran depended on the developed North for items like man-power, that would have not only increased the economic leverage of the North but would also have been economically suicidal for the oil-producing countries. The recent US economic sanctions against Iran is the best example.

In these circumstances, the non-oil producing developing countries did manage to survive with high oil prices by cleverly exploiting the international market. Unlike other developing countries, India not only managed to absorb the immediate impact of high oil prices due to its diversified national resources, but also brought home the idea of mutuality of interests to the West Asian oil producing countries and Iran. This new trend in energy politics needs closer scrutiny.

On India's energy problems, besides a number of Official Reports, two indepth studies have come out in the 1970s—B. Dasgupta's *The Oil Industry in India* and P.D. Henderson's *India: The Energy Sector*. While Dasgupta's book is more a historical study, Henderson examined the whole question of primary energy source materials and the policy options available to India. Peter Sinai's study even though it has chosen to analyze a new dimension compared with the earlier two, fails to bring out India's multifaceted strategy to respond to the increased oil prices. His quick survey of India's energy requirements, costs involved and Indo-Arab economic co-operation in the 1970s, touches only the periphery of the issues involved. The two crucial questions: Do the Arabs and Iranians have an alternative other than depending on the developing countries like India in implementing their development programmes? and What measures India should take to have a better deal in the 1980s? have remained unanswered.

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SREEDHAR

AFRICA

MICHAEL A. SAMUELS, *Ed.*: Africa and the West. Frederick A. Praeger, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, xiii, 114 p., $14.00.

IN this tiny book, Michael A. Samuels has edited a collection of speeches delivered by Foreign Ministers of some African countries (Morocco, Sierra Leone and Tanzania), one important official from the Foreign Ministry of Zaire and Senghor, "ex" President of Senegal before distinguished Washington audiences drawn from the academic, business and the government circles. Although its title is *Africa and the West,* the West is merely represented by the speakers from Belgium and Sweden respectively. A number of important countries from the West such as Britain, France and Portugal which had, and continue to have, intimate relations with Africa have not found a place in this collection. This has naturally severely restricted the area of the range of issues that could be raised from the Western side. Similarly, from the African side a few more countries such as Guinea, Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia, which drastically differ with Senegal, Zaire and Morocco in their world view, could have been picked up to portray a reasonably comprehensive picture of the theme. The distinguished audiences of Washington were denied the pleasure of hearing many more speeches. A review of the present work can be done only by keeping these basic inadequacies in mind.

The substance of all these speeches have two broad dimensions. All the speakers, to start with, have highlighted the specific issues of foreign policy which are of immediate concern to their respective countries. Secondly, they have raised some general problems and spelt out their attitudes towards them. Among the latter set of problems the destabilizing activities of the Soviet-backed Cubans and the future of anti-racist struggles in Southern Africa have surfaced more frequently. In the light of these two dimensions an analysis of individual speeches can unravel a few more complexities of the theme.

Leopeld Sedar Senghor's speech entitled "Africa and America: Culture, Development and Co-operation," summarizes his intellectual interests and mental attitudes as a scholar and political leader. Being one of the founding fathers of the concept of Negritude he has been consistently stimulating the interest of ignorant Westerners in the history of African civilization and culture. He has attempted to fascinate the American audiences by reflecting on Africa's past with his usual finesse.

While discussing the politics of the black continent, Senghor has classified African states into three main groups. The first group consists of about a dozen countries which talk in terms of "Marxism-Leninism" or scientific socialism. In the second group there are countries which claim their allegiance to "democratic socialism." "Parties from these fifteen countries," says Senghor, "have decided to create an Inter-African Socialist Union which explicitly refers to democratic socialism." (p. 17) Senegal falls in this category. Finally, there are about twenty-four to twenty-seven countries which follow "liberal capitalism." In spite of their differences these groups have co-existed harmoniously within the Organization for African Unity. However, their co-existence was becoming increasingly difficult; Senghor holds the destabilising activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa largely responsible for such a state of affairs. He also observes that the United States could send its dollars or get its soldiers killed for West Europeans and Latin Americans but certainly not for Africans. He therefore appeals to the Americans to define their Africa policy and apply it. (p. 19) In contrast to the United States, France he adds, has been arming a number of African countries which are apprehensive of communist penetration in Africa. Senghor's speech reads like an essay on the justification of the Franco-African ensemble. He has also expressed a strong desire to bolster Euro-African co-operation.

The spectre of destabilization has been haunting the Moroccans too. Mohamed Bucetta, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, has aired his grievances against the Americans by complaining about the State Department's apparent indifference towards the role of foreign military troops and their increasing involvement in contemporary African politics. (pp. 33-4) He suggests that even a country like Morocco went to Zaire's rescue during the two Shaba crises by sending military aid and tried to ward off the collapse of the Mobutu regime.

Mohamed Boucetta has also raised the question of Western Sahara and ventured to justify the official Moroccan policy regarding Sahara with an absurd logic. According to him, Western Sahara is an integral part of Morocco and making an independent state out of it is "utter nonsense." (p. 58) He has accused the Algerians of using the principle of self-determination for Western Sahara as a cover to achieve their hegemonic aims in the region. He also suggests that the people of Central Sahara which was handed down by France to Algeria must enjoy the right of self determination. However, it must be noted at this stage that the distinct traits of Central Saharans has not led to the formation of an effective national liberation struggle in that region. In contrast, to achieve sovereign statehood the Western Saharans have launched a sustained war against all the oppressers such as the Spanish, French, Mauritanians and Moroccans during the last decade. It is surprising to note that Mohamed Boucetta has even forgotten to take the cognizance of such a long liberation struggle.

Umba di Lutete who held top official positions in Zaire's Foreign Ministry appears to be preoccupied with three main issues. First, he is involved in an endeavour to project a proper image of President Mobutu's regime. According to him, Mobutu has been following the path of genuine Zairian nationalism. Some of its essential prerequisites are struggle against national disunity, social inequality, imperialism and colonialism. But these high-sounding objectives have hardly brought about a qualitative change in the performance of the Mobutu regime! The speaker has conveniently avoided to spell out the ambiguities in the concept of Zaire's genuine nationalism as propounded by Mobutu. Zaire's present regime has been characterized by the growing dictatorial tendencies of President Mobutu, corruption, rising foreign debts accompanied by increasing dependence upon the erstwhile colonial powers like France and Belgium. In the light of these facts one wonders how far the speaker could succeed in selling the idea of genuine Zairean nationalism to the audience. Second, even if Zaire is aware of the Soviet-Cuban activities in Angola it has taken steps to normalize relations with it. During the civil war in Angola, Zaire was backing the National Front of Liberation of Angola (FNLA) to sabotage the MPLA's victory. The speaker offers a pale explanation of this policy by stating that Zaire supported FNLA only because it was based in Zaire. (p. 76) Third, by categorically condemning the racist policies of South Africa the speaker has reassured the world that Zaire does not believe in adopting a soft posture towards the white minority regime.

Sierra Leone's Abdulai O. Conteh leaves the reader with a feeling that he is a hard-headed realist. The following passage is an evidence of his realism: "The expression 'Africa' or 'African point of view' is itself an improvisation for want of a better term. There is in reality no such thing as 'African point of view.' Africa, it is often forgotten, is a collection of disparate entities which by force of circumstances play the role of sovereign states." (p. 45)

The Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Ndugu Benjamin Mkapa, has given a balanced speech. He has explained the unique experiment of nation-building in Tanzania through *Ujamma*. Despite certain Marxist-Leninist elements which the concept of *Ujamma* has incorporated in its fold the Africanness of *Ujamma* can hardly be underestimated. The speaker has refrained from glorifying the achievements of Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration of 1967; the only valid point that is driven home is that Tanzania is more socialist, more self-reliant and less poor than what it was in 1967. He has also voiced a strong concern about the basic developmental problems of the Third World. According to him: "What we see as the world economic crisis is, as far as we are concerned, our escalating underdevelopment. The value of our raw materials is declining, which means that value of our work is declining." (p. 60).

Henri Simonet and Karin Soder, Foreign Ministers of Belgium and Sweden respectively, represent the West. There is very little to comment on these two speeches. One is rather struck by a confession given by Henri

Simonet about the Western role in Africa in these words; "We must admit that the Soviet and, even more so, the Cuban interventions give the impression, to the African countries, that the communists are fighting for freedom and sovereignty of Africa, while we are attempting to fence it off in order to preserve our economic interests and our dubious connections with some white regimes in Africa." (p. 94) Swedish involvement in Africa has not been significant. Nevertheless, Karin Soder informs the audience about the Swedish involvement in Africa in such areas like trade, assistance to liberation movements and nursing the victims of apartheid.

The present work, on the whole, is a good beginning and one hopes that a more comprehensive book on this theme would come out soon.

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RAJEN HARSHE

H.P.W. HUTSON: Rhodesia: Ending an Era. Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1979, 198p., Rs. 70.

IT will be worthwhile to know a little about the background of the author before this book is reviewed. Major General Hutson was a soldier who had fought in the Sudan; he also had some administrative experience in Nigeria. He later travelled in East Africa, South Africa and Rhodesia. The author has a number of friends and relations settled in southern Africa, who naturally carry the "White Man's Burden." His sympathies are with his kith and kin in Africa and as one reads in the book on several pages, he would be happy with a continued White man's rule in southern Africa. He has nothing but dislike for the African freedom fighters, whom he continuously refers to as insurgents and terrorists as late as during the 1976 developments, when Henry Kissinger arrived on the scene and started his shuttle diplomacy.

One does not know if Gen. Hutson is today watching the developments in independent Zimbabwe ruled by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. If he is and if he has any sense of fair play, he must be feeling peeved. As a prophet of doom his predictions of chaos and civil war after African victory have not materialised. Obviously, the author has a jaundiced view of Africa and the Africans.

The book under review is a historical work on Rhodesia beginning with colonial rule of the late nineteenth century, on to the self-governing period after 1923 and then to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 and on through the years when several efforts were made to settle the question of Rhodesia. But one can at once say that the author's sense of history lacks objectivity. It is a history written by a White man with a strong bias against the non-Whites.

Rhodesia has graduated to an independent Zimbabwe. The book is being reviewed late, but it is a useful exercise because the author deals with a colourful part of Africa with a chequered history. More than half the pages of the book deal with the developments of the last five years, which have an international flavour. That is also the period when the African nationalist forces of ZANU led by Mugabe and of ZAPU led by Nkomo were giving a tough time to the White illegal regime of Ian Smith in the bush war. The author is perhaps right in saying that by 1976 "White Rhodesians must have realised that they were fighting a war which they could not win but also could not afford to lose." (p. 130)

He admits, though reluctantly, that in 1976 the fighting was confined largely to the north-eastern part of the country, but later it spread more widely. Obviously, referring to ZANU he says that the nationalist fighters were getting training and arms deliveries from Tanzania and Mozambique. But he is wrong in saying that Russia was stepping up its arms deliveries to Tanzania and Mozambique. As was well known then and as it is now, it was China and not Russia which was helping ZANU.

One cannot agree with the author that in 1976 the morale of the Rhodesian forces was extremely high. If it was so, Smith would still have been talking of White minority rule for a thousand years. He was, in fact, conceding the principle of Black majority rule and had agreed to elections within two years to put it into effect.

At this stage the Americans moved in to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. They did not want Rhodesia to become another Angola. Came Kissinger in September 1976 to apply his Middle East-type of shuttle diplomacy to Africa for the first time. The African leaders of the five front-line states were naturally apprehensive of the American moves, but later they gave Kissinger whole-hearted support.

While Smith agreed to majority rule and elections as early as 1976, he kept dragging his feet. In the last three chapters the author gives an account of the developments till the book went to press in December 1977. The Anglo-American proposals were not accepted by Smith, but the author does not seem to be impressed even at this stage with the successes of the freedom fighters. He even ridicules British Foreign Secretary Owen, who "seemed over fearful of the guerilla armies."

There appears to be a lot of wishful thinking on the part of the author. One wonders, therefore, what useful purpose the book would serve to the readers from the freedom loving world. Whatever his intentions, we are all satisfied with the last stages of the independence of Rhodesia. British role in forcing Smith to step down and Britain assuming its role as a colonial power were excellent developments. The Lancaster House Conference, which drew up the constitution for independent Zimbabwe, was a long drawn-out affair and at one time it appeared that the conference may not succeed. Here one hopes that the author would allow this reviewer to pay tribute to the sagacity of Mugabe and Nkomo, who gave more concessions to the Whites than were expected.

The internationally supervised elections and the ensuing freedom in April 1980 are events of recent history. Many Western writers called Mugabe's victory a tribal one and they forecast a civil war after independence. The guerilla forces of Mugabe and Nkomo did give the people many a problem, yet the two leaders are today running the affairs of the country rather smoothly and there has been no civil war. The fear expressed by the author in the preface that an independent Zimbabwe may come under Soviet domination has also proved baseless.

New Delhi HARI SHARAN CHHABRA

International Economics

ARUN BOSE: Marx on Exploitation and Inequality: An Essay in Marxian Analytical Economics. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, xxiv, 237p., Rs. 70.

WHILE describing the admittedly elusive concept of capital, John Hicks likened it to the aspect of a building, that if one were to take pictures of a building from different angles, the same building, seen through the pictures, would look different. One may add that even a circular building could be made to look flat if the camera were adjusted suitably. This seems to apply to the system that Karl Marx built. Marx's system is a massive structure, open to inspection from different angles. It may thus look different to different viewers, even though the structure happens to be the same. The book under review illustrates this in a conspicuous manner. Its author, Arun Bose, holds up before our view the proposition which occurs in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme,* namely that "labour is not the source of all wealth," and he argues that this contradicts the labour theory and leads up to what he calls the "capital theory" approach—a theory which represents capital as a "coercive social relation."

The author is thus led to believe that there are "two Marxes"—one upholding the labour value approach, and the other the capital theory approach. And he regards the latter as the true Marx. He takes pains to *prove* that labour is not the only source of "price, surplus or profit," and having proved it he discards the Marx of the labour value approach. It is further argued that there is no link between Marx's labour value approach and his theory of profit, so that the "transformation" exercise, which figures so conspicuously in Marxian literature, is altogether irrelevant to the "core" of Marx's system, the theory of exploitation.

It is very true that Marx, like everyone else, recognizes that capital in the technical sense is productive in the same way in which labour (or land) is productive—labour cannot do without capital, even as capital cannot do without labour. Yet this by itself does not contradict Marx's labour-value approach, or the theory of exploitation which is based on it. A zero-profit situation—which is what the labour theory implies in the limit—does not surely mean that capital (or land) is not productive in the technical sense. Marx *defines* value as labour embodied in commodities, and he proceeds from the "magnitude" of value, as thus defined, to "exchange relations"; relative values are thus equated to the relative quantities of labour that the production of commodities involves. It follows as a corollary that the value of labour power, in so far as it is for sale, should be equated to the amount of labour embodied in commodities that workers need for their supply to be sustained—"necessary labour," as Marx would call it. Now, in so far as the value of output exceeds the replacement cost of machines and raw materials used up in the process of production (Marx's "constant capital") and that of the labour employed (Marx's "variable capital"), there emerges a surplus. This surplus can certainly be attributed to the fact that land and capital goods cooperate with labour. Marx would acknowledge this co-operation, and yet he would claim that, in so far as the surplus is appropriated by capitalists, the workers are "exploited", the "rate of exploitation" being given by the ratio of surplus value to "necessary labour". Productivity, he would argue, inheres in capital goods, not in capitalists.

So far it is all definition—a "norm", so to say. Trouble arises when Marx goes on to translate this value system into what may be called the price system. In Marx's exposition of the value system, the rate of profit—surplus in relation to *total* capital—is necessarily lower than the rate of exploitation, which is surplus in relation to *a part* of capital. Is the rate of profit, as it is defined in the value system, related to the rate of profit, as it is determined in the market? If so, in what way? This is where Marx's transformation exercise comes in. Marx is aware that there is an error in his transformation procedure—he leaves the measure of capital as it happens to stand in the value system. Yet he believes that his assumption that "price" in the aggregate conforms to "value" in the aggregate is substantially correct, so that the rate of profit in the market does indicate the extent to which workers are exploited by the capitalists. What Morishima and his associates, to whom our author refers, have done is to confirm this belief. They have proved that while the rate of profit in price terms lies below the rate of exploitation, both tend to decline as the rate of wages rises, until at the point where profit is zero they coincide. A positive rate of profit in the market is thus a sufficient condition of exploitation. Marx uses the labour theory of value as a ladder to arrive at this position. Having arrived, one could surely discard the ladder. Marx chooses not to; he thinks he needs it in order to be able to exhibit what he regards as the essence of exploitation. After all, "exploitation," as a pejorative concept, is what you define it to be.

How does all this stand in relation to the so-called capital theory approach, which our author puts up as representing another Marx? It seems clear that the concept of capital as coercive power, rather than being incompatible with the labour theory of value, is a supplement to it. Marx, let us remember, deduces the value of labour power as a corollary of his labour theory, to say that it is equated to a certain minimum which is necessary for the sustenance of workers. The question thus remains as to what forces operate to bring the rate of wages, as it is determined in the market, to this minimum. Marx discards Smith's theory which runs in terms of the combination of "masters;" he is anxious to show that even under competitive conditions his theory of wages holds good. Nor would he countenance the Malthusian theory of population as a possible explanation. Where does he turn? This is where the concept of capital as coercive power becomes relevant. Marx shows the correspondence of his theory of wages with the labour theory of value by revealing the essential character to capitalism as a mode of production wherein the capitalist is the agent who takes all economic decisions and wherein labour remains a passive element. The capitalist derives this coercive power simply from the ownership of the means of production. And if even under competitive conditions each capitalist adjusts his investment rate so as to keep wages down to a minimum, it is because by so doing he derives maximum profit.

Marx's price theory is admittedly inadequate. He does not show enough care in his enunciation of the theory of profit; his "price of production" is indeed essentially a value concept. The theory does need emendation. It is indeed in this context that the Sraffa system, of which our author makes so much, becomes relevant. Yet the proposition that there are "two Marxes" and that one repudiates the other is one which few would agree to swallow. No wonder that our author should find himself, as he fears, somewhat isolated.

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A.K. DAS GUPTA

PIERRE JALEE: How Capitalism Works (Trans. by Mary Klopper). Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, 128p., Rs. 22.50.

THIS slim paper-back is probably the shortest available introduction to the Marxian theory of capitalism, up-dated to take into account late 20th century realities, as well as the controversies among Marxists about these realities at that time. The author promises at the outset, in the succint Introduction, that he would present a concise, analytical view of capitalism "which omits nothing essential," which is "accessible to everyone, with no preparation in this field!" The "simple analysis offered," it is also claimed, is unburdened by academic verbiage, more complete than the "dishonest condensation and simplification" sometimes undertaken "on the pretext of writing for beginners." Finally, the author ends his pamphlet with the laconic remark: "Marxism is by its very nature *antidogmatic*," and expresses the hope that by reading his text, the reader would be "better equipped for the struggle against a system that must now be overthrown."

These aims are wholly laudable, and not only Marxists, but non-Marxists, and even anti-Marxists will benefit to some extent, and in different ways, if some of them are fulfilled. There is no doubt that some of them *are* fulfilled. For instance, it is certainly simple, concise, "accessible" to anyone without prior knowledge of the field, provided only that he is interested enough to learn a little, and is *not* distrustful of "analytical" studies which say very little directly about the "facts." It is also commendable in extending the coverage of the "ABC of Marxian political economy" to include such topics as the role of money, interest rates, land rent, and commercial profits which are often unknown to many Marxists, but have been discussed a great deal in recent French writings. It also introduces the reader to some of the basic issues posed by the ideologues of "Eurocommunism," especially in its French and Spanish variants, where the questions have been asked whether under conditions of advanced capitalism in the west, the "proletariat" of the late 19th and early 20th centuries have been reduced to a minority, so that the possibility of achieving "proletarian hegemony" in a revolutionary struggle to overthrow capitalism no longer exists. It also incorporates the work of American Marxists who have re-defined the late 20th century specific features of "monopoly capitalism", and of Marxists throughout the west who have stressed the problem of "alienation" as the major problem of advanced capitalism, and of the "mode of production" under capitalism as a "mode of living."

What is striking about this pamphlet is that in touching on all these problems, the author does *not* cut loose from his moorings in the fundamentals of Marxian theory as a "guide to revolutionary action." In this sense, what we have here is "antidogmatic Marxism" which is up-to-date, but not spurious, or, in Marxian jargon which became widely known in the 1970's, "revisionist" Marxism.

It is a pity, however, that the author did not depart from Marxian orthodoxy more than he has done, to clear up some logical problems of Marxian political economy, which should now be done, and *can* be done, even at the level of a first introduction to Marxian analysis of capitalism. For instance, he adheres to the proposition that "labour is the only source of value," (p. 19), which Marx recognised as a proposition which it is impossible to prove, and ultimately denounced as a "bourgeois idea" to justify capitalist exploitation. He also ignores Marx's insistence that it is impossible to "get rid of constant capital" when calculating "necessary labour" embodied in commodities. (This makes him commit an error in a numerical example presented on pages 26 and 27). He also clings too much to Marx's analysis of "the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall" as the fundamental "self-contradiction" of capitalist development, to which every other contradiction is related. This too, is logically untenable, on Marx's own assumptions, and is an article of faith only in a particular, spurious version of Marxian theory which reduces it to a theory of "economic determinism." These examples—and there are others, especially his discussion of the problem of the relationship between the "infrastructure and the superstructure" of any society—show that the author has not been able to keep his promise either to be "antidogmatic," or to avoid "dishonest simplification" entirely. The reason may be his lack of specialised training in economics and his lack of interest in such less widely read Marxist texts as the *Theories of Surplus Value and Capital,* Volume III, *Wage, Labour and Capital* and *Critique of the Gotha Programme.* If he had paid attention to these, he may have produced an even better concise introduction to Marxian theory which is also up-to-date, and is "antidogmatic" without being "revisionist."

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K.L. SETH: Foreign Capital and Debt Servicing. Varma Brothers, New Delhi, 1979, iv, 108p., Rs. 30.

FOREIGN Capital and Debt Servicing discusses the problems of servicing of debts in developing economies which invariably use foreign capital either in the form of government-to-government loans or in the straightforward form of foreign private capital for achieving accelerated growth rates. The discussion begins with what constitutes the absorptive capacity of a developing economy. Absorptive capacity is a rather loose concept in economics which eludes precise definition. And yet an estimate of the absorptive capacity in every developing economy is essential in order to find out the quantum of foreign capital investment required for a pre-determined rate of economic growth. It is necessary to determine the level of foreign investment available. Should the foreign investment available be greater than required, it would lead to creation of spare capacity which may remain unutilised. In case the foreign capital available is less than required, it will obstruct the implementation of planned economic development. Thus both the excess and shortage of foreign capital can create problems for a developing economy.

The issue which figures prominently in the study is the impact on the economy of a developing country created by debt servicing. Debt servicing is understood both in the sense of payment of interest on foreign loans and the repayment of principal through amortisation. The author correctly observes that debt servicing implies a continuous "drain" on the economy. It is essential therefore, that marginal returns on foreign capital should at least be equal to the cost of foreign capital in terms of debt servicing. Again, one could not agree more with the author when he says that a constant increase in savings largely determines the capacity to service foreign debts, and that in turn determines the total of foreign capital that a country can absorb. Debt servicing, however, not only requires an increase in savings internally but also an export surplus in the balance of payments. Without an export surplus in the balance of payments, debts cannot be serviced properly.

The important question is: How does one determine the debt servicing capacity (which is the same thing as credit-worthiness) of a country? The most important test of the debt servicing capacity of a country is whether capital inflow has enabled a country to maintain a steady rate of growth.

Connected with the capacity of a country to service foreign debts is the question of terms of foreign loans. Judging by the number of instances which one comes across in respect of rescheduling of loans by developing countries, the terms of loans are beyond the capacity of most of these countries. All international institutions including UNCTAD, therefore, have recommended some softening of the terms of loans to developing countries. The least that can be done is to fix the terms of loans in keeping with the debt servicing capacity of a country.

Rising debt servicing obligations do result in an unfavourable balance of payments normally. The only viable remedy for correction of balance of payments, according to the author, lies in import substitution and export promotion. One could not agree more. However, both import substitution and export promotion are not as easy as they might appear at first sight. Both import substitution and export promotion policies are subjected to pressures and cross pressures in the process of implementation.

The final chapter of the book discusses the termination date for receipt of foreign capital. The author takes a look at the ways and means by which dependence on foreign aid can be ended within the foreseeable future.

It is a good study. The best comment on the study, however, has been made by the author himself. "At best, the present monograph can claim to be an orderly compilation of the various views regarding debt servicing."

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INDIA

General

S.L.N. SIMHA and JANAKI G. KRISHNAN: The Saga of Silver. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1980, xiv, 208p., Rs. 40.

INDIA has not been fortunate in the management of its precious metals. Although its own production of silver is negligible, it has vast quantities of this metal and is able to influence and even lead the international market. In the absence of a clearly formulated policy, however, we have not been able to derive as much advantage as might have been expected, of our virtually unique position as a supplier, controlling the release or outflow of vast hoards. Even the awareness of the facts of history, or of the importance of silver considered merely as a commodity at present, is lacking. This book aims at filling this gap. It is a well-documented history. The claim in the Preface that no other publication provides as much data on silver for as long a period seems to be justified.

The historical survey takes up the greater part of the book and reproduces several tables regarding trends in gold and silver prices, production, imports and exports and government's purchases and sales in the United States and India. The effort in assembling these facts is laudable, but the dry official and statistical records could have been enlivened and made more interesting, perhaps, if tit-bits of other information had also been provided.

Silver has had several ups and downs, has aroused intense passions and has been the object of speculative trading, not as bizarre in real life as in Paul Erdman's recent work of popular fiction, but volatile enough to create many problems for individuals and governments. Before it was eased out as a monetary metal, with Germany taking the lead in 1871 to opt out of bimetallism, silver prices were extraordinarily stable for about 150 years in relation to the price of gold (one need not go back further, as neither world trade nor mining for the previous metals had been developed in the earlier years). Because of this stability in prices, silver coins were widely used. The Roman silver *denarius* and many other coins which could be exchanged for their bullion value used to be in universal demand. Later, the silver *thaler*, originally minted by Count Stephen Schlik, owner of the silver rush mines in Bohemia became the prototype for the dollar, leading to the minting of a number of other coins, including the Maria Theresa dollar which was prized as a collector's item all over the world and the United States' dollar itself. The silver rupee and the Spanish and Mexican dollars were in circulation in the greater part of Asia and the Far East.

As an article in daily use silver was also dirt cheap in India. This is illustrated by two instances. In his classic history of the rise, progress and condition of banking in India, written in 1863, C.N. Cooke has referred to the silver trappings of an elephant, with chains sufficiently thick and large to serve as the ground tackle for a vessel of twenty five tons. In his lectures on the Indian currency system, Jehangir Coyajee has referred to a tradition which was current in Western India to the effect that during the American Civil War boom, our import surplus was used for getting the wheel tyres of carriages made in silver and the aminals drawing them also shod in silver.

As for the passions, William Jennings Bryan made free silver, by which was meant the unrestricted minting of silver coins, a national issue; and in a phrase, which he made memorable by his oratory, he opposed the crucifixion of mankind on a cross of gold, long before Keynes.

Speculation in recent times—the Hunt family in the United States becoming so deeply involved that the banks have had to bale them out in the public interest, has almost matched the fantastic description in Paul Erdman's best-selling novel—*Silver Bears*. But even in the past speculation was never altogether absent. The consequences affected governments relatively more than families and individuals, as governments were handling silver every day, while those in the private sector, who were holding on to their stocks in the forms of articles for daily use, were less worried about temporary changes which did not affect them immediately.

Among the governments, which were exposed to the consequences of speculation by private traders, the pre-independence and pre-war Government of India fared very badly. In retrospect, it is amazing that while European countries were abandoning silver for gold, and West Germany in particular, was dumping silver stocks released from coinage, the then Government of India expected the fall in silver prices to be arrested. It waited in vain for the major western countries to take effective decisions at international conferences, in preference to adopting other alternatives. Before the Indian mints were ultimately closed to the coinage of silver, speculative inflows of silver into India, for being tendered to the Indian mints for coinage, had been taking place for some time. The helplessness of the Government of India in a situation which they could not control was in sharp contrast to the alertness of the private traders. A few days before the closure of the Indian mints in 1893, the British Government declined to publish the findings of the Herschell Committee's Report in the House of Commons, before the Viceroy had received it, but a summary of it had been obtained and had appeared in the *Frankfurter Zietung* earlier. Following the closure of the mints in India, a question arose about the coinage of silver in transit, which had already been shipped to India. One of the leading British firms then seems to have had some influence in determining the seigniorage to be levied by the Government of India for this purpose.

It is surprising but true that India suffered, both when silver prices were falling in the seventies and eighties of the last century and the rupee cost of the home charges rose steadily as a result leading to a severe dose of retrenchment and when silver prices rose steeply during the First World War and the Government of India was unable to procure silver in adequate quantities for coinage in India. The Government of India was driven to the necessity of requesting the British Royal Mint to mint gold sovereigns at Bombay, and also to produce gold mohurs at the Bombay mint in 1918, as an alternative to the coinage of silver, as silver was just not available.

During World War II, India had a different experience. It obtained 226 million ounces of silver on a lend/lease basis from the United States. After partition, India's share of this liability was fixed at 172.5 million ounces. Not all of this was used. When it was necessary to return India's share of 172.5 million ounces, the silver refinery, which had been established at Calcutta to recover silver from the quaternary coinage for this purpose, was not ready. The bulk of the liability to the United States was therefore discharged by tendering quaternary coins containing silver.

These are sobering facts, which indicate the difficulties of dealing with precious metals and particularly with silver. In recent years, in the context of a steady increase in silver prices, the Government of India's policy in regard to the export of silver has not been quite clear. As our stocks are non-replenishable, as silver prices are soaring and as the world outlook is that there may be a permanent and widening excess of demand over supply, it is in our interest to conserve our silver stocks, and to export them later at increased prices rather than now at necessarily lower prices. This will, of course, mean that there will be a greater increase immediately in world silver prices, as we will be feeding the market with greatly reduced supplies. Because of this greater increase in world prices, smuggling would become even more profitable.

The problem is complicated, but the basic issue which arises is how far, when, and in what stages our silver hoards, which are a national asset, should be allowed to be depleted by exports. A long-term view will have to be taken; and a policy or policies based on a correct assessment of trends in the international market from time to time will have to be formulated.

This book contains some suggestions in the context of these recent developments. It is proposed that a Gold and Silver Board should be established. The Government of India should try to stabilise the price of silver through this Board, making purchases of about 15 million ounces per annum for additions to its silver stocks. The Board is expected to set up more refineries and to provide in a more orderly manner for the requirements of the electronic industry and other industries using photographic films. It may also arrange for the recovery of silver which is now lost in industrial processes, check outward smuggling and conserve our stocks in other ways, if possible. Exports of silver from India, whether of bullion or of articles made from silver, should, it is proposed be permitted in future, within the framework of a policy to be formulated by the government on the recommendations of the Board. Futures trading in silver in the international markets, it is suggested, should also be undertaken by the Board as a part of its trading activities. The entire profits as a result of the Board's operations will accrue to the government. It is envisaged that ultimately some ceilings may be imposed on private holdings of silver, if prices continue to rise and the conservation and more orderly use of silver becomes in consequence even more important than it is at present.

Not all the policy recommendations which have been made in this book are likely to be accepted. The Gold Board, which was constituted immediately after the introduction of gold control in India, was not able to achieve anything useful; and there is no reason to think that another body, if it is established at present, will be successful. As regards purchases for building up the official stocks, it is extremely unlikely that the quantities which are envisaged will be available or that Government will be prepared to spend the money, which will be necessary for this purpose.

Although one may disagree with some of the recommendations in this book, the value of this survey cannot be denied. The Institute of Financial Management and Research deserves to be congratulated for drawing the attention of the public to the problems of silver and for providing a handy book in which a great deal of relevant information has been collected.

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History of Modern India

B.R. NANDA, *Ed.*: Essays in Modern Indian History. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1980, ix, 252p., Rs. 70/-

ESSAYS in Modern Indian History covers various facets of the Indian national movement, such as the rise and growth of the early Congress, the concept and ideology of the Salt Satyagraha, and the Princes' response to the Congress movement and the economic background to the growth of communal antagonism. The papers, based on lectures delivered at the Nehru Memorial Library, provide a "valuable discussion on different approaches to the understanding of historical processes in India."

The volume includes two historiographical essays. A.K. Majumdar's bibliographical survey of the literature on the transfer of power is descriptive rather than analytical. There is no attempt to identify the dominant interpretations, the context in which these emerged, and the assumptions on which they proceed to explain the events leading to the transfer of power.

Rajat Ray, however, contributes a fairly comprehensive paper on the three interpretations of Indian nationalism. Though tentative in his criticism of certain lines of approach and somewhat ambivalent on some of the issues he has discussed, he provides interesting clues to the "more sharply-defined sets of analyses" amongst the writings on Indian nationalism.

Rajat Ray examines the three interpretations—Marxian, neo-traditionalist and predominantly political—and argues that their differences relate mainly to an identification of the "innermost springs of the major political changes," the territorial units in which the changes need to be investigated, and the groups whose participation shaped the political processes of changes. His conclusion that, "at one level the Marxian method might seem appropriate, at another, the neo-traditional and political approaches might throw light," is a rather "safe" conclusion and is unlikely to go down well with serious students of Indian nationalism. A cut-and-dried explanation may not always be desirable, but a preference for a certain approach is crucial for the understanding and appreciation of a historical process.

S.R. Mehrotra, whose detailed study of the emergence of the Congress (published in 1971) does not figure in Rajat Ray's analysis, provides no fresh insights into the ideals, objectives and organisation of the Congress. His view of the unilinear progress of nationalism and of the monolithic character of the Congress is hardly tenable. So is the use of "moderate" and "extremist" as explanatory categories. Judith S. Walsh's study of Surendranath Benerjea reveals the inadequacy of such categories.

The three essays on the Dandi March, the Princes' response to the deliberations of the Round Table Conference, and on the tribal "sub-movements" illuminate the various facets of the national movement. Based on a wide range of original sources, they considerably advance our knowledge of the role of certain groups who, according to most traditional accounts, were of peripheral importance to the study of India's freedom struggle. K.S. Singh, in particular, does well to reveal that the tribal involvement in regional politics from 1920 to 1947 was deeper than is generally known, and was also more diverse because it centred round specific issues concerning land and forests.

P.C. Joshi and Aparna Basu make serious contributions to the debate on the communal problem. The main thrust of Joshi's argument is that Hindu-Muslim antagonism can be explained in terms of the fact "that for the major part of British rule and in the key areas of the Indian sub-continent the Muslim upper class steadily *lost ground* to the Hindus." Using Gunnar Myrdal's phraseology, Joshi argues that while the Hindus experienced the "backlash" as well as the "spread effects" of the modernization process under British rule, the Muslims were exposed largely to the "backlash" effects of the British impact alone.

Such conclusions are tentatively, hastily formulated and unsupported by existing historical evidence. A complex phenomena like communalism cannot be reduced to the declining fortunes of the Muslim community. Besides, where is the evidence in support of such a formulation? Joshi virtually cites none. Nor does he identify the areas where the Muslim "upper class" was supposedly losing ground to the Hindus. Surely, the Uttar Pradesh Muslims maintained their dominance on land, government service and the professions. This was equally true of the trading communities of western India and the prosperous Muslim landowners of the Punjab, such as the Tiwanas and the Daultanas. So, what requires explanation is the involvement of certain influential and dominant Muslim groups in the communal and sectarian movements and their motivations for doing so.

Joshi points out that "the demand for a separate homeland seemed to give an outlet to the anxieties, fears, uncertainties and aspirations of large sections of Muslims who identified 'Hindu' domination as the greatest impediment to progress." Again, the implicit assumption that the anxieties and fears concerned primarily the material interests of the community is not quite tenable. The ideology of Muslim separatism cannot be simply reduced to a struggle for power, influence and status. Likewise, Joshi's presupposition that the communal ideology was created and fostered by the "upper class" (a somewhat vague category), to protect and promote its interests takes no cognizance of the interplay of various historical forces which heightened communal consiousness among a wide spectrum of the Muslim community and paved the way for the emergence of a powerful separatist movement.

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MUSHIR UL HASAN

ALGERNON RUMBOLD: Watershed in India: 1914-22. Athlone Press, London, 1979, xii, 344p., £ 14.

THE author of the book under review, Sir Algernon Rumbold served in the India Office from 1929 to 1947. He has however, not ceased to look at India from the narrow window of his old office. As he himself says (p. vi): "My knowledge of the period is derived from documents publicly available, but my interpretation of them has been helped by the impressions formed during nearly 19 years in the India Office from 1929 to 1947. . . ." His book deals with the years between 1914 and 1922, which, according to him marked "the watershed of British rule in India, and indeed of the British Empire." (p. v) It examines the effect on British policy of the First World War, the Montagu Declaration of August 1917, the introduction of dyarchy and Gandhi's first non co-operation movement. This book is not really about Indian politics; it is essentially "a study of the management of British policy in India during the First World War and the four following years." (p. v)

Rumbold has thoroughly examined the archival sources in Britain. He writes with great lucidity and objectivity. Unfortunately, he writes more like an administrator than like an historian. He does not seem to realize that even official policy cannot be fully understood merely with the help of official sources.

It is easy to be wise after the event. Rumbold's book abounds in "if onlys" and "might-have-beens." His credo is summed up in the following remark: "Perhaps bolder policies might have reduced the dangers. Reasonable concessions can win middle of the road men; but those made from weakness gain only a pause. When a government reveals that it can be pushed, groups are encouraged to press their ambitions harder. Reluctance to deal with unconstitutional agitation provokes more agitation." (p. 318)

Rumbold also believes that the end of the Raj was not inevitable. He says: "Autocracies are not necessarily doomed to die; although the baton of power may pass, and authority may cloak itself with a curtain. There are still subject peoples, although perhaps under new governors; the satellite states continue to exist; there is no principle of inevitability operating against men ready to rule over others who are willing to be bidden." (p. 321) Here, he argues against the belief of many more knowledgeable and liberal-minded men—both British and non-British, past and present—that the Raj was in a sense an artificial phenomenon which could not last for ever, and that India could not be governed indefinitely by relays of Englishmen from six thousand miles away. Rumbold is not entirely oblivious of the contradictions involved in the governance of an empire by a democracy. But he totally fails to appreciate the strength of nationalism in the modern world. Prominent among the causes which he lists as being responsible for the demise of the Raj are "the acceptance in 1917 of the idea that the Raj might have heirs; the pressures encouraged by the parliamentary system; and the consequent increasing difficulty of the government holding the scales between competing Indian interests." (pp. 321-2) He also does not seem to fully appreciate two other basic facts about the Raj, namely that the British could rule India only as long as India imposed no burden on the British taxpayer, and that the British Government in India was based upon the support and acquiescence of the Indians themselves.

The author is obviously unhappy over the British withdrawal from India and calls it an "abdication." But he is correct in his assessment of its wider historical significance when he remarks: "The British abdication in India, and in particular the statement made in 1917, which came to be interpreted as a decision eventually to abdicate, set the pattern for the dismantlement of the whole British Empire and of the Empires of all western democracies. Without this example, the middle of the twentieth century might not have seen the massive move of dependent peoples to sovereignty." (p. 322)

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S.R. MEHROTRA

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By **Ashok Jambhekar**

(The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences. (Managing Editor)

CHIANG, C.Y. Jesse. *The Good Life* (Bhavan's Book University, 242). Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, 127p., Rs. 12, Paper.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part is a collection of essays on the principles of a good life. The second part, "the vital distinctions" is composed of four essays of double themes—loneliness and solitude; existence and living; intelligence and wisdom; and fun versus joy. The third and last part deals with mystery of life.

D'ABREO, Desmond. *People and Forests: The Forest Bill and a New Forest Policy* (Indian Social Institute Monograph Series, 5). Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1982, 49p., Rs 7.50, Paper.

This monograph is based on the discussions that took place at the Workshop on A New Forest Policy at the Indian Social Institute, April 12-14, 1982. It critically examines the development of the Indian forest policy and legislation, and the proposed Indian Forest Bill, 1980, and suggests a new policy. The appendix section contains a statement of the Workshop and an appeal to the MPs on the Indian Forest Bill, 1980.

DATTA, Aswini Kumar. *Bhaktiyoga* (Bhavan's Book University, 59) tr. from Bengali by Gunada Charan Sen. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bomaby, 1981 xix, 217p., Rs. 20, Paper.

DE SOUZA, Alfred. *The Social Organisation of Aging Among the Urban Poor* (Indian Social Institute Monograph Series). Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1982, 78p., Rs. 20, Paper.

Based on a survey of eight resettlement colonies of Delhi, it provides information on the social and economic situation of the aged among the urban poor, their nutrition and health status and the coping mechanisms they have developed—family kinship, group and neighbourhood ties—to manage psychological stress related to physical and economic dependency status, social isolation and loneliness. It also discusses different implications of old age in Western societies and in India, and for men as compared to women.

DUGGAL, K.S. *Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir* (National Biography Series). National Book Trust, New Delhi, 1982, 95p., Rs. 8, Paper.

Biographical monograph of a former Chief Minister of Punjab, a creative writer in Punjabi. It includes his writings rendered into English, by the author, a former Director of the National Book Trust, India and personal friend of Gianiji.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (*Ed.,*) *The Ten Classical Upanisads* Vol. 1: *Isa and Kena.* Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1981, 312p., Rs. 80.

Under the Bhavan's project to present the critically edited Samskrit texts of the Upanisads with their English translations and appropriate comments, highlighting their relevance to modern times, the editor presents in this volume *Isa* and *Kena* Upanisads. The comments of the editor are followed by the *Bhasyas* of the four Acaryas Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha rendered into English. It also gives a glossary of Upanisadic terms.

GHOSH, S.K. *Protection of Minorities and Scheduled Castes* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 181p., Rs. 50.

Highlights the problems of the minority groups and weaker sections and emphasises the need to explore the various factors which led to the widespread communal, caste and linguistic dissension that erupted into riots in several parts of the country and frequent breakdown of law and order. The author, a retired Inspector General of Police, contends that the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice have a high degree of correlation. He therefore says that every law enforcement officer must convince himself, that, under the law, the government requires non-discrimination in terms of religion, caste, or social standing.

HANUMAPPA, H.G. *Urbanisation Trends in India : Case Study of a Medium Town.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, xiv, 130p., Rs. 40.

Study of socio-economic structure of Hospet, undertaken in response to a request made to the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, by the Municipal Administration of Hospet, for the purpose of planning future development of the town.

HASRAT, Bikrama Jit. *History of Bhutan : Land of the Peaceful Dragon.* Education Department, Thimphu, 1980, xxii, 241p., Illus., Maps.

Presents history of the state from pre-historic times. The author, an eminent historian and an authority on the Himalayan region also discusses developments in government, society, institutions, literature, art and architecture. Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1774; Treaty of Sinchula, 1865; Treaty of Punakha, 1910; Indo-Bhutan Treaty, 1949; Constitution of the Tshogdo of Bhutan—1953 and Third Five Year Plan are given in the Appendix. It also includes a chronology starting from 500 BC-500 AD to 1972.

KAMBLE, N.D. *Atrocities on Scheduled Castes in Post-Independent India (15th August 1947 to 15th August 1979).* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, xvi, 528p., Rs. 150.

Chronology of the nature and extent of the atrocities on scheduled castes and the steps taken by the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary in this behalf. These are presented in five broad categories *viz.*: (a) Source of information and date; (b) Place of atrocity and date; (c) Atrocity; (d) Cause of atrocity and (e) Action taken by the victim, executive and judiciary to remedy it. Information is collected from newspapers, journals and the Report of the Commissioner for SCs and STs.

KAMBLE, N.D. *The Scheduled Castes.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, 264p., Rs. 85.

Traces the historical background of the development and growth of untouchables and untouchability and discusses the socio-economic and political profiles of the scheduled castes in India with reference to their social, economic and political status in the Indian society. Scheduled castes and their area of enumeration is given in the Appendix.

MISHRA, G.P. *Dynamics of Rural Development in Village India.* Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, xii, 89 p., Rs. 45.

The purpose of this study is to examine the social dynamics of rural development in the areas which are experiencing dairy development programmes. It shows how castes and classes figure in the process of rural development in the villages covered under the scheme of dairy development and how the benefits from it flow in favour of the dominant caste in general and the emerging capitalist class in particular who, by and large, come from the large holding group of the dominant caste. The study also highlights the prospects of asset-based income and employment generation for the poor through dairy development in rural areas based on a case study of rural areas in Karnataka. This study is a by-product of the study on "The Impact of Dairy Development in Rural Areas of Karnataka" which was conducted by the author at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore.

RAMACHANDRAN, Arcot. *Energy Research and Development in India—Challenges and Perspectives.* Andhra Pradesh Akademi of Sciences, Hyderabad, 1974, 32p., Paper.

Prof. S. Bhagavantam's Sixtieth Birthday Commemoration Lecture—V, delivered by the Secretary, Department of Science and Technology. Presents the issue of energy problems of India in future years.

SUBRAMANIAM, V. *Aspects of Buddhist Culture Including Veera Kanya Vahini.* Ashish Publishing House New Delhi, 1981, viii, 78p.

Book of dance-dramas in Sanskrit on Buddhist themes. Seeks to glorify Buddha through song and dance.

SUBRAMANIAM, V. (*Ed.*). *The sacred and the Secular in India's Performing Arts: Ananda K. Coomaraswamy Centenary Essays*. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980, xx, 185p., Rs. 100.

This book is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to analysis and criticism of Coomaraswamy's thesis that *art is religion and religion is art*. The editor himself, in three chapters discusses the importance of the secular elements in Indian dance and music from a socio-historical point of view. One chapter is devoted to the history of the devadasis and their contribution. The second part includes essays published in the *Journal of the National Centre for Performing Arts*. These essays illustrate two points: (a) that the practitioners and theoreticians of Hindustani classical music are normally less obsessed or even totally unconcerned with the religious or Bhakti elements, and (b) that how people deeply involved in Bharatanatyam, Kootiyattam and Yakshagana arts bring in the religious element but not with the same obsession as Coomaraswamy does.

SURENDRA KUMAR, (*Ed.*). *India-USSR : Friends in Peace and Progress*. Kalamkar, New Delhi, 1982, viii, 107p., Rs. 25, Paper.

Collection of essays and two speeches made by Shankar Dayal Sharma and T.N. Kaul, at the Round Table organized by the *Soviet Land* magazine. It discusses the international significance of Indo-Soviet relations and friendship.

TALEYARKHAN, Homi J.H. *Splendour of Sikkim*, 2nd ed. Gangtok, 1982, 78p., Illus., Map, Rs. 8, Paper.

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

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